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P R O LO G U E  AND A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
When I first arrived at the EUI, political parties were my main concern. I was 
dazzled by the existence and development of the European Parliament, as well as by the 
ties that related almost every European national party to an international party family. 
Since party coordination appeared to be a significant advantage for furthering regional 
integration, the transnational ‘family vessels' came into sight as a strong asset for the 
building of the European Union.
In contrast, South America did not feature anything alike. Its national parties had 
been shaped under differentiated national environments, and they took pride in 
representing the alleged uniqueness of their respective countries -not the national section 
of any international tendency. European-style party labels only developed in Chile, 
although for some time Venezuela could also be considered as featuring a party system 
structured along the ‘left-right’ continuum. Conversely, in Mercosur -my second area of 
concern— party families were absent altogether. Neither Argentina nor Brazil, even less 
Paraguay and Uruguay, presented a common matrix or significant historical linkages 
among their parties -except for some very loose ties between the main Argentine and 
Uruguayan parties. If integration was to prosper in the Southern Cone -and provided that 
parties were a useful tool thereof—, it would be necessary to build party linkages out of 
nothing. In short, the task would be to establish party families without any family history, 
every effort addressed towards the future. I was fascinated about the possibility of 
studying such a process.
Pretty soon I found out, thanks to Stefano Bartolini and Philippe Schmitter, that 
my topic would probably develop any substance much later than my dissertation deadline. 
As I already was at the EUI, supposedly thought the research center of the world 
foremost integrating region, I decided to keep integration (i.e. Mercosur) in the agenda 
and drop parties. Yet my personal interest for institutions remained, so I moved on to pick 
a topic that was typically Latin American and appeared to be influencing the integration 
process. I do not remember exactly how I came across presidentialism, but I owe a great 
deal to Marcelo Oviedo for having called my attention to how national institutions may 
relate to integration. This research is the outcome of such a new concern.
iii
The dissertation combines two different fields o f scholarly work, namely 
government institutions and regional integration. Since some readers might not be familiar 
with both, a few chapters briefly introduce concepts and debates just to subsequently build 
my argument upon them. I am also aware that the subject matters I dealt with here are 
controversial. On the one hand, in claiming that presidentialism had a positive impact on 
integration I may displease those who see parliamentarism as an always better 
arrangement. On the other hand, in explaining how integration succeeded despite the lack 
of regional institutions I might annoy those who assert the indispensability o f such 
• institutions. Ironically, I do believe in the convenience of creating supranational 
institutions; it was the mismatch between what I thought and what I was seeing what fed 
my desire for a better understanding.
Many people helped me to carry out this research. Apart from Stefano Bartolini 
and Philippe Schmitter themselves, without whose support and insights this dissertation 
would hardly exist, I am particularly grateful to Félix Peña for sharing his knowledge and 
experience, and to Nélida Archenti, Marisa Von Bulow and Daniel Chasquetti for the 
research support they gave me in Buenos Aires, Brasilia and Montevideo respectively. 
Furthermore, I want to express my appreciation to the Language Center, paramount 
institution of the EUI and indispensable resource for obtuse non-polyglot freaks. I lay 
particular emphasis on the efforts done by Cecilia Picchi, Nicki Hargreaves, Maria Pinto 
and Nicky Owtram.
A pool o f  compassionate institutions and people secured my subsistence. I am 
indebted to the European University Institute, the Ministerio de Cultura y Educación de 
la República Argentina, the Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA), the Universidad 
Nacional del Centro de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (UNiCen), Buenos Aires legislators 
Mario Lázaro and José Eseverri, and former Argentine Secretary of Justice, Melchor 
Cruchaga.
I also wish to thank Helena Carreñas, Julián Messina, Yael and Mariano Aguas, 
and the usual suspects for a too-long-to-call number of reasons they all know fairly well. 
Last but not least, I thank Pedro for rushing me to finish the thesis instead of changing his 
diapers.
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A B STR A C T
Regional integration has become a need for national states to face the challenges 
of globalization. However, the ongoing integration processes are not alike, and neither are 
their outcomes. This research outlines the political differences concerning a few of them, 
particularly the two blocs that have reached the customs union stage: the European Union 
and Mercosur. Whereas the former features a pattern of increasing institutionalization at a 
regional, often supranational level, the latter does not progress along the same path but 
through intergovernmental mechanisms, in a more politicized -as opposed to 
institutionalized—  shape.
This research tackles two main puzzles. The first is the success of Mercosur in a 
region where previous attempts at integration had systematically failed. The second is the 
unexpected characteristics o f Mercosur operation, which challenge both established 
theories and the archetypal model of the European Union. The main hypothesis suggests 
that Mercosur success-without-regional-institutions can be partially explained by the 
domestic institutional settings o f its member countries. Executive format is thus addressed 
in order to appraise whether presidential democracies have been able to back up an 
integration process in a previously unsuspected way. Through the empirical analysis of 
seven regional processes that took place between 1985 and 2000, this research looks into 
the extent to which national instead of regional institutions provided for decision-making, 
dispute settlement and rule enforcement. The conclusion arrived at is that, in the absence 
of regional institutions, a specific combination of national institutions with presidential 
diplomacy has supplied effective bases for regional integration.
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C H A P T E R  1
T H E  P U ZZL E  O F  M E R C O S U R
Introduction
In December 2001, the Argentine economy collapsed. The combination of 
complex economic difficulties with unable political management ended up in the largest 
debt default and the greatest economic depression of any country in times of peace. It 
may take years for Argentina to recover, and so it might for the regional bloc it 
integrates: Mercosur. But such a failure cannot hide the fact that, just until a few years 
earlier, Mercosur had turned out to be the most successful attempt at regional integration 
in the history of Latin America. This research aims to explain Mercosur’s unexpected 
success from a comparative perspective.
** *
The consolidation of European unity since the signing of the Single European Act 
and the Treaty of Maastricht, between 1985 and 1992, illustrates the strategy most states 
choose to deal with new challenges. As economic growth and trade soars unevenly and 
complex interdependence increases, nation-states feel the need for policy coordination as 
ever before. The end of the Cold War has witnessed the re-emergence o f regional 
integration “as a conscious policy o f states or sub-state regions to coordinate activities 
and arrangements in a greater region” (Wyatt-Walter 1995: 77, original emphasis; cf. 
also Grugel and Hout 1999b).
In addition to the European Union, among the largest regional blocs line up the 
North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), and the Common Market of the South (Mercosur or Mercosul). All 
of these initially aimed at becoming free trade zones -sometimes, this was the utmost 
aspiration— , in order to increase both intra-regional trade and investment flows and the 
competitive position of the member countries in the global marketplace. Building on 
these common goals, some of the new regions have attempted to go further, Mercosur 
being the most ambitious in this respect. Table 1 presents some of Mercosur basic figures 
in comparative perspective.
Mercosur was formally created in 1991, when previous agreements between 
Argentina and Brazil were expanded and Paraguay and Uruguay joined in the venture. 
Later on, Bolivia and Chile were accepted as associate members, and other South
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American countries expressed their wish to apply. One decade after its foundation, 
Mercosur had reached the customs union stage, albeit imperfect, and was sketching the 
blueprint for enlargement to the rest of the sub-continent while furthering the scope and 
level of the current stage (Grugel and Almeida Medeiros 1999; Peña 1999b; Roett 
1999b). Simultaneously, hemisphere-wide meetings were being held with a view to 
establishing of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA or ALCA) from Alaska to 
Tierra del Fuego,1 and like-minded negotiations were taking place with the European 
Union (Grabendorff 1999; Lafer and Fonseca Jr. 1999; Peña 1999a; Roett 1999a). As a 
telling indicator of Mercosur ambitious objectives, an increasing number of informal talks 
concerning monetary unification have taken place since 1998. Shortly thereafter, the 
Brazilian currency crisis of 1999 triggered a heated discussion on the need to take a jump 
forward instead of delaying or receding the process.
I ^ P ^ I i M e r c o s ü r l n  c o m p a ra tiv e  p e rsp e c tiv e T ’ i
; V -  : :
Area 
(thousand 
sq. km)
Population
(millions
1996)
GNP ($ 
billions 
1996)
GNP per 
capita ($ 
1996)
Exports 
$ 1995
Exports
%
Imports 
$ 1995
Imports
%
Argentina 2,737 ■............ 35 295 8,380 20.4 0.4 18,4 ........0,4
Brazil 8,457 161 710 4,400 46.6 0.9 49.5 1.0
Paraguay 397 5 9 1,850 1.2 0.0 5.2 0.1
Uruguay 175 3 18 5,760 2.1 0.0 2.9 0.1
Mercosur 11,766 204 1,032 5,060 70.3 1.4 75.9 1.5
Bolivia 1,084 8 6 830 1.2 0.0 1.4 0.0
Chile 749 14 70 4,860 16.5 0.3 15.3 0.3
Latin America 
& Caribbean
20,064 486 1,804 3,710 221.7 4.5 233.4 4.6
ASEAN 4,347 489 684 4,111 318.6 6.4 362.1 7.1
EU 3,136 372 8,827 23,363 1,959.2 38.5 1,901.5 37.2
NAFTA 20,289 388 8,345 21,508 852.5 17.2 1,006.7 19.7
Source: own elaboration, from data of World 1Sank report (1997 and 1998), and IRELA (1997).
Aggregated figures have been calculated using the available data.
According to most of the literature concerning regionalization, mainly based on 
the European case, the goal o f creating a common market and especially an economic 
union implies, sooner or later, the setting up of regional institutions. Such institutions are
1 Two summits of chief executives from the Americas have already taken place, the first one in 1994 in 
Miami and the second in 1998 in Santiago de Chile (Roett 1999c).
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supposed to deal with two main dilemmas of collective action, i.e. decision-making and 
dispute-resolution. To date, however, Mercosur has not built any significant institutional 
structure. Its decisions are instead taken through purely intergovernmental mechanisms, 
requiring unanimity in every case. The only decision-making organization consists of 
three regional bodies made up of either national officials o f the member states or 
nationally appointed technicians with low-level responsibilities. Two advisory forums, 
several working commissions, and a minimum administrative Secretariat located in 
Montevideo complete the picture.
A great deal of political and technical debate has been fostered with regard to the 
need to establish supranational institutions. Government officials, professional 
associations -especially lawyers’ ones— , academics, businesspeople, and a myriad of 
other groups have postulated the need of supranational institution-building, strongly 
focusing on the creation of a Court of Justice of Mercosur (Calceglia 1997 and 1998; 
Oviedo 1998) or a likewise mechanism to settle on controversies (Mattli 1999).2 Some 
have even argued that Mercosur development would follow the European model, but 
neither the former claims nor the latter expectations have come true (Cavarozzi 1998). 
Nonetheless, progress in many integration indicators -such as commercial 
interdependence, investment flows, and business strategies—  was evident to observers, 
what puzzled analysts and practitioners alike.
This research attempts to explain the mismatch between the ambitious aims 
proclaimed by Mercosur -whether through official documents or public declarations— 
and the scarce development o f its regional institutions, which goes against both previous 
experiences and established theories. Therefore, it will address not only the ambitions but 
also the actual performance of Mercosur in relation to, on the one hand, the previous 
failure of integration attempts in Latin America, and on the other, the success of the 
highly institutionalized European model.
I advance a main hypothesis in order to account for this novelty, namely 
successful integration without significant regional institutions. It posits that Mercosur has 
not grown out o f an institutional limbo, but was upheld by other kind o f institutions that
2 In Argentina, for example, the Alianza (ruling coalition between 1999 and 2001) issued public 
declarations favoring institutionalization even when in the opposition (Clarin 09-03-1999). On the 
contrary, the previous administration (1989-1999) had maintained that no stronger institutionalization 
was needed for the time being (Andrés Cisneros and Jorge Campbell, “El Mercosur no necesita de la 
burocracia para crecer”, Clarin 18-05-1999).
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are less visible than regional ones. In short, I make the point that the coexistence of 
progress in integration with a minimum set of regional institutions has been possible due 
to the local shape of one national institution, specifically executive format. This research 
is designed to test the extent to which the interaction of a particular type of executive 
format, i.e. presidentialism, has managed to operate as functional equivalent to regional 
institutions.
Mercosur in a world of regions
In the 1960s a thrust towards regional integration encompassed almost all the 
geographical areas over the planet. The decolonization process in the context of the Cold 
War fostered a series of attempts at cooperation among close states, in an era of 
nationalist restoration and protectionist economies. Some years later, despite such a 
general trend, most efforts at regional integration had failed and their demise seemed 
permanent.
In the 1980s, a revival of the integration enterprise flourished everywhere. It was 
different from the earlier wave in that the so-called ‘new regionalism’ was generally 
conceived of as open, thus not aiming at closing the region in a defensive way but at 
improving national competitiveness in an advancing free-trade environment. Therefore, 
the concept and fears of a world divided into several ‘fortresses’ became obsolete, and 
new regionalism began to be thought of as a main feature o f the wider globalization 
process. As for other features of this phenomenon, some authors noted, “an important 
characteristic of the new regionalism is the very wide variation in the level of 
institutionalization, with many regional groupings consciously avoiding the institutional 
and bureaucratic structures of traditional international organizations and of the 
regionalist model represented by the EC” (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995: 3).
Regionalization can be seen as an attempt to rebuild the pervaded national 
boundaries at a higher level. Viewed in this light, it can be interpreted as a protective 
maneuver by those nation states that cannot by themselves guarantee either their own 
interests or goals. This brings to mind the contractualist approach to the genesis o f both 
society and state. Following parallel lines of thought, some argued that regions would 
become new states in the same way as federations and confederations were formed by 
their member units. Others supported an approach to regions as intergovernmental 
associations, therefore weaker than, and dependent on their member states. Still others
Andrés Malamud - European University Institute 5
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have argued that regions are likely to develop along a path different from any historical 
experiences; rather, they will constitute new political entities to which no national feature 
can be transposed without altering its very nature (Abromeit 1998; Bartolini 1998; 
Schmitter 2000).
Given that there are few clues highlighting the general developments of the 
regions, the research strategy followed here stems from a comparative analysis, taking 
the most advanced event of regional integration as a leading case. The European Union 
will henceforth act as a referential frame, allowing us to assess whether Mercosur’s 
characteristics and prospects are common or peculiar traits.
So far, both the concepts ‘Europe’ and ‘political integration’ are closely linked. 
As Haas and Schmitter put it, “most of the important European works lack a broad 
comparative basis; they dedicate themselves to theorizing about integration in one o f the 
regions of the international system, vis., Western Europe; and the absence of cases 
comparable to supranational integration in the EC has led neo-functionalism to establish 
its list of conditions through a comparative analysis o f organizations of cooperation- 
integration that vary strongly in terms of types of integration, institutions, final 
objectives, geographical contexts, socio-cultural conditions, and economic as well as 
political factors” (Haas and Schmitter 1964, as cited in Michelmann and Soldatos 1994: 
6). Further political developments and corresponding research will shed more light on 
whether the region is becoming a new political entity different from the nation state from 
which it emerges, thus definitively changing the nature o f both international and national 
politics (Schmitter 2000). Alternatively, if Bacon was right and “all novelty is but 
oblivion” (Bartolini 1998), it might not be a new phenomenon but a larger expression of 
local politics. It is therefore crucial to isolate some variables in the first place, as this may 
afterwards allow us to appraise if supranationalism is to become a homogeneous political 
phenomenon or, instead, if each region will be unique with characteristics that depend 
only on its particular components. These issues must be dealt with cross-regionally in 
order to control their influence upon the ongoing processes effectively.
For the purposes o f  this research, the main issue is that all Mercosur member 
states are presidentialist. Hence, the present approach takes the democratic type of 
member states as an independent variable of the regional construction. It consequently 
seeks to explain some of the differences concerning supranational institution-building, the 
development of a regional bureaucracy, the legitimacy of the integration, and the
Andrés MaJamud - European University Institute 6
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decision-making process vis-à-vis the EU as a partial function of the executive format.3 
In the Table 1.2 the differences featured by the EU and Mercosur regarding institutions 
in both regional and national levels can be seen.
j': ' *" ‘ '■ ' ■ " TSblS 1*2 : v , ■■■';■
i  -, ;STTie European Union and Mercosur: comparative political features
Level Dimensions European Union M ercosur
Integration stage Economic Union (in process) Political 
Union (partially)
Customs Union (imperfect)
Institutional Mixed intergovernmental and 
* structure supranational
Intergovernmental
Decision-making Complex mechanism (unanimity and 
qualified majority voting, co-decision 
procedures)
Unanimity rule (national 
representatives)
Regional Extended, authoritative, sometimes 
bureaucracy strong
Negligible
Conflict-resolution Judicial (European Court of Justice and 
Regional national courts)
Diplomatic (with ad-hoc 
arbitrage as last recourse)
Norm internalization Direct effect National internalization required
Norm hierarchy Supremacy of Community Law No supremacy of regional norms
Common policies Binding, sectoral, deeply developed in 
some areas
None
Election of regional 2nd (national executives) or 3rd level 
decision-makers election (European Commission)
1SI level election (national 
executives) or their subordinates
Executive format Parliamentary: all 15 cases (albeit 
Finland and France mixed)
Presidentialist: all 4 cases (plus 
the 2 associates)
Executive Before the national assembly 
accountability (Parliament)
Before the citizenry
Cabinet autonomy Wide-ranging 
National vs. chief executive
None
Assembly role Intervention (except direct effect and 
European-law supremacy)
Ratification (except executive 
protocols)
Referendum required In some national cases No
Resistance to further Moderate, uneven across countries 
integration
Minimum, unarticulated
The theoretical orientation here proposed is encouraged by previous analyses, 
dated between the launching of the democratization processes in the mid-1980s and the
3 Very much as Haas put it as early as 1967, “we are on the search for features in Latin America which 
can perform for regional integration the functions carried out in Europe by effective national
Andrés Malamud - European University Institute 7
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creation of Mercosur in 1991. For instance, Schmitter analyzes the newly inaugurated 
democracies and infers that “the future of international interdependence, cooperation, 
and integration in Latin America, and even more specifically, in its Southern Cone may 
depend less on heterogeneity between its regime type and more on diversity among its 
democracies” (1991: 121, original emphasis). Even when he was alluding to social and 
not to institutional types, namely “class” and “populist” democracies, I contend that the 
type of democracy remains significant as an independent variable for integration. 
Therefore, this research focuses on the relation between the domestic features of 
individual countries and the operation o f regional blocs.
Presiderttialism as independent variable
This thesis deals with phenomena that are entangled with integration processes,
whether as cause or consequence: political institutions. Henceforth, it will focus on these 
to explain the development and achievements of Mercosur. In what theoretical 
assumptions regard, the departure point is that institutions do matter; the goal of the 
present research is to explain how they do so, in an integration process that has taken 
place in a region where institutions have been traditionally weak and unstable.
Institutions are viewed as significant for political processes by most western 
political science literature. They are conceived o f as either structures of incentives or 
constraints to individual and collective action, as patterned behavior, or as crystallized 
values. For the purposes o f this research, however, their uppermost feature is the impact 
they make upon decision-making procedures. Following Rockman (1993: 62), 
“institutional structures are important for the decisional characteristics that may 
accompany them (e.g. multiplication of veto points).”
Despite the increasing attention paid to institutions in general contexts, especially 
in developed countries, the case made here attributes to them more particular tasks. 
Notably, respect for institutions and their enforcement cannot be taken as a given in all 
the Mercosur countries. On the contrary, a long history of democratic instability and 
economic disarray does not give rise to a favorable picture for institutionalized 
proceedings. The fact that nowadays a successful political construction is likely to be 
explained through institutional performance adds to our case: there seems to exist a
bureaucracies, pragmatic interests groups, parliamentary government and a supranational technocracy” 
(Haas 1967: 316).
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direct co-variation between newly institutionalized features and positive outcomes. In 
short, the stability of the region’s political regimes appears to be a novelty that may well 
bring about other novel consequences, which may in turn transcend the national borders.
Political regimes have been widely studied through history. From the early works 
of Plato and Aristotle up to the contemporary analyses by Linz, Sartori and Lijphart, 
passing through classics like Machiavelli, Montesquieu and the Federalist authors, many 
typologies have been proposed, dismissed and enhanced. Even the change of regime, 
especially from authoritarian rule to democratic government over the last decades, has 
been the object of detailed studies and academic classification. Whilst the classical 
historical questions have tended to be whether rulers are a minor or a major part of the 
people, or whether they rule according to any pre-established criteria or at their personal 
will, nowadays the focus has become narrower.
As democratic regimes have spread all over the world, what increasingly matters 
is no longer if a polity exhibits an elected government or a dictatorial one, but what kind 
of process it applies to elect -and control— those who rule democratically. In Latin 
America, one of the regions where the third wave of democratization impacted the most, 
a great deal of research has been carried out, focusing on the transition and consolidation 
processes, and taking into account the many paths, facilitating conditions, and constraints 
for the lasting of the new regimes (Morlino 1980; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 
1986; S. Valenzuela 1990).
While these transitions have been taking place, some authors have begun to stress 
the different outcomes that institutional design can bring about in terms of democratic 
stability and govemability. A common point they generally support is that the 
constitutional provisions for the nomination of chief executive officers are significant 
regarding efficacy, representativeness, flexibility and rapid response in case of crisis (Linz 
1990a; Linz and Valenzuela 1989 and 1994; Mainwaring 1990b, 1992 and 1993; 
Mainwaring and Shugart 1993; Shugart and Carey 1992). Whether they were in favor of 
or against the prevailing arrangement in all Latin America, i.e. presidentialism, they agree 
upon the systemic consequences of the institutional design and have produced several 
research works, which have greatly benefited the state of the knowledge on the field.
However, there is still a considerable lack of information regarding other 
consequences of the institutional design -especially executive format—  in the new 
democracies. Some recent studies aim to fill this gap: for instance, Deheza’s thesis on
Andrés Malamud - European University Institute 9
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coalitions in presidential regimes (1997) and Zelaznik’s dissertation on party systems in a 
presidential context (1997), as well as their followers. Regardless of these efforts, all 
concerned with the national political system, little - i f  anything—  has been written about 
the effects of presidentialism upon integration processes (Malamud 2000a, 2000b).
This research claims that interpresidentialism may be the reason behind the 
success or failure of an integration process. Such insight was originally based on 
empirical observations regarding the role played by the national presidents in the process 
pursued by Mercosur, and was later widened by the understanding that presidents do not 
act as mere individuals in an institutional vacuum but are backed -and constrained— by a 
specific institutional format. For this matter, it is necessary to take into account the 
historical-cultural peculiarities of Latin American presidentialism as the archetypical 
American case presents significant differences, as also do the so-called hybrid or mixed 
types. Basically, the difference is that Latin American presidentialism accentuates the 
concentration of power, whereas American type separates it. In brief, the hypothesis 
could be stated as follows:
‘Mercosur presidents, acting within an institutional framework that 
concentrates executive power in accordance with historical legacies and 
political practices, have proved to be well equipped to back integration in a 
context of scarce regional institutionalization’.
Two examples of the impact that ‘concentrationist’ presidents may have for 
integration can be drawn from outside the region under study. In the first place, the 
influence o f De Gaulle over European integration in the 1960s is undeniable4 (Moravcsik 
1998); and it is no coincidence that France was the only presidential-like state in the 
European Community at that moment. This is not to say that De Gaulle’s intervention 
was beneficial for integration -certainly, it was not for supranational 
institutionalization— ; the case I want to make is that his being a president permitted him 
to intervene in a stronger way than any other European chief executive would have 
found possible. In the second case, last year’s attempt by Clinton to obtain the so-called 
“Fast Track”5 from Congress manifests his perception that an empowered chief executive
4 De Gaulle strongly promoted an intergovernmental “Europe des patries” -as opposed to both 
supranational governance and governance “of the parties”.
5 The Fast Track is a congressional act that allows the president to negotiate foreign agreements without 
their being revised by the Congress but as a whole. Otherwise, the possibility of partial congressional
Andrés Malamud - European University Institute i  q
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is more able to advance integration policies. On the other hand, his failure to obtain this 
also reveals that American presidents are not powerful enough to accomplish such tasks 
without congressional authorization.
The Southern Cone democracies have built a different pattern o f relations 
between presidents and integration. This process began formally in 1985 triggered by the 
Alfonsin-Samey rapprochement, continued in 1991 during Menem’s and Collor’s 
tenures, and was deepened later on through Menem’s and Cardoso’s mandates. This is 
not to say that presidentialism was a sufficient condition for the progress of Mercosur 
integration; but it seems that it acted as a necessary one. Therefore, it will be asserted 
here that presidentialism as executive format, along with the active intervention of 
presidents in the context of highest concentration of power in presidential office ever -  
the so-called hyperpresidentialism—, gave rise to certain patterns of decision-making 
under which the integration took place. It is hard to conceive how Mercosur nations 
would have accomplished their goals in such a short time had their executive format been 
different; however, what can -and should— be explained is how national institutions 
actually provided support for integration in the absence of any supranational settlement.
Any generalization derived from the analysis of Mercosur should be cautious. It 
cannot be claimed that any president or any presidential regime has similar incentives, 
attributions, legitimacy or restrictions anytime. Instead, there may well be the two strong 
contra-hypotheses already sketched above. On the one hand, the literature on 
presidentialism has increasingly highlighted that such a format is not homogeneous, and 
some cases are even said to be contradictory with respect to others. For example, 
autonomy with respect to the assembly is very different between the United States and 
the vast majority o f Latin America; this is due to the prevalent political practices, 
however, rather than to any institutional design. On the other hand, even assuming a 
great deal of autonomy, this fact could be used either to back or to weaken regional 
integration. In that case, one could reasonably argue, what does presidentialism explain?
The argument supported here is that not all presidentialisms are alike. There are 
some crucial differences, embedded in the historical practices and the social context of 
Latin American politics. To define and characterize them require going beyond mere 
institutional design, and instead treating the many interactions which have developed
amendments may generate distrust on the part of other negotiating governments, thus discouraging them 
from signing treaties with a not-able-to-comply president.
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among relevant actors, political culture, and written norms, also reconstructing the 
chronological path that explains their concrete manifestation. Only after this can the 
empirical research be conducted, in order to test the intuition that institutions not only 
matter but can also explain an integration process that, according to all the sources, has 
developed over an inexplicable institutional nothingness.
Structure of the dissertation
This work is divided into three main parts. The first part deals with the history 
and theory o f integration. The second part analyzes the typologies and debates regarding 
executive format, as well as the shape it displays in the Southern Cone. The last part 
empirically probes the interplay between integration and executive format in Mercosur, in 
order to test the hypotheses here advanced. In turn, each section is subdivided into 
several chapters. To properly account for integration, a first chapter addresses the 
European experience as leading case and referential framework, underlining the role 
played by national governments alongside the process, with a special focus on the heads 
of government. A second chapter goes into the theorization of integration, revising the 
many explanations given to cope with the EU emergence and their plausible 
generalization; conveniently, the place that different theories and approaches give to the 
role played by chief executives is emphasized. The following chapter offers a historical 
review of integration in Latin America, in order to examine some of its previous and 
most remarkable attempts, and the causes accountable for their general failure. Finally, 
chapter five carries out an analysis o f Mercosur, outlining its evolution, estimating its 
progress, and assessing the performance of variables that, in all likelihood, may have 
conditioned and allowed success. It also approaches some institutional aspects, 
preceding the third section in which the different patterns of institutional development 
between Mercosur and the EU will be more clearly established.
The second part of the research regards executive format, and is in turn divided 
into three chapters. The first one delineates the state of the arts concerning the 
conceptualization of presidentialism, while especially underlining the late developments 
that displays nuances and differences within the pure types of presidentialism and 
parliamentarism. It continues by offering an innovative framework to classify Latin 
American presidentialism, to finally outline the linkages between executive capabilities 
and integration. The next chapter goes further into some regional peculiarities, seeking to
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explain the particular practices and cultural traits in which the otherwise “standard” 
presidential institutions are historically embedded. Last, the institutional configuration 
and actual functioning of presidential government in all four Mercosur countries is 
addressed, with a special emphasis upon Argentina and Brazil, in order to trace the roots 
of executive capacity and autonomy for dealing with the integration endeavor.
The last part consists of an empirical test o f the hypotheses linking executive 
format to regional integration. The first chapter focuses on Mercosur institutional- 
building, reviewing the main treaties -o r  grand bargains— that led to the set off and 
consolidation of the process. It especially concentrates on the role played by the 
presidents and their foreign ministers in the operations of regional architecture. The 
remaining chapter analyzes three cases of policy-making and conflict resolution, expected 
to be vastly representative as they analyze the two most important special regimes: 
automobile and sugar, as well as the 1999 grand crisis. It carries out a comparative 
assessment of the role the presidents played as makers and guarantors of the regional 
agreements, so as to appraise the impact of executive format upon the performance of 
Mercosur.
The research winds up by advancing some conclusions intended to draw 
preliminary lessons out of the observed processes for both integration practitioners and 
theoreticians. In so doing, it forecasts the scenarios that may derive from the mechanisms 
through which Mercosur has effectively progressed -and without which it seems unlikely 
to keep on operating.
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PARTI
INTEGRATION PROCESSES
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C H A P T E R  2
T H E  R E FE R EN TIA L F R A M E W O R K  O F  T H E  E U R O P E A N  U N IO N
Introduction (what?)
Jacques Delors used to define the European Union as an OPNI (objet politique 
non-identifie). Such sarcasm caught thoroughly the trouble in which both actors and 
analysts are involved when it comes to describe the ongoing process o f unification of 
Europe.
The EU is hard to define for a series of reasons, not the least important being its 
unfinished state. As a matter of fact, its current reach and shape were unthinkable not 
only fifty years ago, when it got started, but also by the middle 1980s, before the Single 
European Act was signed. The European founding fathers could neither imagine how 
many countries it would one time encompass nor how deep the regional grasp over each 
member state would become. Furthermore, the European leaders who are currently 
driving the process of integration have not -and cannot have— a common idea as to 
what the EU will be like either, even in the short run.
Another reason for the difficulty to define the European Union derives not from 
the uncertain scope of the term Union, but of Europe itself. As a geographic expression, 
the European boundaries are usually defined as the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the 
Arctic, the Ural Mountains -in  the east— and the Caucasus Mountains and the Bosporus 
-in the southeast. This means, on the one hand, that Russians and Turks alike have good 
arguments to claim to being European; and on the other hand, that there are as many 
Europeans living outside the EU as within it (McCormick 1999). As a cultural 
expression, in turn, Europe can hardly be accurately defined by Christendom any better 
than by Christian inner divisions; moreover, the subnational heterogeneity adds up to the 
multiplicity of ethnic groups and languages already visible at the nation-state level. How 
many countries does Europe encompass, how far will the EC extend its territorial limits, 
what is the meaning of “Europeanness”? These questions come out as much from 
European history as from the continuing evolving nature of the EU.
However ambiguous the EU shape may result, it has already introduced a new -  
and, so far, unique— political feature: the major voluntary surrender (albeit partial) of
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sovereignty by part o f independent nation states ever.6 This is a huge change relative not 
only to the Cold War order, but also to political underpinnings much longer rooted in 
history. It signals the exhaustion -in Europe— of the geopolitical tenets defined, after 
the Thirty Years1 War, through the Peace o f Westphalia, which as early as 1648 set the 
bases for the sovereign rights acknowledged to the nation states. ‘The most radical 
infringement of the accepted concept of sovereignty”, according to a specialist, was “the 
effective establishment of the supremacy of Community law” (W. Wallace 1999: 510).
The main explicative dichotomy, in what the EU nature regards, currently 
confronts traditional or liberal intergovemmentalism with some kind of raising 
supranationalism. The former, taken to an extreme, conceives of the EU as little more 
than an international regime (Hoffmann 1995). The latter, on the contrary, sees it as a 
new polity in which domestic politics has become at least as important as diplomacy and 
international relations (Hix 1994; Schmitter 2000). Many theories find their place in the 
middle ground, such as the Multi-Level Governance approach (Marks 1993) -which 
entangles the national level with both the supranational and subnational ones—  and the 
Variable Geometry framework (Ehlermann 1999) -which stresses the different speeds 
that European integration may assume according to different functions and countries 
alike. Against the mainstream, reluctant to consider the EU as a form of state, Caporaso 
(1996) has argued that it could well be conceived of as a blend of three different forms of 
state, namely Westphalian, regulatory and post-modern. Differentiating state (as 
structure) from government (as actor) and governance (as process), he claims that this 
mixed European State might endure in its somewhat amorphous current shape.
This chapter focuses on the history and features o f the European Union. 
However, its main goal is not descriptive but introductory. On the one hand, it opens the 
door for further discussion on integration theories, which have mostly drawn on the 
European experience (chapter 3). On the other hand, it provides a reference for other 
processes o f integration, like those that took place in Latin America over the last half 
century (chapter 4) and, in particular, Mercosur (chapter 5). The debate mounted around 
the evolution and perspectives of the EU will thus be scrutinized in the light of its utility 
for these comparative purposes.
6 As two authors have stated, “the extent to which governments have sacrificed their legal freedom of 
action -sovereignty in the operational sense— is remarkable” (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991: 7).
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History: foundation and crucial stages (when?) r
The unity of Europe is an idea as old as the consciousness o f Europe itself
(Bartolini 1998). From Charles Magnus onwards, there have been many attempts to 
submit the peoples of the continent under a single rule. Before World War II, however, 
all attempts failed since they were carried out as conquest campaigns and by military 
means. Likewise, peaceful attempts such as many inter-war pan-European movements -  
the most important of which was founded by Hungarian Count Richard Coudenhove- 
Kalergi—  did never take root. The Treaty o f Paris, signed in 1951 by Germany, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg and giving birth to the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), was the first substantive venture that aimed at a collective 
agreement while rejecting the armed way to the same extent.
There were economic as well as political causes among the many that fostered 
the foundation of the Communities. The former included basically the necessity of 
cooperation to afford the reconstruction of Europe after the war, but also France’s need 
to gain access to the German coal and steel fields. The latter implied the prevention of 
another war, by integrating Germany with its neighbors in a cooperative game.7 
Integration, thus, meant more than mere coordination; it was conceived of as the means 
to avoid the repetition of both the armed peace that preceded the World War I and the 
tragic conditions which, brought about by the Treaty of Versailles, followed the end of 
that wpar (Dedman 1996; Nelsen and Stubb 1994). Germany, in turn, advanced the choice 
of friendly cooperation as a re-legitimating device, to avoid the isolation that either the 
fear or the retaliation feelings of its neighbors would occasion.
While integration, either as a federal or as a functional process o f national 
convergence, was in the mind of the Founding Fathers of the European Communities, the 
creation of a unified supranational entity seemed just a whimsical idea to many. In the 
beginning, regional institutions were thought of as mechanisms of national contention 
rather than international expansion, by binding the European countries among them 
through the progressive construction of common interests. Somehow paradoxically, the 
first step towards national coordination was propelled by the United States, when in 
1947 they asked for the establishment of a common European organization to plan the 
distribution o f American aid under the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan).
7 In Jean Monnet’s words, it would make war between France and Germany “not only unthinkable but 
materially impossible” (quoted in Wegs 1991: 154).
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In 1948, seventeen European countries set up the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC, later Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development -  
OECD) to distribute the funds and promote trade among the member nations. The 
rejection of ingression by part of the Eastern European countries, pressured by the 
Soviet Union, entrenched the division of the continent in two halves for almost the rest 
o f the century.
In 1957, through the (two) Treaties o f Rome, the same countries established the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom), aiming at common development in wider areas while following the same 
cooperative pattern as in Paris. Few years later, in 1964, the executive organ of the 
ECSC was merged with the equivalent bodies of the two newer institutions, giving way 
to the complete embryo of the future European Union.
Between the signature of the treaties of Paris and Rome, European integration 
exhibited some progress and two sounded defeats. It was a progressive step, in effect, 
the meeting that ECSC foreign ministers held in Messina in 1955, where the decision to 
deepen the process o f integration was taken. But, instead, the attempts at creating both a 
European Defense Community (EDC) and a European Political Community (EPC) — as 
drafted in 1952 and 1953— collapsed in 1954. These failures brought about two main 
consequences. In the first place, the defeat of the EDC made the integration of Western 
European states into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the only way to 
deal with the partial rearmament of Germany -and, to be sure, to face the Soviet Union 
threat. Secondly, a great deal of supranationalism displayed in the Treaty of Paris was 
downplayed in both Treaties of Rome. This trend towards intergovemmentalism would 
consolidate during the 1960s, when France claimed the nation-states rights to have 
primacy over any community decisions.
The process of integration developed step by step until the 1960s. Then, 
stemming from De Gaulle’s commitment to the French State sovereignty, the process 
stopped its pace and remained almost stalled for a decade. The crisis of the “empty 
chair”, as it got to be known, was set off by France when it challenged the Community 
by rejecting to participate in its meetings, therefore blocking the decision-making 
mechanism. The dispute was solved through the Luxembourg compromise, an informal 
agreement that demanded unanimity -thus conceding unilateral veto power— for any 
proposal in the Council of Ministers that may affect any “vital national interest.” The so-
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called Eurosclerosis marked the following two decades, but under the apparently quiet 
surface some consequential processes were under way. Thereafter, subsequent to three 
stages of enlargement that raised the member countries up to twelve, the integration 
recovered momentum from the signature of the Single European Act in 1986.
In the meantime, however, very important events had occurred. One of the most 
remarkable was the creation in 1974 of the European Council, a summit institution 
intended to bring together the heads of government of all member countries. Not less 
significant was the first direct election held for the European Parliament in 1979, which 
strengthened a supranational institution intended to legitimate the overall project. The 
renewed Parliament joined the Court of Justice, which had been created in 1952 -and, 
since 1989, was aided by the Court of First Instance. Incidentally, the Court of Justice 
played a crucial part to strengthen the Union by banning unilateral restrictions on trade, 
through the establishment of the principle of mutual recognition in a 1979 case.8 Last but 
not least, the European Monetary System was created in 1979, setting limits for currency 
fluctuation within EU members.
The Treaty on European Union (or Maastricht Treaty), enforced in 1992, 
crowned the meeting of the goals established by the SEA, and transformed the European 
Communities into the European Union.9 The EU came to be based on three “pillars”: a 
reformed and strengthened European Community -mainly featured by supranational 
procedures—  and two areas in which there was to be more regularized 
intergovernmental cooperation: a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Home 
Affairs and Justice. The Treaty also established a timetable for the creation of a single 
European currency -which, together with a European Central Bank, came into being in 
1999— , new rights for European citizens, more regional funds for poorer EC states, the 
extension of EU responsibility to new areas such as consumer protection, public health, 
transportation, education and social policy. Besides, it empowered the European 
Parliament and created a European police intelligence agency (Europol) and a new 
Committee o f the Regions (McCormick 1999).
8 The “direct effect” of community law and its supremacy over national legislation had already been 
established between 1963 and 1964, through two highly consequential rulings.
9 In 1990 the Federal Republic of Germany had reunified with the Democratic Republic, thus 
accomplishing a de facto enlargement that added up about twenty million more people to the EU.
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Successive to the enlargement up to fifteen members in 1995, the Treaty o f  
Amsterdam was signed in 1998. It constituted the last Grand Treaty until 2000, and 
besides the simplification and updating of the previous treaties on which the EU is based, 
it has strengthened the power of the European Parliament, the Commission, the Social 
and Economic Committee and the Committee of the Regions. It extended the 
competence of the Court of Justice as well as the qualified majority vote within the 
Council, thereby deepening the province of supranational procedures. The Treaty also 
broadened citizenship and social rights, guaranteed the subsidiarity principle, and aimed 
■at a better coordination in foreign policy. Finally, the Treaty guaranteed larger 
participation to national parliaments in European affairs, in response to rising criticism 
concerning EU democratic deficit and distance from the citizenry.
Evolution and institutional structure (what like?)
The importance that parliamentary institutions had for the architects of Europe is
evident in many aspects. Robert Schuman, for instance, had been not only a prominent 
member of the French Assembly but also became the first president of the European 
Parliament from 1958 to 1960. Despite the significance that Schuman himself and Jean 
Monnet acknowledged to this representative institution, democracy as a ruling system of 
the new Community was alien to their design.
At present, the institutional status of the EU is a blend between 
communitarization (supranationalism) and intergovernmentalism (Weiler 1994a; Scharpf 
1996).10 The successive agreements deepening the Union have conceded the member 
countries the opting-out choice, thus allowing them to keep out from determined 
common areas of policy. This was the case, for instance, with the Schengen agreement 
and the so-called Third Pillar. In other cases, it is the EU itself to select whether or not 
an associate state will be accepted in a particular accord, as occurred in the EMU. 
Nonetheless, every relevant crisis since the SEA seems to be faced by means of a leap 
forward through the strengthening of the Union, not by a halt or, even less, a back-step.
Keohane and Hoffmann argue that “intergovernmental bargains, based on a 
convergence among the leading states of the Community, are the fundamental 
explanation of the Single European Act, although spillover o f the neofunctionalist kind
10 Ostensibly, this blend is exclusive to the EU since it is the only region in which some degree of 
supranationalism has taken place.
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and pressures from the international political economy were also important” (quoted 
from Mutimer 1994: 37). Moravcsik (1991), from a realist standing point, emphatically 
supports this view. Undoubtedly, this bargaining is also responsible for the further 
developments undergone by the EU, including the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties 
and the agreements on the EMU. On the other hand, it is also true that the regular 
performance of the regional institutions has opened up the way, facilitating the otherwise 
much more difficult understanding (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). The cumulative effects 
o f day-to-day politics, as well as the key role played by some so-called supranational 
activists holding institutional office -such as Commission President Jacques Delors—  
have resulted in a positive feed-back over the integration process (Cram 1997 and 
Pierson 1998; Keohane and Hoffmann 1991).
The success of the Single European Act may well be considered as based over 
many columns. Among them, Bonvicini (1997) remarks three: (a) the entanglement 
between the enlargement and the deepening processes instead of their separate treatment, 
(b) the bargaining “em pacote”, i.e. not issue by issue, and (c) the citizenry rather than 
the elite support. To be sure, the last feature was not present in the following stages.
Some authors have argued that the EU only built supranational institutions when 
it had to face the German question. From this view, “decision-making was only pooled in 
a supranational organisation when (the economic and commercial) interests (of the 
nation states) depended on links with Germany” (Dedman 1996: 130). The same 
standing point rejects that federalism has had something to do with European integration. 
Regardless of these and other pessimistic conceptions about the EU, it continues to 
develop into a new entity with little precedent in history, if any.
Unlike Caporaso (cited above), many other authors coincide with Majone that 
“the Union is not, and may never become, a state in the modem sense of the concept” 
(1996: 287). However, the more discussed issue by both scholars and politicians in the 
EU is currently the need of democratizing its operation. Even if democracy is not a 
necessary characteristic of the state, its common meaning applies to the state rather than 
to any other association. As had been long previewed by Weber at a national level, the 
tension between the technical logic o f bureaucracy and the political logic of democracy 
also embeds the dynamic of the European integration. In the next chapters it will be 
shown that this trait is not common to every process of the sort.
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It is worth calling the attention on a controversial point, which may furthermore 
cause confusion when referring to Mercosur. In the direction of Weber proposals and 
contrary to Majone’s (Weber 1994; Majone 1996), politicization -not technical 
approach— is widely considered today as the best remedy against the democracy and 
legitimacy deficit of the EU. It is thus conceived of as an improvement in the 
participatory and representative quality of the polity. For the purposes of this research, 
politicization will be understood as a logic opposite to technical rule when applied to the 
EU, but as a logic opposite to institutional decision-making when applied to Mercosur. 
This distinction will be advanced later in chapter 3.
Another issue to reckon is the current and future role of national parliaments. 
Common sense would indicate that they should be the most interested actors in 
developing an intergovernmental Europe, to allow their control of the process through 
the command over the national executives. However, the growing supranationalism of 
Europe was not blocked at the parliamentary level, but rather delayed at the 
plebiscitarían level. Its comparison with the behavior of congresses and public opinion in 
Mercosur may, later on, shed some light upon these events, as well as upon the real 
influence that national institutions have over the integration process depending on the 
regional institutional design.
At present, the European Union is structured upon five main institutions: the 
European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, and the Court of Justice. The first two agents are intergovernmental in 
nature, while the other three are supranational. The Court is the judicial organ of the EU, 
all the rest sharing some degree of legislative authority -except for the European 
Council, whose decisions do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Council of 
Ministers and the Commission perform the executive tasks of the EU, but strategic 
decisions about the EU developments are only taken through either the European 
Council or especially called intergovernmental conferences. It is worth noting that, since 
their creation, all five institutions have increased their power and competencies over 
time. The corollary is that the strengthening of EU agencies has not been a zero-sum 
game, but they have rather extracted their power from the national arenas -thus 
depriving domestic agencies from previous attributions. How this deprivation has 
impacted on the domestic distribution of power will be addressed in the last section of 
this chapter.
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To summarize, let us resume the evolution o f European integration by briefly 
displaying their treaties’ preambles. A first shift emerges from the signature of the ECSC 
to the EEC treaty, “where ‘economic and social progress’ seems to take precedence over 
preserving and strengthening ‘peace and liberty’” (Nelsen and Stubb 1994: 13). A second 
and more radical shift is exhibited by the SEA preamble. It is gone “the vision of a united 
Europe important primarily as an alternative to war. In its place is a vision of an evolving 
‘European Union’ ready to act in the world as a single entity to protect the common 
interests o f its members, promote democracy and human rights, contribute to the 
‘preservation of international peace,’ and ‘improve the economic and social situation in 
Europe.’ The preamble assumed that the European Communities resembled a sovereign 
entity more than a mere collection of individual states, an evolution the signatories 
believed corresponded to the ‘wishes of the democratic peoples of Europe’” (Nelsen and 
Stubb 1994: 43). Ultimately, the Treaties o f Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (1998) 
endorse the preeminence of the EU institutions over issue areas previously reserved fo r 
national governments. With respect to the professed values, the new ones are “increased 
accountability, and faithful application of the principle o f subsidiarity” (Nelsen and Stubb 
1994: 65), in order to preserve democracy and diversity within Europe.
A firm trend finally seems to impulse Europe in a no return direction. However, 
even if accepted the irreversibility of the integration, its future shape is open. As 
Bonvicini (1995: 147) pointed out, “o futuro da Europa será o resultado de urna 
combinagáo ad hoc dos diferentes critérios acima descritos (urna mistura de  
procedimentos institucionais, aplicagáo do principio da subsidiaridade, percepgdo 
pública das garantías dadas pela participagáo num processo de integragao). Diferentes 
combinagoes produziráo diferentes resultados
Current features and processes (how?)
Winston Churchill’s appeal for a European Court of Justice goes as far back as to
1933 (Tamames 1994: 6). De Gaulle stand against supranationalism reached its zenith in 
1966. By the turn of the century, much has been realized and the process of European 
unity is still in progress. But how is it actually working, and what are its prospects?
The EU has gone through three clear stages since its inception. From a first 
supranational platform in the beginning (Treaty of Paris, article 9) it took an increasing 
intergovernmental approach during the following decade (Merger Treaty, article 10).
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From mid-1960s to mid-1980s it crossed along the “dark ages” of stagnation, although 
this is now seen as an era of hidden fermentation. From the SEA in 1986, the relaunching 
of the Single Market and the project of political union made intensive use of 
intergovernmental tools, while simultaneously and progressively eroding pure 
intergovernmentalism.
Regarding the nature of its institutions, the EC has been characterized “as a 
network whose operations are well described as “supranational” in a specific sense but 
that have always rested on a set of intergovernmental bargains” (Keohane and Hoffmann 
1991: 4). The concept of network is alternative to both international regime and 
emerging state, and involves the pooling of sovereignty;11 furthermore, it encompasses 
not only public but also private bargaining. The term supranationality -as used by Ernst 
Haas in the 1960s— refers to the political process of the EU, while the 
intergovernmental bargains are assumed to be the necessary steps to build up the 
structure of the community.
Nowadays, any assessment of the EU is more than ever related to effective 
governance, thus beyond just integration (Gabel 1998). The EU has developed a 
“variable geometry” structure, meaning that different speeds may be allowed both to its 
members and to eventual applicants. This entails the possibility for some countries to 
opt-out from some common policies, and for the EU core to continue its march without 
being slowed down by reluctant states. In addition to subsidiarity and multi-level 
governance, the variable-geometry characterization has given way to a broad discussion 
concerning EU modes of governance.
Federalism -o r confederalism— has been the usual way of thinking about the EU 
in state-like terms (McCormick 1999). As this label fell short of capturing the real 
functioning o f the EU, some others were coined or adopted from different fields. 
Consociationism is an illustrative case of adoption. Its proponents expect to give count 
of a segmented polity, in which political elites negotiate among them to make the system 
work, but proportionality, autonomy and minority veto power are essential background 
conditions (Gabel 1998).
11 Pooling of sovereignty means here “the transfer of states’ legal authority over internal and external 
affairs to the Community as a whole, although not to supranational organs as such” (Keohane and 
Hoffmann 1991: 35, n. 11).
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If  the EU nature and shape are quite elusive, its policy processes are slightly more 
apprehensible. Although the EU has no direct powers of enforcement and 
implementation and has a very small budget, it has developed progressive intervention in 
some crucial policy areas. “From a time when the EU dealt only with coal and steel 
policy, the member states have transferred so many powers that the EU now touches (to  
varying degrees) on most aspects of economic, foreign, social, agricultural, and 
environmental power” (McCormick 1999: 194). This apparent mismatching between low  
-and ambiguous— institutional capabilities and increasingly strong public policies has 
mainly been managed through voluntary compliance. Seen as one of the utmost 
achievements of the EU, the dependence on voluntary compliance is also one of the 
weaker points of the whole process. It has permitted a satisfactory performance in many 
policy areas so far, but has reached narrower limits in some others -especially in defense 
and foreign affairs, but not only.
Recent events, such as the Gulf War and the intervention in Kosovo, have 
exhibited the EU as a civilian -thus limited—  power]; on the other hand, it has become a 
security community as defined by Deutsch (1957). Today, war in Western Europe is 
unimaginable. However, to account for such Pax Europea it is necessary to refer to the 
military alliance in which European integration is embedded: NATO. So much is the 
Atlantic umbrella significant to EU identity and integrity that some applicants -e .g . 
Spain—  considered accession into both organizations in parallel, giving way to what has 
been called “double-membership” (Buhigas Viqueira 1993; also Rodrigo 1995). As 
shown by the contrast between the remarkable performance regarding economic and 
social figures and the contemporary failure concerning military coordination, the EU is 
still unable of managing autonomously the latter. The question whether integration 
would have proved possible in Europe without NATO as parallel counterpart is even 
more compelling when posed to other regions, which do not necessary count with such a 
powerful guard.
National institutions and the EU (why so?)
According to some authors, integration is deemed to failure -o r  will simply not
take place—  if it is not based on previous economic cooperation (Tamames 1994) o r 
interdependence (Moravcsik 1998). This is considered the reason why pre-war attempts 
at European integration failed to succeed, since they were oriented toward ambitious
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political goals but fell short of achieving a preceding level of economic integration. 
However, once economic interdependence and cooperation have been met, some kind of 
institutional arrangement is needed to overcome emerging problems of coordination, 
externalities, and collective action (W. Wallace 1999). The Treaty of Rome and the 
earlier one of Paris, among other more encompassing agreements such as NATO, 
originally provided such arrangement to Western Europe.
Most theories of regional integration reckon two conditions, economic 
cooperation and (at least minimum) common institutions, as necessary for the integration 
to proceed. Concerning the relation between regional and common institutions, however, 
Claude has pointed out that “the... achievements of the (EU) are attributable less to the 
formal capacity of its institutions to function without the cooperation of governments 
than to their success in stimulating that cooperation” (Claude 1971: 111-112). Regional 
institutions have been, in this light, a “facilitating condition” for states to perform 
integration, not a reason per se.
When it comes to appraise the role played in integration processes by the national 
states, a new dilemma arises. It concerns inner division o f functions and latent interests 
of office holders, especially regarding the leading agency in foreign affairs -the executive 
branch. In the EU, “state executives play a major role ... and much lobbying is channeled 
through them, but the Commission and the European Parliament (and on occasion the 
European Court of Justice) are also worthy targets for subnational governments” (Marks 
et al 1996: 45). This acknowledgment raises a further question: what would happen in a 
region that lack common institutions such as the Commission and the Parliament? Would 
state executives concentrate upon themselves all the social pressures?
Since “executive control over foreign policy depends to a large degree on the 
nature of the political institutions and domestic structures” (Risse-Kappen 1996: 57), the 
case of France acquires a particular exemplarity in the European context. Although 
French regime type is now considered as little different from classical parliamentarism 
(see chapter 6), in the beginning the 5th Republic was closer to a presidentialist design. 
From such institutional platform De Gaulle advocated an intergovernmental Europe, and 
for the Bonn conference of 1961 proposed a Foreign Ministers standing meeting. In 
1962 he regretted the “statelessness” approach of the EC, and in 1963 rejected the first 
application of Britain (Salmon and Nicoll 1990: 80/1). It is ironic, for the hypothesis of 
the current study, that it was the head of the only “presidential” government of Europe
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who once hindered and jeopardized the integration process -even willing, Thatcher could 
never produce a similar impact. On the other hand, this fact highlights the wide margin of 
maneuver that presidents may hold with regard to integration.
While some authors have stated that ‘Europeanization’ implies power transfer 
from national states to the (albeit frizzy) European level o f governance (W. Wallace 
1999), others claim that it may well strengthen national states (Milward 1992). Most, 
however, agree that it has tended to remove domestic issues from domestic controversy 
and into the arena of executive control (Risse-Kappen 1996; Moravcsik 1998). The 
convenience o f formally acknowledging the authority of national executives over the 
integration process led to the belated creation of the European Council -the European 
executive summit— , which was established in 1974, only twenty years after the EC was 
founded! It is worth underlining how the temporal progression displayed by the EU is 
turned around in other regions, notably Mercosur, where national executives commanded 
the process from the very beginning.
In what follows, I will pinpoint some paradoxes that feature the EU, in the 
expectation that they may shed some further light on other cases of integration. The first 
paradox has been defined by Wallace, who emphasizes how “governance is becoming 
increasingly a multi-level, intricately institutionalized activity, while representation, 
loyalty and identity remain stubbornly rooted in the traditional institutions of the nation 
state” (1999: 521). Streeck and Schmitter (1991) observed a second paradox, as they 
were puzzled by the development o f a pluralist organization of interests in a regional 
arena that consists of a majority of states featuring corporatistic forms of intermediation. 
A third paradox is likely to rise from a growing unrest concerning the way of election of 
the Commission. Some authoritative scholars (e.g. Hot 1997), as well as noted politicians 
-am ong whom Giuliano Amato and Felipe González— , have recently advanced 
proposals for a direct, popular election of the President of the Commission. The 
Americanization o f European politics would reach its peak if a fourth paradox comes 
true: the consolidation of a European party system following either an American or a 
Canadian scenario, as suggested by Katz (1999). He argues that the superior level of 
party interaction need not be dominant, and that cartellization may well be a response to 
a federal-like European constitution.
There exists another interesting puzzle concerning federalism at the national -not 
regional— level, as soon as other regions are brought to the fore. In the EU, federalism
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and regionalism are said to have given rise to multilevel governance; this is so because 
some regions skip the national level to deal directly with the regional center -i.e. 
Brussels. But what would the impact of federalism be upon integration when no such 
center exists? In Mercosur, for instance, federal regions are likely to alternatively 
impinge upon the national decision-makers in order to exert any influence over the 
integration process. If this is so, the link between presidentialism and federalism may 
acquire an increasing relevance for the purposes of this study (see chapter 8).
Concluding from the beginning (still another paradox?): while the forces which 
set off European integration have been allocated either to an external threat (the USSR) 
or an internal threat (Germany); to an external push (the USA) or an internal pull 
(reconstruction), nowadays it seems impossible to untangle security from economic 
motives. The EU has neither had a hegemon nor a defection ever -despite some 
arguments on the contrary (Mattli 1999). Its success is due to both its institutional 
strength and the considerable commitments of its members (Keohane and Hoffmann 
1991); elsewhere, instead, only the latter can account for success. Although the EU has 
been catalogued as introverted (H. Wallace 1992), a balance of its unfolding process is 
unavoidable to address political integration, whether theoretically or comparatively.
Regional integration can be succinctly defined as “the process whereby an 
international organization acquires responsibility for taking an increasing number of 
decision in areas which were previously reserved to the state” (Taylor 1983: 26). 
Political integration, in turn, is “the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities 
toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre­
existing national states” (Haas 1958: 16). As above reviewed, only partially did the latter 
occur in Europe. Further reflection is required to deal with this matter, and such is the 
task of the next chapter.
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C H A P TE R  3
C O M P E TIN G  T H E O R IE S  O F R E G IO N A L  IN TE G R A TIO N
introduction
This research conceives of institutions as a two-sided phenomenon, hence 
focusing on their both faces: as cause and as consequence of other political phenomena.12 
It is thus intended to explain the process of institution building at the regional level -o r  
its absence—  as a dependent variable of political action already framed by existing 
national institutions. Therefore, it approaches simultaneously the integration process as 
aimed at, and constrained by, institutional arrangements.
The concept of integration is usually accompanied by one of two adjectives: 
regional or economic. The former refers to a territorial criterion, the latter to a functional 
one. Initially, it is necessary to clarify the meaning and scope of these subtypes of 
integration, and only then to go on further in its theorization. The next section will thus 
deal with those subtypes’ features.
As for the integration issue itself, many theories have been devised to cope with it 
-in  addition to the general theories provided in the area of International Relations. 
Among the most significant should be listed federalism , functionalism , 
neofunctionalism, communicative interactionism, intergovemmentalism, and neo- 
transactionalism (Mutimer 1994; Nelsen and Stubb 1994; Schmitter 1996a; Moravcsik 
1998; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). The first was developed principally by Altiero 
Spinelli; the second, by David Mitrany; the third, by Ernst Haas; the fourth, by Karl 
Deutsch; the fifth, by Andrew Moravcsik; and the sixth, by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet. 
They are discussed in the following sections, in order not to choose or dismiss any but to 
draw some insights from all of them. In addition, every review of each theory will be 
concluded by briefly highlighting the conceivable links between national institutions and 
regional integration, and their eventual application to the case of Mercosur.
12 I mainly follow a new-institutional approach to institutions (March and Olsen 1984, 1989), as 
eclectically applied as possible in order to allow a combination of two different academic fields: 
international relations and comparative politics. To put it in Hix’s apt terms, “the key agents in this 
approach are the leadership elites; ... and the key structures are the formal decision-making rules 
(political institutions), the social group bases of political support (social institutions), and the political 
value traditions (ideology). In more forma! terms, therefore, this approach treats... leaders as strategic 
actors who are bound by organisational, sociological and normative institutions"' (Hix 1995: 33-34).
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Regionalism and economic integration
The very concepts of region and regionalism are controversial (Russett 1969;
Fawcett 1995; Hurrell 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996). However, they have undergone a 
positive rehabilitation over the last decade, regardless of the debates surrounding their 
conceptualization. From a macro perspective, regionalization began to be seen from the 
middle 1980s as a parallel -i.e. not contradictory—  process to worldwide 
multilateralization, thus becoming an aid rather than a foe for more global processes such 
as trade liberalization and security arrangements. On the other hand, from a micro 
perspective, individual nation-states recognized that a regional framework enabled them 
to face tasks that would otherwise remain beyond their reach.
Many factors were at work to account for the renaissance of regionalism, after 
the failed wave in the 1960s whose only survivor was the European Community -even 
this being strongly compromised by nation-state pressures and their effects, in the form 
of the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966. Among these factors, the end of the Cold War 
and huge economic changes -those of so-called globalization—  ranked at the top of the 
list. The former was accompanied by parallel developments, such as the definitive demise 
of Third Worldism, the decentralization of world politics after the melting of the bipolar 
spheres of influence, and the spread o f democratic regimes especially in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe. The latter included the cure along with the disease; that is, the EC 
was taken as the model because it was in the process of facing the challenges posed by 
increasing globalization, thus showing that adaptation to the new scenario was possible -  
and clearly preferable to rejection and isolation (Fawcett 1995).
New regionalism was rapidly defined as ‘open.’ Drawing on Nye’s definition of 
an international region as “a limited number of states linked together by a geographical 
relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence”, and his consequent conception 
of regionalism as “the formation of interest groupings on the basis of regions” (Nye 
1968: vii), open regionalism aims at achieving “compatibility between the explosion of 
regional trading arrangements around the world and the global trading system as 
embodied in the World Trade Organization” (Bergstein 1997: 5). Therefore, it 
constitutes the opposite of the old, closed region conceived as a ‘fortress,’ which tended 
to foster fragmentation instead of integration.
Contemporary regionalism can be seen as an umbrella concept, covering a 
multiplicity of distinct phenomena. Hurrell (1995) enumerates five of these, arguing that
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none should be given the exclusive use o f the term: (a) regionalization, (b) regional 
awareness and identity, (c) regional interstate cooperation, (d) state-promoted regional 
integration, and (e) regional cohesion. The first meaning -regionalization— could be 
understood as interdependence, whereas the second -regional identity— conveys a 
rather cultural than political or economic notion; their common feature is that none is 
produced intentionally but are brought about by unintended factors -such as increasing 
interchange flows or common historical roots. The next three subtypes respond to 
another logic: they are either the outcome of state decisions -cooperation and 
integration— or its consequence -regional cohesion. This research deals particularly with 
integration and cohesion, the latter meaning that “the region plays a defining role in the 
relations between the states (and other major actors) of that region and the rest of the 
world”, while constituting “the organizing basis for policy within the region across a 
range of issues” (Harrell 1995: 44; cf. Gamble and Payne 1996; Grugel and Hout 1999).
With regard to the economic dimension of regional integration, there are four 
progressive levels o f achievement. The simplest, the free-trade zone, is an area in which 
domestic obstacles to trade are dismantled; this means that customs tariffs are not 
imposed on the products of any member country. Distinctively, a customs union moves 
one step further: at this stage a common external tariff is established, fixing the amount 
that products coming from the rest o f the world have to pay to enter the region. This 
implies that the member countries form only one entity in the arena of international trade. 
The third step, a common or single market, is a customs union to which the free mobility 
of productive factors between the member countries and a common trade policy are 
added. It also contemplates the coordination of sectoral macro-economic policies among 
its members, and requires the harmonization of national legislation. Fourth, an economic 
union appends centralized monetary institutions and common financial policies to the 
single market. It goes beyond simple coordination and harmonization among the member 
countries, to establish unified supranational agencies -such as a central bank—  and a 
single currency.
Despite the economic goals o f regional integration as conceived above, the 
entailed necessity o f establishing some kind of common institutional arrangement fosters 
linkages other than the purely economic. In the wake of higher levels of state-promoted 
economic integration, increasing flows of trade and investment are likely to manifest, i.e. 
growing regionalization in the sense of the first subtype defined by Hurrell. Likewise,
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increasing flows of people and communications are able to nurture a regional awareness, 
like the second subtype previously noted. To grasp the potential features and likelihood 
of further developments for any given region, it is necessary to assess the causes, scope, 
depth, type of institutionalization, and degree of centralization of its integration process. 
For this task, several competing general theories are advanced in the field of 
International Relations. After briefly discussing them, I will turn to a number of 
theoretical approaches that have been offered to specifically cope with integration.
General Theories in International Relations: Neo-realism, Neo-rationalism,
*  Constructivism, Neo-idealism
Regional integration can be considered as a small sub-area in the broader field of 
world politics, despite the fact that it has grown strongly -yet not steadily— over the last 
half century. This development has been unexpected for most analysts and theoreticians; 
furthermore, it was often at odds with the many theories that deal with international 
relations in a more general manner. These internationalist theories can be fruitful 
however, and account for some aspects of the new phenomenon. Therefore, they will be 
briefly revised before moving on to the specific theories of integration.
Since being updated by Kenneth Waltz (1979), as a result of which the prefix neo 
was added, the realist theory originally sketched by Hans Morgenthau (1944*) has 
dominated the field o f IIRR, either as an outright approach or as the firmest target for 
opposite schools. World politics are conceived of as taking place in an anarchic 
environment, where sovereign nation-states are the only key actors. As no legitimate 
monopolist power is at work, self-help is the only behavior that states may count on; 
hence, the different interests and capabilities of the actors will mould their interactions, 
giving rise to a dynamics of international alliances and oppositions resulting in a balance 
of power. National interests are defined in two layers, high politics -politico-territorial 
and military issues—  and low politics -economic and other issues. The former are 
crucial, thus rendering the world an arena determined by security concerns and power 
politics.
Neo-realism “has little interest in regionalization or regional economic 
integration” (Hurrell 1995: 53). Instead, it focuses on the concept of regime, defined as 
“explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 
1983: 1). In this view, “any action which either diminishes that capability deliberately or
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assigns it irrevocably to another polity is (theoretically) incomprehensible” (Schmitter 
1996a). Consequently, neo-realism does not aim at explaining international arrangements 
that “may involve institutional structures very different from the traditional idea of a 
coalition, alliance, or traditional international organization” (Hurrell 1995: 53).
Unlike neo-realism, neo-rationalism -also called institutional neo-liberalism— 
claims that cooperation among states is not only possible but also expectable, given 
certain conditions (Axelrod 1984; Keohane and Nye 1989). As national interests are 
translated into national preferences, by way of opening the black box of the state, 
institutions manage to play a crucial role in facilitating agreements, guaranteeing 
compromises through monitoring and supervision, reducing transaction and information 
costs, and generally orienting behavior. The zero-sum game of realists thus becomes a 
positive-sum game, and the issue-linkage allowed by the dilution of the high/low politics 
distinction gives place to a complex interdependence. In this context, subnational 
agencies and transnational actors are recognized to play a relevant role that is neglected 
in neo-realist theory.
Interdependence “consists of (a) economic interpenetration in terms of 
international trade and financial flows; (b) nation-states* collective interest in avoiding a 
major nuclear war; and (c) nation-states’ collective interest in avoiding ecological 
catastrophe” (Sanders 1996: 444). Despite this threefold definition of interdependence, 
the main emphasis falls on mainly one of the mentioned factors -intensive economic 
exchange, “which may influence political relationships but does not necessarily elicit an 
integrative response from those most affected” (Webb 1977: 32). Consequently, 
interdependence is not a sufficient condition for -nor is it the same as— cooperation, 
centralized decision-making, policy harmonization, common institutions, or the like.
A third model, constructivism -o r reflectivism (Keohane 1989)— lies on less 
material or concrete foundations than the above theories. Instead of drawing on either 
political or economic factors, constructivists “are interested in the construction o f 
identities and interests, and, as such, take a more sociological than economic approach to 
systemic theory. On this basis, they have argued that states are not structurally or 
exogenously given but constructed by historically contingent interactions” (Wendt 1994: 
385). Consequently, they “emphasize the importance o f shared knowledge, learning, 
ideational forces, and normative and institutional structures” (Hurrell 1995: 65). 
Although there are many orientations within the constructivist label, such as
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“cognitivists, post-structuralists, postmodernists, critical theorists, and structurationists” 
(Hix 1994: 9), all of the various approaches reject both neo-realism and neo-rationalism 
for their positivist and rationalist assumptions.
Integration is, in the constructivist framework, a possible response to the 
transformation of national identities and expectations. As interchange between different 
peoples grows, new collective identities are believed to emerge from previous 
allegiances; supranational institutions are thus created in order to encompass and contain 
the most recent loyalties.
Finally, one of the first but, strangely enough, newest theory of international 
relations is neo-idealism. Its origins go back at least two centuries to Kant’s speculations 
on world peace ([1795] 1985), but its latest rediscovery dates from the 1970s and 
especially the 1980s, when the third wave of democratization acquired momentum. Neo­
idealists claim that domestic factors are neither secondary nor complementary for 
international politics but instead they are fundamental, and regime type is among the 
most determinant of them(Nye 1988; Schmitter 1991; Maoz and Russett 1993). As first 
evidence, these approaches underline that democracies do not wage war with each other. 
From this peaceful assumption, it has frequently been concluded that some kind of 
cooperative behavior will arise -and indeed, this has happened in many regions 
worldwide. However, democracy has not yet proven that it is either a necessary -see the 
case of Mexico in NAFTA, or the more complex instance o f ASEAN— or a sufficient 
condition for regional integration, and this is even less so for regional or global 
institutionalization.
Integration Theories: Federalism
As regards political integration, the idea of federalism goes a long way back. 
However, although some medieval thinkers developed this idea -and even so the ancient 
Greeks— , modem federalism is a newer device. Kant in principle, and the American 
founding fathers in practice, devised a model that evolved successfully and was thus 
admired and emulated elsewhere. Almost two centuries later, the idea migrated back to 
its original continent to sustain Europe’s nascent self-consciousness. Altiero Spinelli, the 
Italian leader of the European Federalist Movement, was the firmest advocate of a 
federal pan-Europeanism; he “believed that only a dramatic leap to federalism would 
succeed in unifying Europe” (Nelsen and Stubb 1994: 69). Many European constructors
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adopted originally this idea, including Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann. However, 
when federalism proved unable to support the Council of Europe as the embryo of an 
integrated continent, in 1949, most o f them turned to an incremental approach (Mutimer 
1994).
One o f the strongest federalist assumptions is that of the interchangeability 
between the national and the supranational dimensions. It thus presupposes that “the 
political postulates concerning identity, action and loyalty are the same regardless of the 
level of institutional formation. Hence, the principles underpinning federalism at the 
•national level apply equally to federalism at the world (level)” or, more restrictively, at 
the regional level (Hix 1994: 11). As an illustrative example of the latter, the archetype 
of the Swiss Confederation has been lately offered as a prospective model to explore for 
the institutionalization and democratization of the European Union (Blondel 1998). 
Furthermore, other authors would argue that “federal politics” is an already appropriate 
label for the European Union (Sbragia 1992), or even that federalist features resembling 
German federalism are currently at work at the expense, not to the benefit, of optimal 
policy outcomes (Scharpf 1988).
International federalists see their object as a process rather than as a static end­
point. The federal theory admits two ways to advance integration: either through 
intergovernmental constitutional bargaining or through the call of a constituent assembly. 
Both paths lead to the establishment of a federal state, and both are driven from above. 
In what regards Mercosur, the mechanism of intergovernmental bargaining, as well as the 
top-down methods of procedure, might be considered as features revealing an ongoing 
process of federalist integration. However, it overly differs from federalism in that no 
constitutional goal is aimed at, and even less the constitution of a supranational state.
integration Theories: Functionalism
Functionalism, in contrast to federalism, was conceived quite recently: it came
into being by the end of World War II, and was advanced as an alternative mechanism to 
international politics for safeguarding world peace. However, it shared with federalism 
its prescriptive elements and aims. David Mitrany, who first proposed it, viewed it as a 
pragmatic, technocratic, and flexible system to overcome the problems raised by 
nationalism and “competing political units”. The functional approach, instead, would 
“overlay political divisions with a spreading web o f international activities and agencies,
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in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually 
integrated” (Mitrany 1943).
Despite its recognition of a dynamics of integration, thereby accepting integration 
as a process, functionalism was an ideological tool aimed at a static objective (Hix 1994: 
11). That end was the construction of a final super-panes world entity. To achieve a 
supranational state that would prevent war, the element of conflict, which is tantamount 
to saying any theory of politics, was clearly put to one side. This neglect was especially 
stressed by further critics of functionalism, and would subsequently be addressed by the 
approach following it, neofunctionalism.
Mitrany’s proposal was based on the experience of the American New Deal. He 
supposed that a decentralized area-by-area and issue-by-issue treatment of questions 
would increasingly drain the states’ capacity, while building non-political organs and 
bodies capable of dealing with administrative tasks (Mutimer 1994). Mitrany also deeply 
distrusted in a potential central authority. It is interesting to note that this was the path 
chosen by Mercosur countries, although the goals were entirely different: for Mercosur 
leaders, the technical and decentralized approach was not intended to undermine the 
political supremacy of the states, but to reinforce them. As will be shown further on, 
Mercosur is acknowledged as a region where both technical and political -i.e. 
presidential—  competencies are stressed vis-à-vis other national and supranational 
institutions.
Integration Theories: Neofunctionalism
As pointed out by Nelsen and Stubb, “functionalism failed as a theory for several
reasons, but one stands out: it contained no theory of politics” (1994: 99). When 
economic problems proved to be unmanageable by technical experts, and theory could 
not explain why certain choices had been made, a new approach was taken to understand 
the development of the European Community by addressing the deficiencies of 
functionalism. It was therefore in this context that a group of scholars from the 
University of Berkeley, led by Ernst Haas, developed the neo-functionalist theory.
Haas carried out much o f his work in the 1950s and 1960s, when he supported 
the idea that technological and scientific changes would produce incentives and pressures 
for international institutional innovation. In turn, this innovation would lead to political 
“learning” by political leaders, national bureaucracies, and international organizations. In
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sum, the neo-functionalist, just like the functionalist and other pluralist approaches, argue 
that “what matters most is a utilitarian calculus on the part o f actors, and not a dramatic 
or passionate commitment to a new order” (Haas 1975: 12). The theory conceives of 
integration as an open process, characterized by the spillover from one area to another. 
Although the ending point is supposed to be open, “it is clearly intended to be 
institutional” (Mutimer 1994: 31).
Spillover, the central metaphor of neo-functionalist theory, is the process 
whereby “a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the 
original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further 
condition and a need for more, and so forth” (Lindberg 1963: 9). One major shortcoming 
of neofunctionalism was that it “always had more to say about the ongoing role of 
institutions than about the factors that explain the birth o f regionalist schemes” (Hurrell 
1995: 60). Although it recognized the difference between background conditions, 
conditions at the time of union, and process conditions -thus allowing that different 
variables have a different weight according to the stage—, the main accent and stronger 
predictions were oriented towards the process. Once integration had started, 
neofunctionalism saw it being fostered by two sorts of spillover: functional and political 
-unlike Mitrany’s purely technical conception. This two-fold mechanism predicted that 
integration would become self-sustaining. This expected capacity of prediction was what 
neo-functionalist authors believed to be one the most salient features of their theory.
The spillover process did not however take place. What first appeared as a more 
complex and unavoidable process changed afterwards into an extremely contingent 
phenomenon, of little use for understanding general events. As a consequence, Haas 
began to stress the role of ideas and “consensual knowledge” , thus paying more attention 
to the relevance of political leaders and their goals (Waltz 1991).
The change of focus, from an “inevitable” and incremental evolution o f 
international complexity toward a less-determined process, led to the modification o f 
some previous assumptions. Consequently, the role that individuals can play in the 
international arena, and the institutional contexts that may provide incentives for or 
constrain their actions, should be highlighted as key elements of a more general 
development. De Gaulle’s outstanding example was decisive for Haas’s theoretical 
reformulation (Haas 1975).
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It is within this framework that the executive format acquires a greater relevance. 
If the leadership and the leaders’ goals are to influence the integration process, then the 
mechanisms by which national leaders are appointed -and the institutional resources with 
which they count or by which they are limited— cannot be neglected. Hence, one of the 
main claims of this research is that the executive format, as a given structure of 
incentives and restrictions, affects the opportunities and features of the integration 
process.
Integration Theories: Communicative Interactionism
Communicative interactionism, also called transactionalism, was a theoretical tool
developed by Karl Deutsch in the 1950s, aiming at the explanation -and the creation—  
of a “security community”. This means that, among a number of countries that feature 
similar substantive attributes in a given region, the possibility of making war against each 
other becomes entirely unthinkable (Gemeinschaft). The theory suggests that an 
increasing pattern of communication and interchange between neighboring societies will 
give rise to a growing sense of community, regional awareness and supranational 
identification. The departing point was is the homogeneity among mass societies that 
share common values, such as capitalism and liberal democracy13 (Deutsch 1953, 1957; 
Hurrell 1995). By the same token, elites and organized groups are considered of minor 
importance for this process.
The assumptions of transaction theory stress the importance of intra-regional 
communications such as trade flows, telephone calls, post-mail and even tourism, all 
measurable variables that render the theory easily falsifiable. In addition, there have been 
difficulties in establishing a correlation “between ‘behavior’ and ‘identity’ -the defining 
characteristic of a ‘community’” (Hix 1994: 4).
In what the organizational aspects of integration concerns, the theory requires the 
development of common identities among the people of the integrating areas prior to any 
formal institutionalization. Therefore, institutions were considered to be a dependent 
variable. In many respects, this vision has been supported -whether aware of their 
theoretical basis or not— by most of the protagonists of Mercosur’s construction, who
13 Deutsch’s cases comprised the Hanseatic League, the union between Norway and Sweden, the 
relations among cities and regions in Germany and Italy, the formation of modern Switzerland from 
smaller, autonomous cantons, and the emerging pre-national capabilities of the American colonies -and 
later states (Deutsch 1957).
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were unwilling to create institutions before a certain level of social and economic 
indicators of integration had been reached.
Integration Theories: Intergovernmentalism
Intergovemmentalism is the tangible form that the realist approach takes to
integration (Hix 1994; Schmitter 1996a). However, its most sophisticated versions add 
more than nuances to the plain neo-realist conception. Moravcsik, for instance, 
deliberately denominates his framework as “liberal intergovemmentalism”, because it 
does not assume the state as a unitary actor but considers that domestic politics have a 
decisive impact on subsequent interstate relations (Moravcsik 1998). In this sense, he 
makes a concession to the many criticisms received by realist authors regarding their 
neglect of subnational processes, and accepts the idea of opening up the black box of the 
state, as neo-liberal institutionalism had already proposed (Keohane 1989; Keohane and 
Nye 1989). However, this acquiescence does not imply a compromise; it leads instead to 
the reaffirmation of all the intergovemmentalist tenets as far as the international level 
concerns.
One o f the first authors to call attention to the domestic level was Bulmer (1983). 
He intended in this way to restore the primacy of the nation-state, not to undermine it. 
His point was that “member governments, pursuing their own interests, were the 
‘central actors’ in the EC policymaking process” (Nelsen and Stubb 1994: 141). 
Domestic politics was thus the source for explaining regional policy-making, and also 
integration itself; yet Bulmer thought his theory had “a mixed intellectual parentage” with 
“the transnationalist study of the international political economy” (Bulmer 1983: 363). 
This rather eclectic and empirical analysis would be deepened and enriched in the next 
decade.
What constitutes the leading intergovemmentalist study so far was however 
published in 1998 (Moravcsik, 1998). It is a piece of work in which a framework for 
understanding European integration is offered, together with an in-depth examination o f 
the so-called five major bargains14 that arguably defined the features of the EU. Since a
14 Each one of these turning points roughly characterizes a decade in the existence of the European 
Union. They are the Treaty o f Rome, the consolidation of the Common Market (comprising the Common 
Agricultural Policy, the implementation of the CM, the veto of British membership, and the 
Luxembourg Compromise), the European Monetary System, the Single European Act, and the Treaty on 
European Union.
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bundle of general theories are used, and the scope of the framework is said to be 
generalizable to other integration processes, it is worth briefly reviewing its main points.
Moravcsik presents a three-stage approach to regional building. In the first stage, 
national preferences are defined by each state based on its economic interests; 
consequently, the theory dismisses the view that geopolitical interests may hold the same 
importance as economic ones to explain the formation of national preferences -thereby 
detaching itself even further from neo-realism. The second step consists of the 
negotiations between national governments, to fulfill their nationally defined preferences; 
these negotiations depend on the asymmetrical interdependence existing between the 
bargaining states, and not on any kind of supranational entrepreneurship - a  point that 
makes a crucial difference with the neo-functionalist assumptions. The last phase 
involves the establishment of common institutions, according to intergovemmentalism, to 
ensure the credibility of the commitments achieved; along the same lines as before, 
Moravcsik concludes that the choice for the transfer of sovereignty to international 
institutions is due neither to federalist ideology nor to centralized technocratic 
management. In turn, the option between pooling and delegation of decision-making 
competence varies across both countries and issues and responds to the equilibrium 
reached by national preferences in each bargain.
Many intergovemmentalists see integration as a limited -regional— international 
regime. Thereby, their institutionalization is not reckoned as endangering the primacy o f 
the signatory nation-states. In other words, “intergovemmentalism argues that 
supranational integration will be limited to areas which do not affect the fundamental 
issues of national sovereignty” (Hix 1994: 6). However, it is not easy to understand how 
a state could undo its compromises once its ties with the neighboring countries have 
reached a certain level of interdependence. Institutions have effects and these effects are 
cost reversible: that is precisely the function of institutions, to make compromises 
credible through raising the costs of non-compliance. The relativization of institutions on 
the part of intergovemmentalism -whose argument, taken to one extreme, should 
question the very existence of international institutions instead of their importance 
alone— sheds some shadow on the potential to generalize conclusions anywhere else 
than Europe. Mercosur, for instance, has successfully resisted any thrust towards 
supranationalism, showing that regional institutionalization must not be taken for granted
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-even if some intergovemmentalists may do so as a concession to other competing 
approaches, simply in order to then disregard the substantive relevance o f institutions.
Integration Theories: Neo-transactionalism
The last theory specifically dealing with integration to be treated here will be
labelled “neo-transactionalism”, although its main supporters have timidly called it a 
“transaction-based theory o f integration” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998). Others 
have preferred instead the term “supranational institutionalism” or “supranational 
bargaining theory” -as opposed to M oravcsik’s “intergovernmental bargaining theory”.
This approach is explicitly crafted to explain the rise and shape o f the European 
Union, although its using of general theories to account for integration allows for its 
generalization and application elsewhere. The fundamentals of neo-transactionalism draw 
on two of the previously reviewed theories, i.e. transactionalism and, especially, 
neofimctionalism. It assumes that the increase of transnational transactions between 
neighboring countries leads to the development of a more complex pattern of relations, 
both social and economic, within and among countries. The resulting increase in 
complexity cannot be managed satisfactorily by existing norms and regulations, thus the 
costs of information and transaction will rise. In turn, the need to reduce these costs will 
drive transnational transactors to claim for the establishment and standardization of rules.
According to the neo-transactionalist view, the main actors o f integration are 
national states -as for intergovemmentalism—  but they feature at the same level 
transnational transactors, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice 
(Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998). In short, all the four national, transnational and 
supranational actors must be reckoned as playing a part in determining the outcome o f 
the European Union. The starting point for the process is, however, regarded as clearly 
institutional, since the Treaty of Rome established the two supranational bodies in 1957.
The theoretical roots of neo-transactionalism are made explicit by Stone Sweet 
and Sandholtz, who observe that “the three constituent elements of our theory are 
prefigured in neofunctionalism: the development of transnational society, the role o f 
supranational organizations with meaningful autonomous capacity to pursue integrative 
agendas, and the focus on European rule-making to resolve international policy 
externalities” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 6). They also claim to agree with Haas 
“that there is a logic of institutionalization” (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 16).
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However, it is at the institutional level that they advance significant modifications to 
previous theorization.
While the influence of institutions is simultaneously determining of and 
determined by other feedback factors, there are two logics that underlie the process and 
keep it far from the mechanical or political automatism of simple spillover: “the first has 
to do with path-dependence, the second with principal-agent relations” (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz 1998: 19). Based on these logics, neo-transactionalists distance themselves to 
some extent from neofunctionalism and, especially, from intergovemmentalism, since 
both logics reinforce their argument that “institutionalization in the EC is not reducible to 
the preferences of, or bargaining among, member governments. The expansion of 
transnational society pushes for supranational governance, which is exercised to facilitate 
and regulate that society”15 (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998: 19).
The concept of governance as a continuum between an intergovernmental and a 
supranational pole is not new. However, the novelty offered by neo-transactionalism is 
the possibility that changes can occur at different speeds, or even in opposite directions, 
regarding different issue areas. Therefore, many EUs are possible depending on the 
matter at stake (telecommunications, monetary union, security, defense, and the like). 
The disaggregation of a given region’s governing processes by policy sector may well tell 
us more than its characterization as a whole, or the search for an average measure. 
Therefore, the disaggregation strategy will be used to analyze Mercosur in the last 
chapters of this research. However paradoxical it may seem, a pure intergovernmentalist 
approach to an intergovernmental region such as Mercosur is not productive, since no 
major interstate bargaining (such as the Treaty o f Asuncion o f 1991 or the Ouro Preto 
Protocol o f 1994; see chapters 5 and 9) has led to either institutional pooling or 
delegation.
Another crucial feature of integration is its possibility of developing in either a 
negative or positive way (Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998). Negative integration refers 
to the dismantling of national restraints on trade and distortion of competition, while 
positive integration implies common policies that shape the conditions under which 
markets operate (Scharpf 1996). This distinction is highly significant because the former
15 Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) define supranational governance as the competence of the 
European Community to make binding rules, for its member states and citizens, in any given political 
sector.
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may be attained through intergovernmental proceedings, while the latter may require to 
be enforced by supranational organizations and rules. Since negative and positive 
integration are generally sequential, the use of this criterion supports the view of those 
who see the passage of intergovemmentalism to supranationalism as progressive over 
time; however, progressive does not mean irreversible. Mercosur is still completing its 
negative stage of integration, while having already started arduous negotiations to 
advance through the positive phase.
Recapitulation and perspectives
There are some conclusions that are worth reviewing in the above theories. 
Whether theoretical or empirical, these conclusions may prove fruitful for the analysis of 
Mercosur developed below. First o f all, not all the authors agree on calling his or her 
conception o f integration a “theory.” Among them, Schmitter (1996b) and Moravcsik 
(1998) stand out for designating theirs as an “approach” and a “framework” respectively. 
This attitude is alleged to be a recognition of the complexity of the subject matter; 
however, their capacity for both explanation and prediction is no more limited than those 
schools that call themselves “theories”. As this research is not intended to go any further 
in the meta-theoretical field, all of the above listed conceptions will be designated from 
now on as theories, approaches or frameworks indistinctively in the more general 
meaning of each term -except when a different meaning is specified.
A second key element for assessing the reach o f these theories is the role 
allocated to the economy. Most o f the approaches recognize a central position to 
economic aspects such as commercial flows and trade interdependence, while others still 
hold a more culturalist or even institutionalist accent. Among the former (the 
economically driven), an emphasis on political economy is particularly given by 
intergovemmentalism. Likewise, the so-called convergence theories -stressing the 
convergence towards more liberal, deregulated, open, and market-oriented policies on 
the part of previous divergent national economies—  acquire great importance in 
explaining the push for integration in many sub-versions of diverse theories. On the 
contrary, classic neo-realism is unable to account for processes where the economy 
appears as the highest priority -instead of security and power concerns—, just as it is 
when dealing with those that feature non-power values at the top -such as becoming a 
peace and security community, thus eliminating the possibility for any player to lose.
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Regardless of the approach, Mercosur provides challenges to most of the above 
economic assumptions. As Hurrell points out, “it is worth stressing that liberal theories 
(both neo-functionalist and institutionalist) which see co-operation as a response to the 
problems generated by increased interdependence have little to say about the moves 
towards subregional co-operation that gathered pace in the second half of the 1980s. 
Indeed state-led co-operation was a response to declining levels of trade 
interdependence” (Hurrell 1995: 258). Although neofunctionalism did never intend to 
explain initiation, its logic does not adequately fit Mercosur’s further steps either.
A third distinction between contending theories has been that which contrasts 
politicized processes to technical-economic processes. While it is true that the neo­
functionalists have been the main supporters of this distinction, intergovemmentalism has 
also seemed to accept the dyad simply to turn it upside-down, emphasizing the major 
importance of asymmetrical power over technical management. In contrast, my research 
advances a different continuum, running from the politicization pole on one side to the 
institutionalization pole on the other (see Figure 3.1). This choice is due to the 
particularity of the concerned subject matter, Mercosur, which presents a process of non- 
conflictive complementarities between politicians and técnicos -although notably 
featuring a sharp supremacy of the former over the latter— but without supplying it with 
a consistent institutional framework.
. - Figure3.1 .-v: ,
Different uses of the concept npolitidzationw / . ^  '•> * ) - *
Theory Context Continuum and emphasis
Neo-functionalism European Union Politicization Technical management
Intergovemmentalism European Union Politicization -----------  Technical management
Inter-presidentialism Mercosur Politicization -----------------  Institutionalization
Assuming the first above-mentioned use of politicization -as opposed to 
technical management— , Caporaso argues, “power has been strangely downplayed in the 
EC. I can see two reasons for backgrounding power. The first reason is that integration 
studies, as a field, has a ‘technicist’ orientation in a certain sense... The second...has to 
do with the nature of the EC itself’ (Caporaso 1998: 347). However, the mechanism 
through which political leaders agree on general principles and leave the drafting of the
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detailed rules to leading national and supranational technicians is previous to the 
development o f any EU nature: it was the process -lately known as the ‘Messina 
method’— eventually used in the drafting of the Treaties of Rome (Haas 1967: 340). In 
contrast, the second meaning of the concept politicization -as  opposed to 
institutionalized proceedings—  better suits the operation o f Mercosur. Whether this is 
due to Mercosur nature or to its immaturity -hence temporary—  is one of the puzzles 
that drive this research.
I am aware that politicization may be given somewhat different meanings by 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. However, what I am highlighting here is not 
nuances of meaning but emphasis within each theory, along with its contrasting concept. 
In next chapters I will also focus on whether there is any movement along each 
continuum, what are the respective sequences if so, and what the presumed feedback that 
each theory predicts -and reality verifies.
The issue of institutionalization, as discussed above, is certainly not missing in 
the debates on European integration. The role played by the Court of Justice has been 
recognized as crucial to foster integration, especially during the seeming stagnation ages 
of the 1970s and early 1980s (Weiler 1994b; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998). Moreover, 
some authors have arrived to the extent to explicitly propose “an institutionalist theory of 
European integration” (Tsebelis and Kreppel 1998) -albeit still shortly developed and 
empirically feeble. The difference between the two regions under scrutiny, however, is 
that what must be explained in the European Union is the presence (and shape) of 
institutions, whereas in Mercosur the question to be accounted for is their absence.
Until a few years ago, a major difficulty in studying integration was “the single­
case issue” provided by the European experience (Caporaso 1998: 343). Now that 
integration seems to have settled its roots elsewhere, comparative studies have become 
possible. However, while most theorists concerned with integration are now switching 
from international relations to a comparative politics approach, they are doing so 
conceiving the EU as a novel “national case” instead o f approaching it by contrast to 
other regions (Hix 1994; Caporaso 1998; Schmitter 2000). This may be fruitful for a 
better understanding of the European domestic politics or the Europeanization of the 
European national polities, but does not add very much to the understanding of 
integration processes as such. Likewise, the contributions made in the field of public
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policy (Heritier 1996) and regulation theory (Majone 1993) are not yet generalizable to 
other regions in the world.
What are the perspectives, therefore, for the theoretical debate on integration? It 
is highly likely that it will widen up over the next few years, along with the expansion of 
the object itself. The consolidation of regions other than Europe, whether following the 
European model or not, will demand further research to cope with this. However blurred 
this development may appear at present, some of the major debates it will raise are 
foreseeable: a) the prior relevance of micro or macrofoundations; b) the relationship 
between transnational society and supranational institutions; c) the relevance of history 
and path-dependence (Caporaso 1998); d) the scope, limits, and shape of regional 
institutionalization; and e) the role and extension of democracy (at both levels), 
(Bartolini 1998; Schmitter 2000).
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Let us finish this chapter by briefly comparing the theories discussed above on the 
basis of some key variables, as displayed in Figure 3.2. Whereas all these theories have 
been devised to understand the EU evolvement, and thus become part of the decision- 
makers’ background in a feedback process, none of this has yet occurred in Mercosur. 
Neither federalism nor neo-funotionalist spillover was in the minds of the founders, nor
ci •e-,.'f : ■
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have they found their way into the founding treaties. Rather, it seems that the eventual 
analyses and decisions profited from the failure of past Latin American experiences, 
which were seen as excessively ambitious in terms of institutions, and naive regarding the 
faith on supranationality. The dichotomy, in practice if not in theory, opposed 
supranationalism to intergovemmentalism; and the former was clearly defeated by the 
latter. Whether it has worked well so far, and whether it is likely to be sufficient in the 
future, is the central matter of the following chapters.
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C H A PTER  4
T H E  LATIN A M E R IC A N  N O T-SO -S U C C E S SFU L E X P E R IE N C E S
Introduction (eariy antecedents)
The unity of Latin America has long been an ubiquitous component of the 
regional political discourse. As Mace (1988: 404) points out, “the wars for independence 
were not yet over before proposals for political unity began to be heard throughout the 
newly independent territories/’ Simón Bolivar, the Venezuelan liberator, established his 
belief in a sort of United States of Hispanoamérica in his messages to the Congresses of 
Angostura (1819) and Panama (1826), which can be fairly considered as the first 
attempts at regional integration in the continent.
As omnipresent as the idea of a continental union could appear, the real unity of 
Hispanic Latin America was never but a myth. Although it was true that most of the 
region shared a common culture, language and religion,16 the divisive factors at work 
long outweighed those pushing toward unity. Among the natural obstacles, large 
distances were paramount -be  they by ground or by sea. Geography made 
communications extremely difficult, and contemporary technology was not enough to 
overcome such a shortcoming. Still, the social obstacles were even more serious: Spain 
had developed an administrative system aimed at extracting resources and controlling the 
territory from a single center, that of Spain itself. Consequently, its American colonies 
were seldom connected to one another, and territorial as well as regulative disputes were 
conducive to jealousy, rivalry and competition between them. This is why the end of the 
independence wars frequently led to civil strife, and conflict over borders has become an 
enduring source of problems that some Latin American countries still face today.
Administrative necessities, along with the impossibility of arriving at any kind of 
confederate arrangement, ended up in the division of Hispanic South America into nine 
independent countries out of the originally established Viceroyalty of Peru. Central 
America, though of a much smaller size, followed a similar pattern of fragmentation, 
Mexico standing as the only original viceroyalty that managed to conserve most of its 
territory. On the other hand, Portugal’s larger colony -Brazil—  kept its unity in spite of
16 Ernst Haas has turned this apparent advantage upside down, in affirming that while “Europe is 
divided by language and religion, but united by regionally similar social and economic conditions and 
institutions, Latin America is united merely by language and religion" (Haas 1967: 333, emphasis 
added).
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its huge extension and its many internal differences. In part, this was due to the fact that 
the Portuguese Imperial Court was directly transferred to Brazil between 1808 and 1821, 
thus contributing to the centralization of power -and to the legitimization o f the hence 
strengthened central government.17
The numerous obstacles to cultural and economic interrelations faced by the 
Latin American countries, combined with the failure of the attempts at political 
unification throughout the nineteenth century, led to a decline in support for the idea of 
integration. It was later replaced by pan-Americanism, a water-downed concept of 
continental unity for the management o f international relations in the region, from the 
1870s to the late 1950s. After World War II, the emphasis was dramatically changed 
from political unity to economic integration.18 Many factors were responsible for this 
turn, among them the functionalist theory’s argument that international organization -  
aimed at world peace as ultimate goal—  would be better served by functional 
arrangements in economic, social, and cultural affairs than by political or federal 
integration. Such reasoning notwithstanding, the decisive thrust toward Latin American 
integration came from the newly instituted United Nations Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA, or Comisión Económica para América Latina - CEPAL) 
(Wionczek 1970; Versiani 1987; Mace 1988).
ECLA’s proposal was aimed at the enlargement of national markets through the 
constitution of a Latin American common market. The coalition of technocrats and 
reformist politicians led by Raúl Prebisch, then the Commission’s executive secretary, 
considered that economic cooperation was the only means to overcoming traditional 
dependence on primary commodity export trade. The rationale behind such project was 
the understanding that the heretofore model o f development -so-called import- 
substitution industrialization (ISI)— was reaching its limit of exhaustion within the 
national markets. Therefore, larger markets entailing economic diversification and
17 Even after declaring its independence from Portugal in 1822, Brazil kept the imperial form of 
government until 1889, when the First Republic was instituted and a federal constitution was swore.
18 One of the first projects of economic integration in the twentieth century dates back to 1909, when a 
group of politicians and businesspeople proposed the creation of a Southern Customs Union in which 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay would participate. Between 1933 and 1935, 
Argentina’s Justo and Brazil’s Vargas signed nineteen protocols in the framework of reciprocal 
presidential visits. Around 1950, Argentina’s Perón dreamed of the ABC triangle as a strategic alliance 
with Chile’s Ibanez and Vargas himself -just returned to power in Brazil. In the early ‘60s, Argentina’s 
Frondizi and Brazil’s Quadros signed the Declaración de Uruguayana in an attempt to foster and 
coordinate their developmental policies (Fraga 1999). However, none of these attempts flourished.
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technological modernization were an urgent need in order to advance further 
development across the region (Wionczek 1970; Versiani 1987). A second, rather 
political goal sought by the proponents of integration, was to build regional blocs able to 
counterbalance US dominance in the region (Grugel 1996). Other accounts also mention 
the creation of the European Community as triggering the integrative efforts, on grounds 
that the resultant trade diversion having place in Europe was damaging Latin American 
countries that were primary-commodity exporters (Mattli 1999).
The drive for regional integration brought about two waves of integration efforts 
in the following two decades. The first one saw the establishment of the broad Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the narrower Central American 
Common Market (CACM) in 1960; the second one led to the creation of the Andean 
Pact (CAN) in 1969 and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 1973 (Mace 1988). 
Although some of these processes reached an apparent success during their early years, 
and most of them are still in existence -whether slightly or radically changed— , none 
achieved the initial objectives. By the beginning of the 1990s Latin America still was an 
underdeveloped and highly unequal region, and its national economies had neither grown 
enough to improve most o f its population’s living standards nor become complementarity 
specialized as planned. Moreover, the dependence on, and unbalance to the United States 
had not withered away but deepened further. The next sections revisit the historical 
process of each of the four mentioned associations, to finally draw some general 
conclusions regarding the causes of their failure.
Broad experiences: LAFTA and ALADI
Shortly after the creation o f the European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and
the European Economic Community (1957), Latin America was already beginning to 
take its first substantial steps towards regional integration. In 1960 the Latin American 
Free Trade Association (LAFTA, or Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio - 
A L A L Q , that in 1980 would become the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA, 
or Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración - ALADI), was instituted. The Treaty of 
Montevideo, giving birth to LAFTA, was subscribed by six South American countries —  
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay— plus Mexico, aiming at a Latin 
American common market through a progressive process o f ‘articulation and 
convergence’ of the sub-regional integration initiatives. Colombia and Ecuador joined
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LAFTA in 1961, Venezuela in 1966, and Bolivia in 1967, raising regional membership to 
eleven.
The LAFTA agreement provided for the creation of a free-trade zone, by means 
of periodical and selective negotiations between its member states. This choice -  
negotiation at the discretion of the member states rather than automatic reduction of 
import duties— made LAFTA trade opening program develop reasonably well in its first 
years, lose impetus as of 1965, and almost come to a complete standstill in the 1970s. 
Thus, despite its having stimulated mutual trading between member states, the distance 
between its original objectives and the results obtained was badly large. To make things 
even worse, multilateralism -a  mechanism that obliged countries that reached a bilateral 
agreement to expand it further to all the other partners— reduced the advantage of 
making concessions, as it would carry no compensation by third countries who would 
also benefit from such concessions.
One of LAFTA’s proclaimed principles was reciprocity. It was understood as the 
obligation by the member countries to expand their imports to the same extent as their 
exports increase. However, the nonexistence of institutions able to monitor and enforce 
reciprocity, together with the high asymmetry between the partners, turned the principle 
into dead letter. LAFTA was indeed composed of three groups: the semi-industrial 
‘giants’ Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico; a middle group led by Chile, Colombia, and 
Venezuela; and the group of least-developed economies that included Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Paraguay. As the benefits o f integration were soon perceived to favor predominantly 
the larger countries at the expense of the smaller ones, the latter started to raise 
complains that would further lead to the constitution of a subregional group within 
LAFTA: the Andean Pact.
According to Wionczek (1970: 64), the causes for the failure of LAFTA were 
“[a] large differences in development levels in the area; [b] the existence of a sizable 
margin for national import-substitution policies in the large and middle-sized republics; 
[c] the defence o f the status quo by domestic industrial groups thriving behind national 
tariff walls; [d] the improvement of the traditional export sector leading to a relaxation of 
the pressure for structural modernization; [e] the aid and credit practices of the capital 
exporting countries; and, finally, [f] the fear of the predominance of foreign private 
capital in an expanded regional market.” The first three causes alongside the fifth one 
have all a common element, namely regional heterogeneity. Such absence of convergence
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among Latin American economies, coupled with shared economic and ideological factors 
cited as causes [d] and [f], would finally decide the fate of LAFTA. As Mace (1988: 413) 
put it, LAFTA “never really got off the ground and this spill-around situation was 
maintained throughout the 1970s until the member countries decided to transform 
LAFTA into the Latin American Association for Integration.”
The Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), created in 1980 to replace 
LAFTA, used other means to pursue integration. In place of the free-trade zone 
established by LAFTA, an economic preference zone was established creating conditions 
favorable to the growth of bilateral initiatives -as necessary prelude to the institution of 
multilateral relationships in Latin America. ALADI thus made possible subregional 
agreements limited to the countries wishing to carry out joint action, without compelling 
them to extend the accorded benefits and concessions unto third countries. Although the 
establishment of a common market still was a long-term objective, the new Treaty of 
Montevideo displayed more realism and modesty than the older one. Among its guiding 
principles, flexibility and gradualism substituted for fixed reciprocity and automatic 
extension to all partners (García Martinez 1987).
Not only did ALADI favored the internal clustering of countries according to 
subregional criteria, but it also fostered integration limited to branches or sectors of 
production. This fragmentative spirit aimed at building up the region from its 
components toward the whole rather than the other way round. Departing from either 
geographically or sectoral limited agreements, the process would thus progressively 
converge into a broader uniting (Versiani 1987).
ALADI was (only) slightly more fruitful that its predecessor LAFTA. It 
simultaneously framed and constituted part of the third wave of regional integration in 
Latin America, of which Mercosur was to represent the most visible outcome. The 
renewing of the integrative thrust provided by ALADI also helped reinvigorate hitherto 
dying regional blocs such as the Andean Pact. The next sections undertake an assessment 
of the real performance and likely perspectives of the aforementioned subregional 
attempts at integration, namely those taking place in Central America and in the Andean 
region.
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Subregional experiences: the Central American Common Market
The Treaty of Managua, signed by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua, established the Central American Common Market (CACM) in 1960. Costa 
Rica joined the bloc in 1963. Not only were economic reasons at the origin of the 
agreement, but also utmost political causes. Among them, the perceived threat put by the 
Cuban revolution was highly significant (Schmitter 1972), and it partly explains the 
greater support the new region received from the US respective to that enjoyed by 
LAFTA.
Created at the same time as LAFTA as part of the first wave of regional 
integration in Latin America, the CACM “went much further and... was much more 
responsive to ECLA’s proposals than LAFTA” (Mace 1988: 411). By the late 1960s it 
was widely recognized as “the underdeveloped world’s most successful regional 
integration effort” (Wynia 1970: 319). Measured by the growth of trade within their 
respective areas, the achievements of the CACM long exceeded those o f LAFTA. 
However, it would not last much longer: the so-called Football W ar of 1969 between El 
Salvador and Honduras unleashed a severe blow upon the process —whose difficulties 
had started before the war in any case.
Initially, the CACM performed remarkably well. By 1965 the level and scope of 
integration approximated that of a customs union: most internal tariffs had been 
abolished and a common external tariff on most items had been created (Wynia 1970; 
Mattli 1999). Furthermore, a number of complementary regional treaties had been 
signed, and the institutional structure o f the bloc was acquiring an ever-growing 
complexity. This progress was basically due to technical -i.e . non-politicized— 
management (Wynia 1970), and to the low political and economic costs of integration -  
since it did not threaten any powerful interests, while the administration expenses were 
paid by foreign sources (J. Nye, as cited in Wynia 1970; cf. also Mattli 1999). However, 
the actual fragility of the achievements became apparent as the task of holding the 
integrative structure together, instead o f expanding it, turned out to be the principal 
concern of regional leaders after the boom of the first years. The result was an expansion 
in the scope of the tasks performed by an increasing number o f regional institutions, 
without a concomitant increase in the authority of such institutions -that is, in the level 
of regional decision-making. Schmitter (1970) called this mechanism spill-around, to
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distinguish it from the expected spillover with which neofunctionalists described 
European integration.
The reasons for CACM failure are still controversial, although most analysts 
agree that its previous attainments had been overpublicized (Wynia 1970; Wionczek 
1970). According to Wionczek (1970: 64), “many of CACM’s difficulties prior to the 
Honduras-El Salvador war were due largely to an overemphasis on regional trade 
liberalization on the one hand, and, on the other, to a neglect of joint industrial policies.” 
The latter was mainly due to the domination of the regional market by foreign capital, 
which limited the margin for maneuver of the already weak central institutions -thus 
turning them unable to develop any kind of special treatment for the less developed 
members of the integration scheme (Mace 1988: 414). On the contrary, Mattli (1999) 
claims that it was precisely the role played by a foreign country -namely the US—  what 
explains the initial success of the process. Through the supply of leadership (and 
resources), the US eased the process of policy coordination and facilitated the reaching 
o f agreements, turning integration into a positive-sum game. However, this argument 
contradicts accepted accounts on Latin American integration as a means of 
counterbalancing US dominance (Grugel 1996) without providing conclusive evidence, 
and does not adequately explain why the process finally failed. At any rate, it is clear that 
the costs that national governments had to pay for the integration to start were growing 
over time, until they turned to be unbearable for domestic leaders. In acknowledging this 
oblivion, Wynia has claimed for bringing the nation-state back in.
“ liin-THiiiirfCr- -  ‘ ‘ Table4.1  
te r ita l  Aræncan Common Market: national figures and democratic stability/
Population
(millions)
GNP
($ billions)
GNP per capita 
($PPP)
Regime
breakdown
Democratization
Costa Rica 4 9,8 5,812 - 1948
El Salvador 6 11,2 4,008 1979 1984
Guatemala 11 17,8 3,474 1963 and 1982 ]966 and 1985
Honduras 6 4,6 2,338 1963 1981
Nicaragua 5 1,8 1,896 1979 1990
NB: The bloc was founded in 1960; Costa Rica joined in 1963. Dates in italics designate an elected 
government that held power by extra-constitutional means. For some countries such as El Salvador 
and Nicaragua, the 1980s witnessed the first wave of authentic democratization ever.
SOURCE: own elaboration; economic data, corresponding to year 1998, from World Bank Development 
Indicators 2000.
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Local circumstances were decisive for the fate of the CACM. Table 4.1 shows, 
alongside basic current figures, how all members except Costa Rica have suffered from 
permanent instability ever. (It should be remarked that, unlike the Andean countries, 
many Central American countries did not enjoy democratic regimes before the dates 
signaling a breakdown, regime change therefore meaning an alternation between 
authoritarian governments.) Traditional authoritarianism, together with political 
instability and civil strife, made a great deal to hinder the integrative efforts. Wynia 
(1970: 331) thus focuses on national policymaking in order to challenge the conventional 
wisdom that depicted “Central American presidents as ‘strong men’ rather than as 
insecure leaders constantly harassed by competing power contenders.” He insightfully 
suggests to explore “the effects o f the national political roles o f presidents on their 
implementation of regional commitments” (Wynia 1970: 331), an aspect that had been 
long overlooked -and, strange enough, would continue to be.
In the early 1990s, pacification and democratization led to a revival of the once- 
moribund CACM (Grugel 1996; Mattli 1999). This time, however, the US would 
constitute a direct threat to the region instead of a leader, hegemon, or donor, since its 
participation in NAFTA jeopardizes the position and markets of the CACM by 
privileging partnership with Mexico. To make things worse, the institutional 
configuration of the group is so cumbersome as to turn policy coordination and regional 
decision*making into a colossal feat.
The mechanism of spill-around activated forty years ago has marked Central 
American integration ever since. As far as regional integration concerns, this is certainly 
the most disordered and confusing area in the continent. The process of institutional 
development has been accumulative and non-centralized, and only in 1991 the Protocol 
of Tegucigalpa -enforced two years later—  included all but a few existent organizations 
under the umbrella of the Central American Integration System (SICA). As late as 1996, 
however, the region featured eight different levels of country participation in schemes of 
cooperation and integration, with associations ranging from two through nine countries 
without solution of continuity (see Table 4.2).
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I  - T ab le4 .2  . 1 
I  Eevel of country participation in Central American schem es o f regional, s ' I  
|  cooperation and integration, 19%  - ^  I
Integration scheme Number of Member countries
members
Customs Union 2 Guatemala and El Salvador
Northern Triangle 3 + Honduras
Central America-4 (common parliament) 4 + Nicaragua
CACM 5 + Costa Rica
Central American Integration System 6 + Panama
ALIDES (Sustainable Development Alliance) 7 6 + Belize
CORECA (Council of Agrarian Coop.) S 6 + Mexico and Dominican Republic
OIRSA (Agrarian Health) 9 6 + Belize, Mexico and Dominican
Republic
SOURCE: CEPAL-BID 1998: 30.
The fact that Central American institutions did not emerge as a coherent system, 
but were built along disparate stop-and-go processes, left as imprint a still messy and 
mostly inefficient web of entities (CEPAL-BID 1998). Schmitter (1970) thought such a 
muddle was a feature of the whole process, not just of its institutions. In his words, “the 
Central American process has never... been a movement rooted in widespread 
satisfaction, identity of purpose or consensus on basic values. Rather it has developed 
from a series of crises related to uneven performance, periodic dissatisfactions and 
conflicting purposes” (Schmitter 1970: 48). As early as 1970, his prognosis was that 
economic integration in Central America would probably survive the Football War, but 
political integration would probably not. By the late 1980s, it was not exaggerated to 
affirm that he might have been too optimistic. However, only shortly thereafter, Central 
America would undergo a firm shift toward both democratization at the national level 
and the relaunching of integration at the regional level. The institutionalization of the 
presidential meetings as of 1991 was, according to a joined report by the CEP AL 
(ECLA) and the Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (1998: 35), “un factor clave en el 
renovado dinamismo del proceso de cooperación e integración en Centroamérica, y  ha 
... permitido lograr avances de significativa importancia para el desarrollo regional.” 
So-called ‘collective presidentialism’, if something, has given an important contribution 
to the revival of Central American integration; however, it still is a languid process with 
much way to go before becoming what it once aspired to be.
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Subregional experiences: the Andean Community
The Andean Pact (or Andean Group), predecessor of the Andean Community
(CAN), was established in 1969 within the framework of LAFTA. Together with 
CARICOM, it formed part of the second wave of integration processes in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Its goals were to improve the conditions for participation of the less 
developed countries encompassed by the LAFTA agreements, while simultaneously 
aiming at the gradual formation of a Latin American Common Market. Five countries 
signed its founding treaty, the Cartagena Agreement: Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, 
and Peru. Venezuela joined the group in 1973, but Chile withdrew in 1976. The Andean 
Group constituted an agreement stemming from, and depending on, the Treaty of 
Montevideo, and would not acquire juridical autonomy until 1983, when the Tratado de 
Creación del Tribunal de Justicia del Acuerdo de Cartagena entered into force. In the 
1990s, after a period of stagnation and crisis, the integration process was relaunched and 
its institutional structure was strengthened.
The emergence of the Andean Pact was a direct response to LAFTA’s failure, 
and its integration scheme was more far-reaching than anything ever before realized in 
this field in all o f the Third World (Mace 1988). Two main features characterized it. At 
the economic level, it relied on two parallel processes: inter-regional trade liberalization 
and regional industrial planning. At the political level, it created a decision-making 
structure including two main institutions, the Commission and the Junta, whose 
respective majority-rule voting and binding supranational authority were as ambitious as 
exceptional.19 An additional element was an extensive program o f special treatment for 
the less developed countries in the group (i.e. Bolivia and Ecuador).
The process of Andean integration had started in 1966 when two democratic 
presidents, those from Chile and Colombia, invited their counterparts to examine 
alternative courses of action to LAFTA. The subsequent instability of democracy in most 
partner countries would become a major liability for the process, whose origin and 
development were boldly marked by the character of the domestic political regimes.
19 Within the intergovernmental Commission, responsible for all the major decisions concerning the 
integration process, no member country was allowed to unilaterally veto community decisions except on 
very important subjects. In turn the Junta, endowed with administrative, agenda-setting, and decision- 
implementation functions, enjoyed supranational powers that entitled it to take resolutions binding on all 
member countries -a t least formally (Mace 1988).
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Table 4.3 shows, alongside basic current figures, how all founding members except 
Colombia were undergoing democratic breakdowns around 1970.
T able4.3
Andean Community: national figures and democratic stability
Population GNP GNP per capita Democratic Democratic
(millions) ($ billions) ($ PPP) breakdown restoration
Bolivia 8 8,0 2,205 1971 1982
Chile 15 73,9 8,507 1973 1990
Colombia 41 100,7 5,861 - -
Ecuador 12 18,4 3,003 7970/72 1979
Peru 25 60,5 4,180 1968 and 1992 1980 and 1994
Venezuela 23 82,1 5,706 1999 **
NB: The bloc was founded in 1969; Venezuela joined in 1973, Chile withdrew in 1976. Dates in italics 
designate an elected government that held power by extra-constitutional means.
So u rce : own elaboration; economic data, corresponding to year 1998, from World Bank Development 
Indicators 2000.
Although the Andean Pact performed quite satisfactorily in its early years, the 
enlargement to Venezuela and the withdrawal of Chile generated a succession of major 
crises. Given the complexity of the Andean integration scheme, those events led to the 
renegotiation of some important mechanisms of the process and, in the end, to the 
complete abandonment of the original integration schedule (Mace 1988). Apart from the 
rigidity of the Agreement, the failure was given many other reasons: (a) unequal 
distribution of costs and benefits, (b) politicization of integration issues, (c) 
incompatibility o f national policies, (d) non-compliance of the member countries with the 
Andean Decisions (Vargas-Hidalgo 1979), (e) great political instability, and (f) lack of 
regional leadership (Mattli 1999). While causes (c -incompatibility) and (e -instability) 
were basically domestic, the others were intrinsic to the integration endeavor. Among 
them, two variables were related to power issues -both (a -distribution) and (f - 
leadership)— and still two to institutional issues -both (b -politicization) and (d -non- 
compliance). One of the recipes proposed to overcome the crisis was to build regional 
institutions able to settle conflicts between members, and so was done. The result was 
the creation of the Court o f  Justice and the Andean Parliament in 1979.20 However, this 
institutions lacked real weight -due to, in neofunctionalist terms, the precedence of form
20 The Court entered into activity in 1983; the Parliament is still comprised of representatives of the 
national congresses, but plans are laid for that they be directly elected by 2002.
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over function. The integration process would not see the light at the end of the tunnel 
until 1987, when the Quito Protocol was signed in order to flexibilize the working 
mechanisms of the bloc.
• Table 4 .4  - > ^
Andean Integration System
Ruling Bodies
Andean Presidential Council (intergovernmental)
Community Institutions 
Andean Business Advisory Council
Andean Council of Foreign Ministers (intergov.) Andean Labor Advisory Council
Commission of the Andean Community (supranat.) Andean Development Corporation (CAF)
'General Secretariat (supranational) Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR)
Andean Parliament (supranational) Simón Bolívar Andean University
Court of Justice (supranational) Social Conventions
The renewed institutional structure of the Andean Pact was broader and deeper 
than that of any other region in Latin America -incidentally, as it had also been since its 
very origins. Nevertheless, it was not until all presidents met in 1989 that the region 
firmly embarked on a process of deepening and opening; and the setting of the Andean 
Presidential Council in 1990 was to consolidate such a bid. The Presidential Council is 
comprised by the presidents of the member countries, and constitutes the highest-level 
body of the Andean Integration System (AIS). In turn, the AIS is the series of bodies and 
institutions that, working in coordination, directs the process o f  integration and governs 
over its operation (Table 4.4).
In 1997 the Junta became the General Secretariat o f the Andean Community, the 
executive body of the renamed bloc, while the Commission kept its role as central rule- 
maker. Today, the legal principle o f direct effect and the preeminence of the community 
law make the Andean Community the second region in the world according to the level 
of formal institutionalization, only behind the European Union. Its economic record, 
however, is far less impressive. Although a free trade zone is in force since 1993 -first 
between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, with Peru being incorporated 
later— and a common external tariff is operative since February 1, 1995, not economic 
development but social turmoil, political instability and economic failure have been the 
mark of the region. Furthermore, a brief war between Ecuador and Peru was waged in 
1995 on grounds o f territorial disputes. The balance of the process could not be more 
ambiguous: despite the highly institutionalized organization and the commitment to
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establish a common market by the year 2005 at the latest, the Andean countries have not 
yet succeeded in creating a region of peace, stability and development. As a result, some 
of them have opted for negotiating complementary agreements with third countries or 
regions (e.g. Colombia and Venezuela with Mexico, and Bolivia with Mercosur).
The stages of the Andean integration process can be summarized as follows: a 
first, brief period o f progress from 1969 to 1973; a long period of stagnation and crisis 
between 1973 and 1987/89; and the relaunching of the process since then. Yet the last 
two stages were not homogeneous: while the apparent failure of the earlier covered a 
wide process of broad institution-building, the apparent success of the later disguised a 
serious crisis between 1991 and 1994, a series of democratic comedowns, and even a 
war between two member states.
Whatever the appraisal regarding the performance of the Andean Community 
may be, most authors agree that any lately success should be acknowledged to one major 
institutional actor: the Andean Presidential Council. Lloreda Ricaurte, who served as 
General Director of the Andean Secretariat, observed that “Zn participación activa de los 
presidentes [en el Consejo Presidencial Andino] ha sido un factor de primer orden en 
la consolidación y la profundización del proceso andino de integración” (Lloreda 
Ricaurte 1988: 121). Likewise, Majluf (1999: 84) pointed out that “esta instancia fue la 
responsable de la reactivación del proceso de integración a partir de 1989.” It came as 
no surprise that the crisis undergone by the region between 1991 and 1994 coincided 
with the lapse in which the Presidential Council did not meet -basically due to the 
temporal suspension of Peru in the wake of Fujimori’s 1992 autogolpe. From 1995, **el 
Consejo Presidencial Andino se reúne nuevamente retomando el liderazgo del proceso 
de integración, lo que se plasmó posteriormente en la reforma institucional del sistema 
de integración andino, en la creación de la Comunidad Andina, y en la profundización 
y aceleración del proceso de integración” (Majluf 1999: 84). Along the same line, da 
Cruz Vilaga remarked on the crucial role performed by the presidents in supporting the 
process and reforming the regional institutions. In his words, “após urna fase 
‘convulsiva ’ de 1991 a 1994, a melhoria do clima de confianqa entre os países andinos, 
a realizando da integrando económica através da instaurando de urna zona de comércio 
livre, a adopgao de urna tarifa exterior comum e a decisüo de arrancar para a 
harmonizando das políticas macroeconómicas e o inicio da participando activa dos 
presidentes andinos no processo de integrando criaram o incentivo e as condigóes
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contextuáis pora a reforma das instituigoes andinas” (da Cruz Vila9a 1999: 429/30). As 
in the Central American case, democratic presidentialism seems to have provided a basis 
for the region to overcome some of its traditional weaknesses -although the Andean 
Community still remains far from a wholly successful one.
Conclusion (on scarce convergence and inadequate institutionalization)
Before the 1990s, all attempts at integration in Latin America failed due to
different factors. Summing up, as most significant among them can be cited (a) the low 
level of prior interdependence, (b) the scarce convergence regarding levels of 
development and economic policies, (c) the political instability brought about by the 
frequent breakdowns o f democracy, and (d) the adoption o f either too week or too rigid 
regional institutions. As will be dealt with below, Mercosur also suffered from the two 
former drawbacks, but was still able to overcome them -at least in part— via the stability 
of democracy and the prudence in choosing an adequate and flexible institutional 
structure. The case I make is that the latter two were somehow connected, since a 
specific institutional type of democracy articulated with a loose regional 
institutionalization to bolster the process. Both the Andean and the Central American 
region started to follow a similar path after years of unequivocal failure.
. i : - *; ' "V y Table 4 .5  
Historical factors for integration failu
Character
Domestic
Political
Democratic instability
Scope Regional Inadequate institutionalization
Economic
Underdevelopment and 
zigzagging policies
Low interdependence
Table 4.5 classifies the four factors of failure above cited according to two 
criteria: character (either political or economic) and scope (either domestic or regional). 
What strikes the most is that recent progress in Latin American regionalism was due to 
political factors, not to economic ones -which have not changed a great deal. This come 
back of politics should not be such a surprise though. Haas (1967: 338-9) had already 
called attention to the fact that, given that political parties and parliaments were not 
regarded as “sufficiently central to the political process in some Latin American countries 
to serve the function their counterparts played in Europe”, technocrats were frequently 
encouraged to take their place as brokers within the integration process. Henceforth, it
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was the failure by Latin American técnicos to accomplish such role what led to the 
stagnation or reversal of most integrative endeavors until the late 1980s, when leading 
politicians decided to take the task on them.
■ Table 4 .6  • • •**' 
V 1' O u tom es o f  integratfon s c h e m a
(Uncontested) regional leadership
YES NO
3 2
Relatively
significant
European Union EFTA (after 1973)
NAFTA Asia Pacific Economic
Zollverein Cooperation Forum (APEC)
EFTA (until 1973) MERCOSUR
(Potential) 2 1
market gains 
from integration
Relatively
insignificant
CACM (until 1969) Bavaria-Württemberg Customs 
Union
Middle German Commercial 
Union
Economic Community of West 
African States 
ASEAN
CACM (after 1969)
Andean Pact 
Caribbean Community 
LAFTA
References: success rate: 3 = highest; 1 = lowest. 
Source: Mattli 1999: 66.
The historical mismatching between economic interests and political 
arrangements has frequently been noted, especially along the last two decades. Grugel 
and Almeida Medeiros (1999: 56) argue that “integration in LAC failed in the past 
because of a lack of real economic interests between LAC firms, despite the complex de 
jure structures of integration that were created.” Likewise, Mattli focuses on demand 
and supply of integration as sine-qua-non conditions for success, the latter being 
indisputable political. He argues that, once “political leaders are willing to initiate an 
integration process, chances of sustained success are greatest if two strong integration 
conditions are satisfied: first, a regional group stands to reap important gains from 
integration; second, the group is led by a country able to serve as an institutional focal 
point and regional pay-master” (Mattli 1999: 64-5). The classification of integration 
schemes according to Mattli’s criteria is displayed in table 4.6. This typology has two 
main drawbacks though: first, it does not account for differences concerning the level of 
integration; to cite an instance, NAFTA cannot be plausibly compared to the European
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Union as if they were equivalent entities -not to speak of the Zollverein. Second, the 
model does not explain the character of regional institutionalization either; in so doing, it 
neglects the crucial difference between the presence and absence of supranational 
decision-making bodies. Besides, the argument stating Germany’s role as the so-called 
‘benign hegemon’ in Europe is quite controversial -as developed in chapter 2; and so is 
his interpretation of the US as regional paymaster in the first years o f the CACM. Finally, 
Mattli does not measure the ‘success rate’ of the regions but offers instead a rather 
impressionistic valuation, thus diminishing further the accuracy of his insights.
Be that as it may, the turn of the last decade meant a watershed in what Latin 
American integration regards. The birth o f Mercosur in the first place, but also the 
relaunching of both the Andean and the Central American regional efforts, may well be 
marking a new beginning -although it is still too early to say. Many were the factors that 
brought about such a revival; crucial among them were the restoration (or inauguration!) 
o f democracy all across the region, the resolution of border and military conflicts, and 
the homogenizing constraints that the national economies ought to face in the wake of 
global processes. And still, economic interdependence was absent from the picture. As 
illustrated above, what accounted for the relative success of the new attempts was a 
political variable, not an economic one. In short, it was the direct involvement of the 
national presidents the institutional novelty accompanying the regional renaissance. Table 
4.7 displays the key dates of all three subregional processes, showing how their 
momentous transformations took place only after the establishment of decision-making 
bodies made up of the national presidents.
TiiW JmB iSSiiK i i n j j
Start of 
regional 
integration
Momentous 
transformation 
of the process
Foundation of 
Regional 
Parliament
Foundation of 
Regional Coun 
of Justice
Establishment of 
Presidential 
Summits
1960
[l
1991 1987 1992 1987/91
| 1969
l
1996 1987 1983 1989
1991 — - - 1991
ta is swelled out in chapter 5.
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Even close witnesses to the events failed to foresee the possibilities opened up by 
the direct intervention of the presidents as a working mechanism. For instance, Carlos 
García Martinez (1987), who served as president of the Argentinean delegation to 
LAFTA-ALADI from 1976 through 1986, believed that the absence of homogeneity 
(“the most fundamental law of integration”) between Argentina and Brazil exceeded the 
limits of the flexible framework provided by ALADI. According to his view, the Treaty 
signed in 1985 between Argentina and Brazil went beyond the real possibilities of these 
countries to enforce and accomplish it, and slipped back into some of the false beliefs 
that led to the building and failure of LAFTA. In fighting against “the myths of Latin 
American integration” he fell into the same pitfall he was intended to disclose, since even 
the myth of Latin American eternal failure could sometime be proven wrong.
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C H A P T E R  5
T H E  S U C C E S S F U L  E X P E R IE N C E  O F  M E R C O S U R  
Introduction (what?)
Mercosur, Spanish acronym that stands for Mercado Común del Sur (Common 
Market o f the South), is a political and economic association consisting of Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay as full members. These countries share the territories 
located in the southern extreme o f South America, the so-called Southern Cone, along 
with Chile -which is also an associate member of Mercosur. The other associate 
member, Bolivia, is socially and economically split between an Andean and a Southern 
alignment, the latter gaining weight lately. The region mainly develops toward the South 
Atlantic Ocean, despite Brazil’s vicinity to the Caribbean basin and Chile’s increasing 
interaction with the Pacific rim countries.
Established in 1991, Mercosur is one of the most notorious members of the third 
wave of integration throughout the Americas. Its sister region, as far as timing regards, is 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), located at the other extreme of 
the continent. However, whereas the latter comprises three countries with different levels 
of development, Mercosur gathers only developing countries. In addition, it is a pure 
Latin American group, what plausibly makes its success even more puzzling.
Mercosur has changed, by the mid-1990s, what was a free-trade zone among its 
member countries into a customs union, with a long-term goal of becoming a common 
market. Such an organization constitutes one of the most developed forms of regional 
integration, only transcended by the economic union. Beyond this broad substantive 
classification, it should be noted that the shape assumed so far is distinctive of the region, 
thus different from any previous or contemporaneous experience. As observed by Peña 
(1998a: 2), Mercosur is “un caso de regionalismo abierto en el marco de la 
Organización Mundial de Comercio,...un proceso de integración original que no sigue 
necesariamente una metodología similar a la empleada en Europa.”
In 1999, Mercosur covered an area with over 205 million inhabitants and has an 
overall Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of nearly 1,100 billion dollars -more than 50 
percent o f the Latin American GDP21. It has become the most successful case of
21 Latin America consists of nineteen countries, including Cuba and excluding Puerto Rico. The figures 
are from the World Bank report, 1997.
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integration among developing countries, due to its concept of open regionalism as much 
as to its members’ performance regarding rapid economic growth, inflation taming, and 
structural reform (privatization, deregulation and trade opening). As for the credibility of 
the new policies, it is not of little importance that they were accomplished within the 
framework of sustained processes of democracy consolidation.
The most evident accomplishments of Mercosur have been a notorious increase 
in intra-regional trade -along with a parallel increase in extra-regional trade (see Tables 
5.1 and 5.2)— , a strong augmentation of direct foreign investment (see Table 5.3) and a 
growing international interest in Mercosur by investors as well as by governments and 
technicians (Nofal 1997b). Whilst the first indicator shows that trade creation surpassed 
trade diversion (see Table 5.2) -thus denying the negative visions of some World Bank 
reports (Yeats 1997)— , the latter ones show how Mercosur opened its way through the 
global economy, becoming a target of greater interest for businesses and impinging on 
the strategies of enterprises and governments from outside the area. As the two largest 
economies of Mercosur, Argentina and Brazil, are reckoned as global traders, any 
restoration of the policies of economic closure would harm them rather than benefit. 
Such an objective fact bestows additional credibility to the integration project. 
Furthermore, the region’s new orientation made that its constituent countries be seen 
under a new light. As acknowledged in The Economist, “in just five years Mercosur has 
already done much to help its members feature on the world’s map for the new century’’ 
(Reid 1996: 30).
Table 5.1
Mercosur: indicators o f  Interdependence
Argentina
Intra-zone exports 
Gl
1991
1.04
as a proportion of 
9P
1997
2.86
Intra-zone exports 
total e
1991
16.5
as a proportion of 
xports
1997
36.2
Brazil 0.60 1.17 7.3 17.1
Paraguay 4.18 7.48 35.2 62.0
Uruguay 5.58 6.67 35.4 51.4
Mercosur 0.86 1.80 11.1 24.7
Sources: Informe Mercosur N° 3 (1997: 7) and Bouzas (1998: 219).
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•: —V ' .» V ' Table 5 .2  ;
:;.v, f  ; Mercosur trade (imports) 1985-1996: d eation , not diversionWm?
U$S millions Percentage of variation
1985 1990 1996 1990-85 1996-90 1996-85
Intra-Mercosur 1.848 4.241 17.060 129.5% 3023% 823.2%
Extra-Mercosur 17,418 25.061 67.370 43.9% 168.8% 286.8%
Total 19.266 29.302 84.430 52.1% 188.1% 338.2%
Source: Nofal (1997b: 74).
Share of Mercosur and others In direct investment  ^f io ^ ^ i^ e ^ S g ^ S n W e s  
: (percentage over DIF to  Developing Countries excluding C h in a > j | |p H || |K ^
1984-1989 
(annual average)
1991 1995 Variation
95/91
Mercosur ' 10.6% 9.9% 14.7% 48.87c
Chile 3.1% 1.4% 4.9% 243.4%
Mexico 12.2% 12.8% 11.2% -12.47c
India 0.7% 0.4% 2.8% 637.87c
Thailand 3.4% 5.4% 1.07c -81.1%
Source: Secretaría de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales de la República Argentina (1996: 14).
Despite its definite economic dimension, Mercosur has since the beginning had 
broader aims. It was conceived as more than merely business. Its founding members saw 
the future o f Mercosur including the consolidation of a peace and security community in 
the subcontinent, the development o f a social and cultural area that shares common 
historical roots, and an area capable o f responding to global challenges -such as the debt 
crisis of the 1980s—  in a coordinated way. In the short run, however, the main political 
stress was placed on the guarantees for democracy that such a rapprochement between 
Argentina and Brazil, the two strongest powers of the region, could bring about 
(Schmitter 1991; Hurrell 1995; Lafer 1997; Fournier 1999).
The success o f Mercosur can be seen as the firmest step towards the achievement 
of the libertadores' s dream: a free, united and borderless Latin America. Government 
officials, as well as local analysts, frequently say that the four countries’ giving birth to 
the region have not only responded to the new challenges they faced, but also to their 
huge history in common. It is, however, difficult to sustain that integration was a firm 
goal for generations o f descendants of Portuguese and Spanish conquerors and settlers -
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or indeed for the first original inhabitants of these lands and those brought later from 
Africa. Given that previous attempts at integration have all failed forcibly, it should be 
assumed that the success of Mercosur so far depends on more recent developments; 
among them must be especially underlined those which have taken place since the end of 
the last dictatorships (Lafer 1997; Peña 1998b).
History: antecedents and early evolution (when?)
The current integration process can be reckoned as beginning in the 1980s, when
the democratization processes were initiated in the region. Democracy would 
consequently become one of the main goals as well as an indispensable condition of 
support for the reached agreements. However, the first steps were taken in 1979, under 
the military presidencies of Jorge Videla in Argentina and Joâo Figueiredo in Brazil. That 
year both countries, together with General Stroessner’s Paraguay, signed a trilateral 
agreement regarding the Paraná basin. This agreement settled many disputes on the use 
of hydric resources in the region, including the inconveniences and perceived threats to 
Argentina that would have been created by the construction of the giant Itaipu dam 
(Lafer 1997).
The Malvinas/Falklands war allowed for a second crucial stage -the building of 
confidence and the emergence of a shared self-perception vis-à-vis world politics (Peña 
1988; Lafer 1997). In that occasion Brazil assumed a position that, despite its reluctance 
to support the use of force, explicitly endorsed Argentina’s right to the islands. Such a 
stand was in harmony with most of Latin America -except Chile; but it was all the more 
significant because Brazil was not only the largest Latin American power, but also 
Argentina’s traditional rival.
The third step, giving rise to lasting cooperation ranging from economic matters 
through issues such sensitive as atomic power, was set off by the new democratic leaders 
of the 1980s. Elected in 1983 and 1985 respectively, both Argentina’s Raúl Alfonsin and 
Brazil’s José Samey decided to engage themselves in a process that would have been 
unlikely to succeed without their strong commitment. Within the frame of the more 
general treaties, Argentina and Brazil signed twenty-four bilateral protocols with the 
purpose of improving trade between 1984 and 1989. In 1985, they signed the 
Declaration of Foz de Iguazú, which laid the bases for future integration and created a 
High Level Bilateral Commission to foster the process. The crucial Argentine-Brazilian
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Integration Act (Acta para la Integración Argentino-Brasileña) was endorsed in July 
1986 in Buenos Aires, setting the Integration and Cooperation Program (Programa de 
Integración y Cooperación entre Argentina y Brasil - PICAB). As widely acknowledged 
later, this agreement constituted a turning point in the history of relations between these 
two countries, and in fact can be seen as the embryo of Mercosur. The change was 
substantially due to the role the newly appobted democratic presidents had decided to 
play b  the regional scenario. Arguably, neither the globalization pressures nor the bare 
democratization process would have been sufficient to overcome the secular distrust 
between Argentina and Brazil, including as it did military cooperation and the mutual 
mspection of their nuclear installations.22
In 1988, during the same presidential tenures, the Treaty on Integration, 
Cooperation and Development (Tratado de Integración, Cooperación y Desarrollo) was 
signed. Conceived of as the culmination of a process of mutual recognition and 
confidence building, it instead turned out to be a crucial step b to  the next phase of the 
new relationship. Towards the end of 1990, Argentina and Brazil signed, and registered 
with ALADI, an Agreement on Economic Cooperation {Acuerdo de Complementación 
Económica) that systematized and deepened pre-existing bilateral commercial 
agreements. That same year, representatives of both countries met with Uruguayan and 
Paraguayan authorities, which expressed their willingness to participate in the ongoing 
integration process. The result was an agreement to create a common market among the 
four nations.
During the period runnbg between the signature of the PICAB and the creation 
of Mercosur in 1991, a versatile bstitutional arrangement was settled in order to keep 
the process working. Its m ab features were the direct participation o f high officials b  the 
negotiations, under the coordbation of the Foreign Ministries; the meetbg of a six- 
monthly presidential summit; the high profile o f bilateral diplomatic channels, especially 
the ambassadors in every capital; and the nonexistence of common bodies btegrated by 
bdependent experts (Peña 1998b). Most of these characteristics, imprinted by maximum 
pragmatism and flexibility, were to mabtain along the further stages of the process 
despite the endowment of some formal structures.
22 Along with the main Treaty the presidents signed a Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy (Declaración 
Conjunta sobre Política Nuclear). For further developments on nuclear cooperation, cf. Hirst and Boceo 
(1989).
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The institutional structure of Mercosur (what like?)
Three main documents established the normative structure of the nascent region:
the Treaty of Asuncion, the Brasilia Protocol, and the Ouro Preto Protocol. The first 
defined the general criteria of Mercosur, leaving open its definitive profile and linking it 
to the results of the negotiations to be carried out during the transition stage. The second 
set up a mechanism for the resolution of controversies, instituting as highest instance an 
ad-hoc arbitrage system instead of a permanent Court of Justice. The last settled the 
current bodies of Mercosur, and rendered the association an international juridical actor. 
These institutions are briefly reviewed in the remainder of the section.
On March 21, 1991, the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Asuncion, for the “constitution of a 
Common Market” between their countries. This treaty included the elaboration of a trade 
liberalization schedule, the coordination of macro-economic policies, the setting of a 
Common External Tariff and other commercial norms and regulations, all to be in force 
from January 1, 1995.
However, this “framework agreement” goes beyond mere economics, and in fact 
covers other areas such as the environment, education and health. The democratic ideal 
is also deeply embedded in the text, and “economic development with social justice” 
together with “the improvement of life conditions of their inhabitants” are emphasized. 
The principles underlying this quadrilateral treaty were explicitly based on the goal of 
achieving the common welfare of their populations. Last but not the least, the agreement 
was made with broader regional vocation, thus leaving open the possibility of future 
adhesion to the other ALADI member countries.
To fulfill the Treaty of Asuncion, in December of that same year Mercosur 
countries signed the Brasilia Protocol, technically called Dispute Settlement System 
(iSistema de Solución de Controversias), as the highest means to solve disagreements 
within Mercosur. It established a three-instance mechanism of conflict resolution: direct 
negotiations, the GMC intervention (see below), and the call of an arbitrage procedure to 
be carried out by an ad hoc tribunal of experts.
Until December 31, 1994, Mercosur had a temporary institutional structure that 
comprised the transition period established by the Treaty of Asuncion. Therefore, on 
December 17, 1994, the incumbent Presidents and the Foreign Affairs Ministers of
Presidential Democracies and Regional Integration. An Institutional Approach to Mercosur (1985-2000)
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Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Ouro Preto Protocol, which 
established Mercosur administrative and political bodies.
V F ig u re .5 .1 : : ; ; :^ , ^ ¥34s
Mercosur institutional structure (1998
Economic and 
Social Advisory
Forum__ i
t
Common Market Council ! Joint ;
(CMC) ! Parliamentary \
! Commission 1
I
Common Market Group Administrative Sub
(GMC) Secretariat Commissions (8)
I T Ì
Working Sub Ad Hoc Groups
Groups (11) (6)
Specialized Technical
Meetings (3) Cooperation
Committee
Trade Commission 
(CCM)
(10 Trade Groups)
□
I I
Hierarchic relation 
Non Hierarchic relation 
Decisional bodies
Administrative, Technical and Working bodies 
Advisory bodies
At the highest level of this hierarchic structure is the Common Market Council 
(Consejo del Mercado Común - CMC), consisting of the Foreign Affairs and Finance 
Ministers of each member country. A step below, playing the role o f executive power, it 
is the Common Market Group (Grupo Mercado Común - CMC) composed of 16 
members representing the Foreign Affairs and Finance Ministries and the Central Banks 
of each country. Below this is the Mercosur Trade Commission (Comisión de Comercio 
del Mercosur - CCM), in charge o f helping the GMC and watching over the application 
of the instruments o f common trade policy. The Joint Parliamentary Commission 
(Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta - CPC) is the representative agency of Mercosur 
national parliaments. The Economic and Social Advisory Forum {Foro Consultivo 
Económico y  Social - FCES) represents the economic and social sectors of each member
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country. Last, the Mercosur Administrative Secretariat (Secretaría Administrativa del 
Mercosur - SAM), with a permanent seat in the city of Montevideo, gives operative 
support and is responsible for the coordination of the other Mercosur agencies (see 
Figure 5.1).
Another transcendental decision that arose from the Ouro Preto Protocol was to 
confer legal personality to the Mercosur, transforming it into a subject of public 
international law and allowing it to relate as a bloc with third countries, economic groups 
and international organisms. The four countries also agreed on the ultimate version of the 
Common External Tariff (CET, or Arancel Externo Común), with convergence schemes 
for common exceptions, and other necessary instruments for the establishment of the 
Free-Trade Zone and the Customs Union from January 1, 1995.
With the signing of the Treaty of Asuncion, the member countries had committed 
themselves to establishing the Common Market as from December 31, 1994. The Ouro 
Preto Protocol reset the original, narrow timetable and, in acknowledging the 
constitution of a Customs Union among the four nations, made the integration process 
more flexible. The Union, albeit incomplete, started to work on January 1, 1995, as an 
intermediate step to the expected conformation of the Common Market.
It was impossible to immediately apply all the principles of the new Customs 
Union, as the national economies needed time to adapt to the new rules. The member 
states therefore agreed on a transitory regime (Régimen de Adaptación) and a number of 
Exception Lists (Listas de Excepción), by which some products in the commerce 
between the four countries would continue to pay tariffs for a limited time. According to 
the established schedule, the major convergence was to become effective in 1999 for the 
two larger members, and in 2000 for the rest of the member countries; the Customs 
Union was expected to be in full effect on January 1, 2006.23
Regarding Mercosur associates, on their way to further engagements in the 
eventual enlargement process, a free trade agreement with Chile came into being as from 
October 1, 1996, and with Bolivia as from February 28, 1997. A similar accord with the 
Andean Pact was expected to become effective by 2000, but this deadline was later
23 As from 1995, the CET comprised the 85% of the trade universe, featuring an average of 14% and a 
maximum of 20%. The remainder ranges from 0% to 35%, the main exceptions being capital goods, 
computing equipment, and telecommunications; the data of convergence on a single tariff were 
stipulated for 2001 for the former and 2006 for the latter two, as already mentioned (Ferrer 1995).
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extended. As for bilateral and multilateral relations with the outer world, Mercosur has 
signed general agreements {Acuerdos Marco) o f association with the United States on 
investment and trade in Washington on June 19, 1991, under the so-called “4+1” 
arrangement; with the European Union on inter-regional cooperation and political 
coordination on December 15, 1995; and with the Central American Common Market 
CMercado Común Centroamericano) on trade and investment on April 18, 1998. 
Mercosur is currently negotiating, together with the thirty other countries of the western 
hemisphere, the constitution of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, or Área de 
Libre Comercio de las Américas - ALCA), to enter into force in 2005.
Thus, at the threshold of the new century, Mercosur was facing the challenge o f 
perfecting the Customs Union and deepening the integration process towards the 
Common Market. Until 2000, the many hazards it had confronted -th e  Tequila crisis in 
1995, the Asian crisis in 1998/9, the Brazilian and Paraguayan presidential impeachments 
in 1992 and 1999 respectively— were due to either international crises or national 
turmoil or both, not to the integration process per se (Nofal 1997). Worse, stagnation in 
the current stage could not only jeopardize the very core of the project but also reverse 
it. For Mercosur to subsist a progressive inertial dynamics is needed, as expressed by the 
bicycle-tricycle metaphor (Schmitter 2000); otherwise, it risks becoming a replication o f  
the EFT A (European Free Trade Association) rather than o f the European Union.
The next tasks will be to confront the sensitive issues o f discipline concerning 
incentives and fiscal harmonization, reciprocal opening for services and governmental 
purchases, stronger macroeconomic coordination, and more reliable treaty and regulation 
enforcement (Bouzas 1996; Lavagna 1996; Nofal 1997; Peña 1998b). As to the 
enlargement to new partners, the fear of the “aladización” of Mercosur24 is likely to 
keep the issue frozen in the short run. Nevertheless, the strengthening of the links with 
Bolivia and Chile may prepare the field for their future incorporation as full members; in 
fact, since the signing of the association agreements all six countries have participated in 
the main conferences and summits o f the bloc. The hardest endeavor to be dealt with 
appears to be monetary convergence. As Europe did in Maastricht, Mercosur countries
24 The concept makes reference to ALADI, and evokes periphrastically the preoccupation about the 
neutralizing consequences for the integration that an enlargement, previous to a stronger consolidation 
of the region, could bring about. Mentioned by former Argentina’s president Raul Alfonsm in Clarin 
(March 1999).
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will probably need to set some common economic criteria that allow them go further in 
the process of integration.
The particular origin and development of Mercosur (how?)
To account for the emergence of an integrating region is not the same as to
explain its further progress (Haas 1964). On the contrary, many approaches would argue 
that any concession on sovereignty could be seen as the consequence of a contingent 
necessity, brought about by a temporary weakness in the nation-state power that needs 
to be overcome. Consequently, no subsequent progression is to be assumed from 
regional agreements -states do not go bankrupt, it is said; nor do they commit suicide, 
delivering their sovereign powers to other entities if they can avoid it. Other theories 
stress instead the feedback effect of the first moves towards integration, whether it be 
called spillover or not. However, none of these theories attempts to allocate the same 
causes to the origin and the continuation of an integration process.
While the factors that set off a process are not necessarily equal to those that 
keep it going, other variables likely to have a relevant impact on both stages may either 
change or hold. Many were ignored or at best taken for granted in the first theorizing 
efforts to grasp the move towards integration in Europe; among the most significant was 
the democratic condition of the contracting states. Later studies (Karl 1989; Schmitter 
1991) demonstrated that this neglected factor was not trivial but crucial. Further research 
has been conducted in order to appraise the extent to which domestic regimes impinge 
upon international cooperation and regional integration (Putnam 1988; Schmitter 1991; 
Russell 1992; Remmer 1994; Moravcsik 1997). Yet the main distinction was made 
between democratic and authoritarian rule, somehow overlooking the differences within 
each type of regime. In this respect, as long as the homogeneity of these types was 
presumed, the kind of democracy -whether presidential or parliamentary, consociational 
or majoritarian— was ignored. Lately, new democracies and new regions, increasingly 
widespread over the last decade, allow -o r  indeed demand—  us to test the accuracy of 
such an assumption.
In order to understand the reasons for the creation of Mercosur and its progress, 
many theories of integration should be considered. It is worthwhile reviewing the most 
plausible of them while offering empirical evidence to check their applicability.
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Intergovemmentalism has a strong case to make, Moravcsik being its main 
defender. He applies “an alternative theory of foreign economic policy” (1998: 6) to 
explain the emergence o f integrative efforts. In this approach, economic interdependence 
is seen as a strong condition for integration. The working mechanism would consist in 
the impact that increasing exchange has on the capability of single states for individually 
managing higher levels of complex interaction. Export dependence and intra-industry 
trade are thus reckoned to generate the strongest pressures for trade liberalization, which 
in turn is the main cause for integration. Although Moravcsik himself recognizes that the 
empirical data “are more suggestive than conclusive” (1998: 496), he argues against 
geopolitics as alternative explanation, and especially against regional particularities as a 
reasonable basis for explaining regional integration. Table 5.4 gives the data that support 
the political economy hypothesis, by showing that Europe is the most natural region to 
embrace integration, and Pacific Asia the least likely to set off a similar process.
r— ■ » '■ ■j ■ *■ Table 5 .4  - . ■ . ■  v i i & s i S & v C :  
; Regional trade dependence o f Germany, United States and Japan as  a lp  
• - % proportion o f GNP, 1958 and 1 9 9 0 - ^ ^ ^ x m p m t ?
Intra-Regional 
Trade/GNP (1960)
Germany (vis-à-vis EC6 6% 
then EC 12)
Intra-Regional 
Trade/GNP (1990)
..........~2\% "
Intra-Industry 
Trade/Regional 
Trade (1980s)
6 6 % ...........
United States (vis-à-vis 1% 
Canada Sc Mexico)
2% 60%
Japan (vis-à-vis Northeast 2% 
Asia, ASEAN and India)
3% 25%
SOURCE: Moravcsik (1998: 495).
Intergovemmentalists do not, however, provide any reason for the further 
development of integration. According to their standpoint, each decision regarding 
integration is seen as independent from any preceding agreement. States would face a  
“blank” situation whenever they engaged in negotiations for reaching an international 
accord, and the goal to grant new “credible commitments” is not thought to build 
accumulative constraints for autonomous state action.
With regard to origin and development, neofunctionalism may be considered the 
opposite of intergovemmentalism: neofunctionalists do not fully explain the starting up 
of an integration process, but advance a hypothesis on the causes for further expansion.
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Their central mechanism, spillover, departs from either or both the extension of the area 
scope and the deepening of the authority level required to sustaining the process once 
initiated (Schmitter 1969, 1971). Increasing technical necessities are seen as demanding 
further intervention and regulation over wider areas, in turn generating new necessities. 
Unlike sheer functionalism, neofunctionalism accords a role to politics: supranational 
bargaining and interest group lobbying influence the dynamics of integration, being 
crucial factors for the reproduction of the spillover logic. In short, the principle is that 
what fosters the process is, in due time, fostered through feedback, therefore keeping the 
wheel spinning. The logical corollary o f this continuing movement approach is that the 
cessation of the expansion would jeopardize the process.
The neofunctional approach stresses the interaction between integration and 
institutions, rather than that between interdependence and integration (as 
intergovernmentalism does). However, its supporters do not deny the same basic 
sequence: both theories25 agree on the order of precedence, in spite of underlining 
different dyads according to their theoretical assumptions and heuristic goals.
Neotransactionalism, to give a label to an extensively developed but so far 
unnamed theory (Sandholtz & Stone Sweet 1998), draws centrally on neofunctionalism. 
It consequently highlights the “inherent expansionary” nature of integration processes, 
sustained “by means of policy feedback” (1988: 25), and the role of supranational 
organization. However, it does not dismiss the power of national governments and the 
primacy of intergovernmental bargaining in a number of areas. The relation stressed by 
this theory is that between interdependence -called exchange— and institutions -the 
process of institutionalization included. Integration as a voluntary state policy is 
therefore seen as an intermediary transmission level, a sort of crossing point between the 
actions carried out by transnational transactors and the institutional channels that are 
developed in their wake and in tum regulate them. Briefly, increasing transnational 
transactions make the first move, the consequent demands for facilitating and regulating 
the transnational society gives rise to an institution-building process, and the new 
institutions keep the cycle going and growing.
The first grand theory that calls into question the sufficiency of the tripartite 
sequence has come to be called neoidealism. Drawing on the thought of Kant ([1795]
25 The discussion on whether the label of theory fits these theoretical stands or rather approach 
(Schmitter 1996) or framework (Moravcsik 1998) would do better is dealt with in the previous chapters.
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1985), it not only focuses on inter-state relations but also on intra-state structures and 
processes. According to this theory, the type of political regime influences the kind of 
link that countries may develop with one another. Moreover, the coincidence of one of 
these types -namely republican for Kant and democratic for his followers— in two or 
more countries has definitive and dramatic effects; among them, the impracticability of 
war (Schmitter 1991). It is true that other theories had also recognized the importance of 
societal actors and their subnational or transnational links; none o f them, however, had 
emphasized these points so strongly, nor considered the relevance of the political regime 
as such.
Empirical evidence is frequently displayed in order to prove that democracy 
accounts for cooperation among countries that feature such regime, and even for 
integration (Schmitter 1991; Sorensen 1992; Dixon 1994). In contrast, other studies call 
into question the very tenets of neoidealism with statistical data (Remmer 1994). What is 
surprising is that both assertions, despite their opposition, are defended with evidence 
derived from the Southern Cone. Furthermore, not only is it difficult to verify the 
neoidealist hypotheses, but their claim to explain the causes of cooperation/integration is 
also incomplete: as intergovemmentaiism, they account for the origin but not for the 
subsequent steps of integration. Regarding the purposes of the present research, 
however, the crucial novelty of this approach is that it adds a stage at the beginning while 
simultaneously keeping the rest of the sequence untouched.
Intra-regional 
trade/GDP (1986)
Intra-regional 
trade/GDP (1997)
Argentina 1.5% 5.1%
Brazil 0.9% 2.4%
Paraguay 11.0% 24.5%
Uruguay 12.5% 14.7%
SOURCE: own elaboration, from data of the World Bank report (1997) for GDP and INTAL databases for 
intra-Mercosur trade. Uruguay's small increase is due to the large augment of its GDP along the decade, 
thus not to stagnant trade. Data regarding Paraguay are not highly reliable.
However, none of these theories fits Mercosur developments. According to the 
data shown in Table 5.5, the sequence of interdependence-integration-institutions simply 
did not take place. Instead, as can be seen in Table 5.6, interdependence had been
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declining for some years by the time the first steps toward integration were taken, and 
only started to rise from then on (Hurrell 1995; Nofal 1997b; Peña 1998a). It is also 
noteworthy that regional institutions came into being as mere intergovernmental fora, 
where national representatives were constrained to reach unanimity as the only means to 
take a decision.
¿'.(«fi.-' Table 5 .6
interdependence between Argentina and Brazil, 1980-1996*
1980
Exports (in M $) 
765
Imports (in M $)
1.072
Exchange (in M $) 
1.837
1985 496 612 1.108
1990 1.423 718 2.140
1995 5.484 4.161 9.645
1996 6.615 5.326 11.941
Source: Nofal (1997b: 67).
The evidence shows, in the first place, that interdependence was not a 
precondition for integration in the case of Mercosur. Furthermore, the largest Mercosur 
economy -Brazil—  hardly exceeds at present one third of Germany’s figures in the 
1960s. So relevant for the objection of major integration theories as it could appear, such 
a claim is just half of the news. The remaining half goes beyond the mere invalidation of 
the causal relation between interdependence and integration, turning it upside-down: in 
the Southern Cone, the moves toward integration actually brought about increasing 
interdependence (see Tables 5.2 and 5.5 for the data, and Figure 5.2 for a comparative 
theoretical framework).
Having put into question the mainstream theories on integration, which underline 
interdependence as the determining variable, it is now necessary to examine the role 
played by the institutional variables at their two levels: national and regional. While the 
former is considered either irrelevant or independent depending on the theory used, the 
latter is always reckoned as dependent on the other variables. There is little to say in this 
exposition about regional institutions: Mercosur countries have been regularly and 
consciously reluctant to set up any kind of institutional arrangement that could restrain 
national sovereignty. And they have certainly succeeded in this respect. Although the 
building of regional institutions has been verified only in the European Union thus far, 
many authors have used this case to elicit conclusions and generalize hypotheses
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(Mitrany 1975; Haas 1961, 1964, 1975; Deutsch 1969; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 
1998; Moravcsik 1998). Some form o f institution building was, therefore, believed to be 
a logical consequence -and  a support means—  of regional integration. However, the 
region coming right behind the European experience -in  terms of accomplished stages of 
integration— contradicts this inference.
The many approaches to the rationale o f Mercosur emergence draw either on 
external causes or internal ones. The former stress in general the pressures coming from 
the globalization of trade and investment flows -since regional interdependence cannot 
be seen as a cause for Mercosur, as shown above— , and in particular those rising from 
the costs that NAFTA threatens to impose on non-cooperating and isolated countries in 
the western hemisphere (Bouzas 1996). The internal causes involves instead more 
heterogeneous sources, ranging from regime change -democratization (Schmitter 
1991)—  to economic change -from  inward to outward looking economies (Foders 
1996). Regarding the nature rather than the source of the process, Hurrell (1995: 253; 
also Peña 1996) arguably claims, “the first moves towards regional co-operation were 
essentially political.” Yet they were due to a shared sense o f vulnerability rather than 
strength on the part of the newly established regimes.
Be it cause, consequence, or feedback effect, as the political movements that 
fostered the emergence of Mercosur got stronger the region was definitely becoming a 
“pluralistic security community” (Deutsch 1969). The most stunning effects were the 
nuclear agreements and the cooperation on security and defense policies.“ These 
decisions were certainly an output of the confidence-building measures practiced by the 
incoming democratic authorities, but also o f the new vision they shared about the 
ongoing changes “out there” in the world. Therefore, to allocate the causes exclusively 
to one level, either external or internal, would not capture the whole picture.
Besides the factors that led to the integration in the first place, and kept up the 
momentum of the process later on, there is one element omnipresent throughout the 
history of Mercosur: the high profile o f national presidents. The role performed by these 
agents was not casual, but responded to the very logic of the region. As a key actor of 26
26 “The 1990 Declaration on a Common Nuclear Policy created a system of jointly monitored safeguards 
and opened the way for full implementation of the Tlatelolco Regime” (Hurrell 1995: 259-260). In 
addition to nuclear cooperation, military spending and arms imports started to decline steadily after 
democratization in all of Southern Cone countries, and augmented the decreasing rhythm from 1990 
onwards.
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the negotiations put it, the flexibility of the diplomacia presidencial manifested a clear 
political motivation and “comprensión frente a las dificultades coyunturales de los 
socios”, proof of the “lógica política ’ rather than “jurídica” of the integration (Peña 
1996). Unlike the European Union case, no Court of Justice was at work more or less 
subtly to sustain and deepen the integration, nor were day-to-day politics adding to an 
increasing regional power.
The role of the presidents to keep integration from stalling is an outstanding 
characteristic of Mercosur. However, it is even more bewildering that it has also proved 
decisive in the other crucial stage of integration, i.e. its origin. It could be said that the 
process shows no sign of completion yet, and next stages may observe a diminution in 
the presidential importance; however, it is still true that without the presidents’ action 
neither the initial impulse nor the solution o f the main crises would have been 
accomplished (Peña 1996). A more accurate appraisal of the difference between 
presidents as individuals and presidentialism as an institution is developed in the next 
section.
Another particular feature displayed by Mercosur, concerning its flexibility as 
well as its informal complexity, is the contrast between its political inspiration -public, or 
state-driven— and its microeconomic implementation -private (Lafer 1997: 261). This 
brings us to the role played by firms, interest groups and, in the language of a theory, 
transnational transactors. In Europe these actors are recognized for having claimed 
common institutions, in order to reduce the costs of information and transactions 
through single rules (Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). 
The uncertainty and sub-optimal outcome of multiple national institutions, they believed, 
hindered the realization of the customs union first and, later, the single market. Today, 
the economic union would be unthinkable without supranational rules.
The reality of Mercosur is still far from that of the European Union. On the 
contrary, national businesses in the Southern Cone are used to the “institutional deficit” 
already prevalent in their countries. Such a reality had accustomed them to addressing 
directly the core of decision-making power in the case of necessity, instead of going 
through the less trustworthy institutional channels. As far as the political regime was 
concerned, this aspect was called “other institutionalization” rather than institutional 
deficit (O’Donnell 1996). Nevertheless, what matters here is that national regime 
institutions were already perceived as ineffective when it came to taking rapid decisions
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and solving problems fairly. From this judgment on domestic institutions to a similar one 
regarding eventual regional institutions the distance was very short -i.e. the only reliable 
authorities would be the same ones that resolved problems at home: the presidents. It is 
not only metaphoric but also heuristically provocative to derive that, from delegative 
democracies, Mercosur might have engendered a new regional animal -paraphrasing 
O ’Donnell (1994)— : delegative integration.
' F ig u re5 .2 r  <
Integration theories: sequence o f phases end core rela tion sh ip JP fj^
Intergovernm ental N eofunctionalist N eotransactionalist N eoidealist Interpresidential
sequence sequence sequence sequence sequence
(M ercosur)
— Democracy
1
Democracy
(presidential)
Interdependence
1
Interdependence
1
Interdependence
(transnational exchange)
Interdependence
i
Integration
Integration
1
Integration
1
Integration Integration
(cooperation)
Interdependence
Regional Institutions Regional Institutions
(supranational)
Regional Institutions Regional Institutions . . .
NB: The core relationship (dyad of variables) for each theory is marked in bolded letters.
National institutions and the features of Mercosur (why?)
As noted above, Mercosur was bom as a consequence of certain national
processes underwent in Brazil and Argentina: re-democratization, the removal of old 
hypotheses of conflict between the two neighbor countries, and a new, more outwardly 
oriented, economic profile. It is worth underlining that Argentina exhibited the most 
radical changes, since Brazilian political transition and foreign policy distinctness had 
started much earlier, in the 1970s.
Along with these transformations, as previously underlined, the role of the new 
presidents was crucial for setting off the integration project. This “presidential 
protagonism” was not a purely individual feature but instead was institutionally 
grounded, as theoretically supported by other studies. Lijphart, for instance, asserts that 
American presidents compensate their institutional limitations in other areas by stressing 
their direct link to foreign policy. Therefore, “the general pattern is that, during their 
terms of office, they tend to direct more and more of their attention and energy toward 
foreign policy issues” (1994: 102). Danese (1999), following Barilleaux, goes further in
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the appraising of the phenomenon as he distinguishes five areas of the decision-making 
process where it is possible to assess the performance of chief executives regarding 
foreign policy.27
In the Southern Cone, the pattern described was reinforced by the new 
democratic regimes. As observed by Silva, in Samey’s Brazil “the process of 
democratization has produced a major ‘politicization" of the Foreign Ministry” (Silva 
1989: 94). In Argentina the effect was similar in terms of presidential involvement, but in 
contrast with Brazil -where foreign policy defined in Itamaraty was held without 
significant breaks since 1971—  the new regime improved the country’s historically 
erratic line. For the first time in sixty years, it was recognized that the “central 
coordination of international relations within one ministry has given Argentina’s foreign 
policy a higher degree of coherence and predictability. However, the power of decision is 
still concentrated too much in the hands of president Alfonsin and his minister of foreign 
affairs, Dante Caputo” (Silva 1989: 91). This characteristic continued with the 
subsequent presidency. Hence, while stressing the central part played by the presidency, 
another key feature of the regional game emerges: the role of the Cancillerías.
Whereas Mercosur was intentionally created and kept as an intergovernmental 
process, the actual feature of the region appears to be its extreme type: let us call it 
“inter-presidentialism”. As an analyst has pointed out, “el proceso del Mercosur está, a 
nuestro juicio, bajo el signo de un apriorismo ejecutivista y tecnocrático, que los 
partidos y las representaciones parlamentarias han tolerado, hasta el presente” (Pérez 
Antón 1997: 19). This unique aspect brought about a kind of spillover that is not that 
one predicted by the neo-functionalist theories, but a different one driven from above.
The celerity of its development and the exiguousness of the norms that rule its 
proceedings distinguish Mercosur from other processes of integration (Pérez Antón 
1997: 16-7). Both traits, velocity and political action regardless of the presence of 
regulations, are characteristics o f Latin American presidentialism, as will be shown later 
on. The beneficial paradox of the Southern Cone novelty is thus that the national and 
regional levels converge now towards a minimum and flexible institutionalization.
27 The five areas are (a) foreign policy formulation and direction, (b) organization and constitution of 
foreign policy teams, (c) administration and supervision of foreign policy (especially in case of crisis), 
(d) skill to build and maintain consensus on foreign policy, and (e) accomplishment (Barilleaux 1985: 
114; Danese 1999: 394). The performance of Mercosur presidents across these areas is analyzed in 
chapters 9 and 10.
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Whereas past failures of democracy and integration in Latin America were allocated to 
deficit or excess of formal institutionalization respectively, Mercosur had apparently 
reached an equilibrium until external causes put the process at risk by 1999.
Another lasting, sometimes misleading attribute of Mercosur is decentralized 
bargaining as a basic mechanism. Once the bulk of any given bargain has been done, 
presidents exert a decisive influence to get their preferred outcome -sometimes even in 
contradiction with the proposals drafted by the national negotiators. As unified actors, 
they can capitalize better on their resources facing a spread arena with many protagonists 
than a narrow one with fewer key players (see chapter 6). This occurrence is not 
exclusive of foreign politics: analyzing national politics in thirty-six democracies, Lijphart 
(1999) finds a strong positive correlation between the degree o f pluralism of organized 
interests and the level of executive dominance. A last peculiarity favoring presidential 
power, especially of the largest countries, is that there are no overlapping cleavages in 
the region as there are in Europe. Instead, the axis Argentina-Brazil catches all the 
attention while in the European Union this is divided among the oppositions between, 
say, Germany and France, the big and the small countries, the Nordic and the Southern, 
the supranational and the intergovernmental, and the like. Lane and Maeland (1998) have 
shown how, depending on decision rules, the more the members the less the power each 
one wields; in Europe, larger numbers concur with crosscutting cleavages to diffuse 
power, whereas in Mercosur those conditions are radically different.
The perspectives for the forthcoming years seem to be quite stable. Only the 
enlargement towards medium size countries such as Chile may dissipate the risk of a 
“diarchy of authority”; but this is not likely to happen soon. With respect to the internal 
organization, as one of the main specialists on the region has put, “<? modelo 
intergovemamental deverá assim ser mantido e o futuro de curto e médio prazo do 
Mercosul dependerá da capacidade de negociando de diferengas mais do que da 
identificando de interesses comuns” (Hirst 1995: 195). In short, the negotiation over 
different positions has no higher and, thus far, more suitable channel than the inter- 
presidential one.
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PART II
EXECUTIVE FORMAT
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C H A P T E R  6
C O N C E P T U A L IZ IN G  P R E S ID E N T IA L IS M
introduction, or why institutions matter
The main hypothesis o f this research is that presidentialism28 made Mercosur
possible. This argument focuses primarily on the institutional dimension of such 
executive format, and only thereafter on its behavioral dimension. It does so by means of 
underlining the structure and properties of constitutional design before analyzing the 
actual performance o f those leaders that happen to serve in office. Presidents are 
understood as acting within a given framework of incentives and constraints, to which 
they can give their particular imprint -bu t in no way neglect. In the first place, it is 
necessary to precise the meaning of institution, to subsequently define executive format 
and presidentialism.
Political institutions are generally conceived of as “the rules of the game” 
(Rothstein 1996: 145). In other words, they establish what moves are formally allowed 
to the players -political actors—  and which are not, through the provision of 
punishments and rewards. Once political institutions have been set up and consolidated in 
any given polity, and their enforcement and extensive respect are taken for granted, they 
have the power to define how winners and losers become such. Punishments are 
furnished by increasing the restrictions to any given action, raising the costs of action for 
players choosing that move. Rewards, on the other hand, may consist of either lifting of 
costs or direct gains for actors following suit. However, “institutions provide risks and 
opportunities, not certainties. They facilitate or hinder, but do not directly determine 
outcomes. Their effects are thus indirect” (Rockman 1997a: 22). This is so also because 
institutions are not just formal structures, rules or procedures, but also a collection o f 
values by which decisions and behaviors of members are shaped (March and Olsen 1984; 
also Peters 1998).
Formal political institutions are devised to perform three main tasks: decision­
making, administration, and representation. As to the former, Rockman stresses that 
“institutional structures are important for the decisional characteristics that may
28 In the sake of simplicity, I will further use the adjectives presidential and presidentialist as synonyms, 
to define a regime that adopts presidentialism as constitutional format -against Riggs’ (1994) claim, 
who makes a difference between them. The term president, except otherwise indicated, will refer to the 
head of state of either presidential or semi-presidential regimes, not of parliamentary ones.
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accompany them (e.g. multiplication of veto points)” (Rockman 1997b: 61). Hence the 
importance of the distinction between concentration and separation of power -as treated 
below— , the latter entailing a higher number of decisive instances to come to a decision.
Informal institutions such as values and patterned behavior are generally 
crystallized in more formal and consolidated institutions, and molded thereof. In turn, 
they fine-tune the general features and performance of formal structures, giving to each 
particular case its peculiar features -notwithstanding the usually standardizing effects of 
similar formal institutions. Non-institutional factors also interact with institutional ones, 
profoundly conditioning the effectiveness o f institutions (Putnam 1993). Dimensions 
such as the economy, history and culture, diversity and social cleavages, inequalities, 
habits (the impact of time), communication technologies, size and geography can affect 
governmental capabilities and policy outcomes in several ways (Weaver and Rockman 
1993b, Rockman 1997a). The quality -and vagaries— of leadership are still additional 
paramount aspects of political life that impact on, and are impacted by, institutions.
The effects of specific institutional arrangements depend on a number of 
intervening factors. They are thus contingent, differ across policy areas, are channeled 
through different governmental decision-making characteristics, and present direct trade­
offs between institutional capabilities (Weaver and Rockman 1993c). Henceforth, a 
comparison between cases along any single institutional dimension must prove 
insufficient, if one were to infer regime stability consequences or policy outcomes from 
only such institution. Government capabilities and government effectiveness should be 
given count through a complex, multidimensional, not linear approach.
As Rothstein posits, three different but interrelated questions about political 
institutions may be raised. “One is normative: Which institutions are best suited for 
creating ‘good’ government and societal relations. The other two are empirical: What 
explains the enormous variation in institutional arrangements? And what difference those 
differences make for political behavior, political power and the outcome of the political 
process?” (Rothstein 1998: 135/6). Since a particular institution, namely president ialism, 
is the independent variable of this research, what matters is its impact on the dependent 
variable, i.e. integration. Thus, I aim to answer the third question above, leaving mostly 
apart both normative concerns and explicative approaches to the explanans. However, it 
is still necessary to address the latter’s features, in order to account for their particular
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consequences over the explanandum. This chapter and the following two are intended to 
accomplish such task.
Executive format
This research deals with democratic regimes. It is assumed that no integration 
process o f this magnitude would have taken place, either in Europe or in the Southern 
Cone, should dictatorships or any other kind of non-democratic regime have remained in 
power (Schmitter 1991, 2000). Likewise, there is little doubt that a reversal in the 
democratic system of any of the member countries would provoke either its expulsion 
from the regional group or the breakdown o f the whole integration process. Therefore, 
‘executive format’ in this paper refers only to a democratically elected -o r appointed—  
executive. For all purposes, it is worth adding, democracy will here be understood as 
modem, liberal, and thus representative (Morlino 1991).
Contemporary democracies, or polyarchies in Dahl’s more exact term, can be 
classified according to many different criteria. The most traditional of these is the 
institutional one, which catalogues democracies as a function of their inner organization 
of power, whether separating or concentrating it. This originated from Montesquieu and 
the Federalist writings, although they referred more to the government and its 
institutional control and less to the people’s right to self-government. Henceforth, the 
distribution o f competencies among the executive, the legislative, and the judicial 
branches, and their mutual autonomy or dependency, would define the nature o f the 
overall regime, whether presidential, parliamentary, or a blend of both.29
Lijphart (1984), dissatisfied with the inability of the previous theory to account 
for the effective functioning of some polities -particularly the small European 
countries— , developed a further taxonomy of democracies. Lijphart’s model is more 
complex than the above, and is based on different levels of analysis such as the socio­
cultural, as well as the political and institutional. It respectively considers the economy in 
terms o f its impact upon the electoral dimension, the social features regarding the degree 
of homogeneity within the polity, the cultural traits with respect to the ethnical, religious 
and linguistic cleavages, and the institutional constraints by keeping some aspects raised
29 It is worth noting, however, that the judicial branch “is substantially independent in all democracies, 
regardless of whether they are parliamentary or presidential” (Lijphart 1992). Therefore, the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature is the defining feature of any democratic system.
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by the institutional model, such as the fusion or division of powers -plus others, like the 
electoral system.
Recently, the two approaches aiming at the comprehension and classification of 
the democratic regimes have converged into a comprehensive approach. At present 
democracy is seldom examined, either theoretically or empirically, without taking both 
aspects into consideration. Regardless of many other aspects they also agree upon, the 
most relevant point for the present work is clearly captured by Linz and Valenzuela 
(1994: x), when they argue that “the most important difference among democratic 
regimes concerns the generation and accountability of executive authority.”
Generation and accountability of executive authority are different categories, 
although both are interconnected within the overall system they are embedded in. A 
democratic government should not only hold power, but also be accountable 
(responsible) for its exercise before the people and the constitutional organs. An 
authoritarian government, on the other hand, wields power not subject to either popular 
will or institutional restrictions. However, within each camp there are several ways of 
organizing the access to, and control of, executive power. The most widely used 
category to account for such ways is that that runs from the fusion -o r concentration— 
to the separation of powers.
Despite the fact that the axis fusion/separation o f power is seen as the crucial 
issue in distinguishing between democratic regimes, the most widely used empirical 
category focuses on the presidential/parliamentary dichotomy. This is so because it 
favors an institutional approach, what increases the potentiality for operationalization, 
measurement and, thus, comparison. I only partially agree with Rockman when he argues 
that “the reality is that the distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems 
masks a far more vital distinction, namely the capacity to concentrate or diffuse power” 
(Rockman 1997b: 60). Instead, my point is that regardless of how much one duet may 
mask the other, it is neither the same thing nor a less ‘vital’ one. The difference between 
the dichotomy presidentialism/parliamentarism and concentration/diffusion is still 
significant. The choice to begin by the former stems from methodological considerations 
-albeit not only. As Riggs points out, “comparison of political institutions should begin 
with basic regime types, the constitutional principles that determine how a government is 
organized” (Riggs 1994: 75). The degree of concentration of power, instead, is also
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determined by political practices and informal institutionalization (O’Donnell 1996a) 
rather than by formal-legal, i.e. constitutional design.
In the next sections of this chapter, I disaggregate the concept of presidentialism 
to render it applicable and, above all, meaningful. I follow three steps in order to 
accomplish this task: first of all, I present the definition of presidentialism as a contested 
concept, thus in opposition to its confronting term, parliamentarism. Subsequently, I 
advance the progression of the debate, in which more specific aspects are dealt with and 
more empirical cases are brought to bear. Finally, I face the question of the many 
subtypes o f both presidentialism and parliamentarism, and set up a matrix that allows the 
understanding and classification o f executive formats beyond the pure formal features.
Presidentialism versus parliamentarism
In the last decade, the academic discussion concerning the virtues and defects of
both presidential and parliamentary regimes has reached a peak. The mushrooming of 
democracies, borne by the crest o f the third wave, offered the possibility to choose -and 
fostered the need to set up—  the most adequate institutions, thus emphasizing as never 
before the role of political engineering. Although scholars are still far from agreeing, two 
important goals at least have been achieved. First, the increasingly sophisticated analyses 
have greatly enriched the topic, by calling into examination a cluster o f intervening 
variables such as the party system, the electoral regime and cycle, and the constitutional 
attributions of the presidency, all o f which affect the way in which any type o f democracy 
actually works. In the second place, a rough agreement has been reached regarding the 
wide definition of the terms in question, as well as the conceptualization of the hybrid 
and other not-so-clear cases. However, remaining disagreements have proved to be 
resilient, and many of them still are of considerable importance. These disagreements cut 
across most of the specialists in the topic, whether they are supporters of presidentialism 
or not. Some o f the contributions made by this research stem from these disagreements, 
as will be showed further in this chapter and more broadly addressed in the third part.
The classical definitions o f presidentialism and the initial debates running through 
the 1980s are advanced below. Afterwards, the critiques received by such institutional 
arrangement will be discussed, to further move somewhat backwards to the 
disagreements concerning the essence -th e  defining properties—  of the concept. Finally,
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the particular characteristics of presidentialism that may affect the process of regional 
integration will be addressed.
Among the many relevant scholars concerned about the institutional features of 
democracy, Lijphart has been one of the most influential. He defined presidentialism as 
the political regime that features two characteristics: a) the chief executive shall not be 
dependent on legislative confidence, but rather shall sit for a fixed term; and b) shall be 
elected by popular vote (Lijphart 1984: 68-69). Ten years later, once the discussion had 
been enriched by both the theoretical debate and the empirical research focusing on the 
new wave of democratization, he added a third point stating that its overlook had been 
an important flaw of his previous characterization. Thus, the presidency c) shall consist 
of a one-person executive (Lijphart 1994: 93).
Table 6.1 displays Lijphart’s eightfold typology of forms of democracy as 
advanced in 1992, and his grouping of the existing cases according to such typology. 
Apart from the fact that many empty cells put into question the consistency of the 
typology, there are some strange bedfellows -like 5th Republic France brought together 
with the U.S. and most Latin American democracies!— that are difficult to sustain, both 
on theoretical and empirical grounds. Further in this chapter, I advance an alternative 
typology with a view to overcoming these pitfalls (Table 6.3).
!? § p o !o ^ ^ rfo n n s o f democracy and some empirical examples^
Collegial executive One-person executive
Dependent on 
legislative 
confidence
Non dependent 
on legislative 
confidence
Dependent on 
legislative 
confidence
Non dependent on 
legislative 
confidence
Executive selected 
by legislature
P arliam en tary:
M ost W es t E uropean  
d em o crac ies  
M ost C o m m o n w ea lth  
d em o crac ies  
Jap an  . . .
S w itz e rlan d N o em p irica l 
ex am p les
L ebanon
Executive selected 
by voters
No e m p irica l e x am p les C y p ru s (1 9 6 0 -3 ) 
U ru g u ay  (1 9 5 2 -6 7 )
N o em p irica l 
e x am p les
Presidentia l:
M ost L atin  A m erican  
dem ocracies 
U n ited  S ta tes 
F rance  (5 lh R e p . ) ...
Source: Lijphart 1992: 6.
In the wake of the democratic processes inaugurated in Latin America in the 
1980s, however, it was Linz who paved the way for the institutional debate. By judging 
presidentialism as troublesome, rather than by defining it, he called the attention of
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politicians and statesmen, as well as academics. The critiques he made will be dealt with 
afterwards; at this stage, what matters most is the degree to which his definition 
resembles Lijphart’s. He stated that a presidential system is that in which: a) “both the 
president, who controls the executive and is elected by the people (or an electoral college 
elected by the people for that sole purpose), and an elected legislature (unicameral or 
bicameral) enjoy democratic legitimacy. It is a system of ‘dual democratic legitimacy*; 
and b) both the president and the congress are elected for a fixed term, the president’s 
tenure in office is independent of the legislature, and the survival of the legislature is 
independent of the president. This leads to what we characterize as the ‘rigidity’ of the 
presidential system” (Linz 1994: 6).
It is evident at first sight that both points are quite the same as above, though 
inverted -and elaborated in a more complex shape. This consonance is present again in 
Shugart and Carey’s definition of presidential government, which follows closely Linz’s 
while adding little modifications to make it more precise (Shugart and Carey 1992: 19). 
They underline as key features: a) the popular election of the chief executive; b) the 
terms of the chief executive and assembly are fixed, and are not contingent on mutual 
confidence; c) the elected executive names and directs the composition of the 
government; and d) the president has some constitutionally granted lawmaking authority.
The two characteristics they add to the definition allow them to proceed further 
on. First, it permits the creation of a typology of democratic regimes, based on both the 
freedom consented to the chief executive for cabinet appointments and its competence 
about legislation. Second, the types derived from the typology proved empirically 
adequate to explain the performance o f the overall regime, concerning its stability and 
effectiveness. The conclusion they draw is that little power in presidential hands may 
drive to deadlock and stalemate, yet large lawmaking authority of the presidency do not 
improve the efficacy of the system but militates against its persistence.
There is an author, however, who has questioned the increasing stress put on 
non-defining criteria, the broad agreement reached in the field notwithstanding. Riggs 
convincingly argues that it is sufficient to define presidentialism  as “those representative 
governments in which the head o f government is elected fo r  a fixed term o f office; that 
is, he or she cannot be discharged by a no-confidence vote o f Congress” (Riggs 1994:
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77, original emphasis).30 Hence, specifications such as that of one-person-executive or 
the popular election of the president refer to accidental rather than defining properties, 
since under presidentialism there have been cases both of collective executive 
responsibility and of presidents appointed through non-popular elections. By the same 
token, direct election is a redundant characteristic, as many non-presidentialist (i.e. 
parliamentary) presidents are directly elected as well (Riggs 1994: 142 n. 4). Riggs turns 
someway back to the original definition by Lijphart -though by no means to the most 
recent one (Lijphart 1999)— , yet obtaining some further gains regarding parsimony. His 
effort has proven remarkably fruitful to clarify the distinction between parliamentary and 
presidentialist regimes.
Conceptualizing presidentialism%
Fixed term
Head of government selected by Yes No
Voters Presidential Hybrid (Israel)
Legislators Hybrid (Switzerland) Parliamentary
Source: Shugart and Main waring 1997.
More recent analyses have also contributed to the conceptualization of 
presidentialism by improving the degree of specification and detail, underlining 
differences within the type -not just between types. Mainwaring (1992, 1993), Sartori 
(1991, 1994) and Mainwaring and Shugart (1993) have firmly remarked on the 
importance of distinguishing among different presidential polities. As the Westminster 
model of parliamentarism has little to do with the assembly system of the French Third 
Republic, or even with the strong federalism of the German chancellery case, they 
analogously argue that distinct institutional aspects along with other features of the 
political system decisively affect the overall outcome. The party system, party discipline, 
the electoral regime, and the electoral cycle are key factors influencing the way in which 
presidentialism works.
The literature also raises a rather wide disagreement concerning the democratic 
‘virtues’ of presidentialism. The bitterest -albeit civilized—  disputes date back to the
30 In this regard, Norway stands out as a notable exception to standard parliamentary rule since its
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middle eighties, departing from the above cited article in which Linz launched a forceful 
assault against presidentialism, accusing its disfunctional impact upon democracy. He 
made four main critiques concerning its characteristics: a) dual democratic legitimacy; b) 
temporal rigidity (election for a fixed term); c) winner-take-all politics; and d) political 
style.
The first three characteristics are not always reckoned to be negative; it has even 
been argued that they should be considered advantages instead of pitfalls (Shugart and 
Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart 1993). Riggs (1988) and M. Jones, for example, 
view the first one as inevitably leading to immobility and paralysis, while they consider 
the other two as inherent virtues of presidentialism -since they “enhance accountability 
and identifiability” (M. Jones 1995: 3). By contrast, their strong accusation points to the 
feature originally considered as the principal virtue of presidentialism, i.e. the separation 
of powers that gives rise to the mechanism of checks and balances.
The fourth point, political style, is more difficult to evaluate, because personalism 
and decisionism can be seen as features of the polities -o r the persons themselves!—  
where presidentialism is implanted and not of the design itself. Perhaps the bitterest 
debate has arisen around the validity of the third point: whereas Lijphart sustains that 
presidentialism definitely supports majoritarian instead o f consensual tendencies, 
Mainwaring and Shugart straightforwardly question this point.* 31 In turn, Horowitz has 
argued that Linz’s analysis rests “on a mechanistic, even caricatured, view of the 
presidency” (Horowitz 1990: 73). This accusation of oversimplification has been taken 
on frequently since originally advanced, and Linz itself has paid some heed to it and 
developed limited corrections or additions. However, he kept the core of his argument.
The conceptual controversy regarding presidentialism, as sketched above, hinges 
on two main axis. In the first place, the flaws are not always such; in the second place, 
there are different forms of organizing a presidential system -and  they make a difference 
concerning advantages and disadvantages of the whole type. Among the advantages that 
are likely to prosper because o f presidentialism, and not despite it, Shugart and Carey
legislature is elected for a fixed term and cannot be dissolved by the executive.
3i Deheza (1997) and others (Altmann 2000; Amorim Neto 1998; Chasquetti 1997/8) have shown, 
through empirical research on South America, that party coalitions under presidentialism -both at 
legislative and cabinet levels— are more frequent than expected; hence, the seeking of consensus 
becomes a crucial task for presidents.
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(1992: 44) mention: a) accountability; b) identifiability; c) mutual checks; and d) an 
arbiter.
In addition to the conceptual critiques advanced against the original ‘anti- 
presidentialist’ allegation, Horowitz earlier and Shugart and Mainwaring later contended 
Linz’s claims on grounds that they were not empirically sustainable. The former 
underlined that they were “based on a regionally skewed and highly selective sample of 
comparative experience” (Horowitz 1990: 73), while the latter showed how 
“presidentialism is more likely to be adopted in... parts of the world... [that] have more 
• formidable obstacles to democracy regardless of the form of government. On the other 
hand, parliamentarism has been the regime form of choice in most of Europe and in 
form er British colonies (a large percentage of which are microstates), where conditions 
fo r  democracy may be generally more favorable” (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997a: 29, 
emphasis added) -meaning by conditions fo r  democracy income level and living 
standards.32
Through questioning the correlation between constitutional form and democratic 
success, the mentioned analyses have opened the door to more specific -and 
specialized— research. In the first place, they compelled to have another look back to 
the conceptual field, giving rise to fruitful attempts at redefining the very concept of 
presidentialism. In the second place, they contributed to turn the focus from exclusive 
maintenance capabilities of presidential regimes to consider also goal attainment 
capabilities, allowing comparisons of performance -and not just of durability— between 
regime types. Finally, it led to a richer and more realistic approach that focused on the 
inner differences of each regime type.
As Weaver and Rockman have pointed out, “highlighting the consequences of 
parliamentary and presidential differences is...not the end point of analysis, but rather a 
place to begin what is inevitably a more complex and subtle analysis of institutional 
influence on government effectiveness” (Weaver and Rockman 1993b: 8). In order to 
assess the impact of presidentialism upon integration processes, such ‘more complex and 
subtle analysis’ should be accounted through a more detailed reconceptualization in the 
first place, an overall appraisal of capabilities afterward, and subsequently the 
identification of differences within each regime type.
32 Lipset (1994) has gone even further regarding the influence of cultural and economic aspects on the 
stability of democracy, as far as neglecting any significant role to institutions.
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Deepening and aftermath of the debate
Presidential government was bom in Philadelphia in 1787. Successful as it turned
out to be, the model was replicated elsewhere, with notable frequency in Latin America. 
However, recent studies have insisted on the sharp differences that dissociate the original 
model from its followers. Riggs (1988, 1994), for instance, claims that the American case 
is an exception rather than the rule, as far as regime performance is concerned. His 
argument sustains that the United States achieved a successful political record in spite, 
not because, of presidentialism. According to his reasoning, it was the para-constitutional 
practices -such as loose political party structures, the utilization of long ballots, a 
tendency toward involvement in private rather than public organizations, and the 
common law tradition—  what guaranteed regime stability and average effectiveness.
Riggs strongly advocates parliamentary forms of institutional organization. He 
claims that the success or failure of democratic regimes is closely linked to contextual 
and environmental conditions, which should not be attributed to regime types. However, 
certain types are more likely to foster conflicts and malfunctioning, whereas others may 
lessen or limit damages, providing institutional frameworks more able to process 
conflicts and get to effective decisions.
The argument advanced by Riggs can be carried further, beyond the simple 
analysis o f advantages and disadvantages of presidentialism and parliamentarism. One of 
his main points is the exceptionality of American presidentialism, and this entails that 
there are -a t least—  two kinds of presidentialism: the successful one and all the other 
cases. Charles Jones (1997) has provided a reason, and a definition, to give count of such 
distinction: in his view, American government is separationist rather than presidentialist. 
The operative rule o f the system is the relative symmetry of power between the executive 
and legislative branches, not the preeminence of one o f them -although the label of the 
system, presidentialism , may conceal this fact.33 As Dahl has pointed out, somehow after 
Woodrow Wilson, “one might better call it the presidential-congressional system, 
because probably no other national legislature in the world is as influential as the U.S 
Congress” (1997: 14). This feature differentiates the American system from the British,
33 Of course, there have been a deep enlargement of presidential power and room of maneuver in the last 
century, especially after F. D. Roosevelt presidency (Schlesinger 1974; Neustadt 1980). However, the 
Congress is still powerful enough as to keep a strong hold on governmental decisions, and the president 
is not able to disregard it -particularly, but not only, in the case of divided government, which has been 
the norm in the last decades.
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since the latter -also despite the misleading label of parliamentarism— exhibits a full 
primacy of the executive; but also from most -if not all— Latin American 
presidentialisms. Be this last contrast due to different institutional arrangements or to 
other variables, such as the presence or absence of a liberal, democratic, or pluralistic 
tradition, the conclusion is that Latin American democracies should not be considered 
within the same institutional set as the United States. In fact, the label presidentialism 
fits better the former than the latter. This case for reconceptualization and sub­
classification of the presidential type will be advanced in more depth later in this chapter.
The identification of two main kinds of presidential democracy has significant 
consequences regarding regime characteristics and capabilities. By way of illustration, 
the case made by Mettenheim to defend presidentialism shows this clearly. He remarks 
on three sorts of opportunities raised by presidentialism, which are usually overlooked: 
they link presidential institutions to (a) political theory, (b) tensions between liberalism 
and democracy, and (c) divided government. He claims that “liberty, the dispersion of 
powers, and effective government are mutually reinforcing; ... traditional liberal theories 
of representative government with the direct popular appeals typical of mass politics... 
are reconciled; and... legislatures remain productive when U.S. presidents lack legislative 
majorities” (Mettenheim 1997b). However, almost all evidence is drawn from the 
American and French -as  in Lijphart (1992, 1999), too strangely considered as 
presidential— cases, while it is far from proving true in other cases, notably Latin 
American democracies.
The case of France is somewhat difficult to address. This is so because of two 
reasons: first, it is a quite new system, and is still evolving; second, the literature is 
openly divided concerning not just the properties, but the very nature of the French 
system and its followers. Duverger (1980) first called it semipresidentialism. Thereafter, 
it received the several names of dual leadership (Blondel 1984), hybrid type (Linz 1990), 
premier-presidentialism (Shugart and Carey 1992), semiparliamentarism, and even 
hyperpresidentialism! (Mettenheim and Rockman 1997b). Although it was by and large 
well considered, and widely proposed as a model to follow for the Latin American new 
democracies of the 1980s, there are just a few cases in the world, none of them in the 
Americas.
There are two main ways to understand semipresidentialism: as a mixed type or 
as an alternating one. The former means a stable mixture, a medium point between
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presidentialism and parliamentarism. The latter entails the oscillation between the two 
main types, depending on whether the elected president enjoys a majority in the assembly 
and is thus able to appoint a chief of government of his own party or coalition or, on the 
contrary, the opposition holds the majority and selects the chief o f government among its 
ranks, thus different from the president’s -a  phenomenon called cohabitation. 
Cohabitation can be thought of as a particular form of separation o f powers (Mettenheim 
and Rockman 1997b); however, it is not always so since, at least in principle, the 
president and the prime minister do not share competencies but have reserved domains -  
■if ill-defined. Therefore, executive division in semipresidential regimes does not 
necessarily denote checks and balances or subordination, but it may entail conflict over 
the constitutional interpretation of each part’s domain.
At any rate, most authors agree that semipresidential government is slowly 
leaning towards the parliamentary pole o f the continuum, thus becoming detached from 
its original design34 -notable exceptions still being Mettenheim and Rockman (1997b) 
and Lijphart (1999). Some sustain that it has never been much more than a variation of 
parliamentarism (Nohlen and Fernández 1998b) -since presidential powers are 
constitutionally limited everywhere except (perhaps) in Finland. More recently, though, 
also Finland and Portugal started to follow the French trend back to parliamentary 
government (Ignazi 1997). In fact, the fixed term constitutionally attributed to the head 
of state is not extendible to his or her eventual position as head o f  government, since the 
latter function automatically stops when the parliamentarian majority corresponds to a 
party or coalition other than the president’s. On the other hand, Israel became the latest 
institutional novelty with the introduction o f a popular election to select the prime 
minister -in  the framework of a parliamentary democracy, in all other respects.
Different presidentialisms
As seen before, Weaver and Rockman (1993b) assess the effects of institutional 
design in terms of its impact over government policy-making capabilities. They introduce 
a three-tier model to explain differences in such capabilities, and place the category
34 Charles De Gaulle established semipresidential ism in France between 1958 and 1962, and its 
blueprints were overtly designed to fit his charismatic leadership. Once De Gaulle left the government, it 
started to gradually develop a more parliamentary profile. A crucial stage was the cohabitation between 
Socialist president Miterrand and center-right Prime Minister Chirac, between 1986 and 1988; but the 
trend continued also thereafter, cohabitation becoming a frequent event. I am thankful to Jean Blondel 
for having called my attention to this point.
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presidentialism/parliamentarism at the top. The second tier accounts for the inner 
differences of both first types -although they underline differences just within 
parliament ary systems35—, and is determined by the interaction of the first tier with other 
institutional constraints -such as the electoral rules, and the rules and norms of 
government formation. The third tier refers to broader framework institutions, secondary 
characteristics of legislatures, political conditions and policy-makers’ goals, 
socioeconomic and democratic conditions and past policy choices. Since the first tier was 
dealt with above in this chapter, and the third one is mostly matter of the following one, 
in the remaining of this section I will concentrate in the differences within systems that 
are likely to impinge upon the overall system capabilities.
Weaver and Rockman split the second tier into two subtypes, labeled regime type 
and government type. The former is defined as a modal pattern o f government formation, 
the latter as the variations likely to occur to the modal pattern within any individual 
country. While regime type accounts for categories such as multiparty coalition, party 
government, or single party-dominant, government type includes minority government, 
oversized coalition, coalition government by opposition parties, and the like. The name 
they give to their subtypes is unfortunate, and as misleading as the very matter the 
subtypes are intended to define; therefore, I will not make further use of them. What is 
however important is that the distinction they make among parliamentary regimes leads 
them to define a set of attributes to qualify internal decision-making processes, and this 
set is adequate to scrutinize further the differences between presidential systems.
Weaver and Rockman list a series o f four attributes of decision-making processes 
that are allocated to the overall system (whether presidential or parliamentary), and a 
second series of five attributes originated from the second tier institutional constraints. 
The global attributes are: a) level of party discipline in legislature; b) recruitment 
processes for government executives; c) degree of centralization o f legislative power in 
cabinet; and d) degree of centralization of accountability, while those derived from their 
subtypes are: a) cohesion of government elites; b) existence o f veto points within 
government; c) stability of government elites; d) elite autonomy from short-term 
electoral and constituency pressures; and e) level of interest group access and influence.
35 This is so because they introduce only one presidential system, ihe United States.
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Departing from this three tier taxonomy, parliamentary systems are classified in to  
three groups: the first, labeled multiparty coalition, includes most of Western Europe; 
the second, party' government, does so with Britain and other Commonwealth countries; 
and the third, single-party-dominant, comprises Japan, Sweden (pre- 1970s), and Italy  
(pre-1976). Given that, nowadays, the latter has virtually no members, there are tw o  
groups left. As can be seen, this classification supports intuitive wisdom and traditional 
accounts, which have historically distinguished Anglo-Saxon parliamentarism from all the 
other cases. On the contrary, differences within presidentialism have been traditionally 
neglected, therefore disregarding any subtypes other than the successful American one. 
This trend has progressively changed along the last decade, mostly due to the persistence 
of presidential democracies in Latin America and elsewhere.36
Some efforts have been devoted, though, to differentiate between presidential 
democracies and pseudo-democracies that allow some kind o f election of authoritarian 
executives. To avoid this pitfall, Mettenheim appeals to a minimal definition strategy, 
stating that “the central characteristic o f  presidential government is the separate election 
of the executive and the legislature for fixed terms” (Mettenheim 1997b: 2). This 
strategy contrasts with others that stress the direct election of executives, while 
underestimating the separation of powers. Hence, this definition coincides with Jones's 
and applies mainly to the United States.
Unlike Jones and Mettenheim, Riggs considers the separation of powers not as 
the main feature o f presidentialism, but as a result o f a single rule: the fixed term of the 
president (Riggs 1994: 76). Separationism, therefore, is a consequence of presidentialist 
design instead o f its essence. Such elucidation opens way to another possibility: that a 
presidential regime might not be separationist in practice! Since separationism is 
visualized as a practical consequence, not as a rule, it is conceivable that a more 
‘concentrationist’ presidentialism may find its way under certain conditions. I will argue 
that this apparent possibility, for long time overlooked, is the form presidentialism has 
assumed in Latin America. In fact, the concentrationist perspective of presidentialism 
bridges the gap (the philosophical contradiction) between presidential government and
36 Carey and Shugart (1998) and Eaton (2000), for example, have highlighted some differences between 
presidential regimes such as the eventual delegation of powers by the legislature to the president, and the 
degree to which internal congressional institutions are developed. Chapter 8 deals with these intervening 
variables in more depth, as they are apt to understand certain political practices of the Southern Cone 
countries.
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separation of powers highlighted by Lijphart (1992: 4, original emphasis), namely that a 
“unipersonal president means the concentration of power within the executive -the very 
opposite of limited and shared power.”
Many authors have acknowledged the differences between the existing 
presidential regimes. Nohlen and Fernández ( 1998b: 24), for instance, have argued that 
there are four subtypes of presidentialism: “7... reforzado, 2... puro, 3... atenuado, y 4... 
parlamentarizado” determined by purely constitutional considerations. The typology I 
am advancing goes much further since, in the first place, it takes into consideration 
political practices in addition to institutional design. Additionally, it does not just offer a 
continuum along which presidential regimes can be ordered according to the president’s 
power, but a typology that allows a comparison with parliamentary regimes as well (see 
Table 6.3). Within this framework, the claim that “the U.S. system does not stand out 
from all parliamentary systems in its pattern of capabilities, but rather tends to cluster 
with coalitional systems on many of those capabilities” (Weaver and Rockman 1993c: 
460) acquires greater sense.
Head of 
government
Fixed term
♦ V'• -:V ."liable 6.3 ■ ^  ■:.
typology o f democratic regimes, regarding executivè f o r m a t ^
Real concentration of power
Yes
(presidentialism)
Executive concentration
Concentrationist Presidency 
(Argentina) [a]
No
(parliamentarism)
Cabinet government 
(UK) (b)
Equilibrium executive- 
legislative
Separationist Presidency 
(USA) [c]
Coalitional parliamentarism 
(Italy) [d]
NB: each cell label defines an ideal type, the countries between brackets being the closest 
case to each ideal type, Most Latin American countries would cluster just behind Argentina, 
while many Western European countries would rather rank near Italy.
To make my case, I stem from the fact that “both parliamentary and presidential 
systems are generic types that conceal a great deal of variation in the extent to which 
they concentrate or disperse power” (Rockman 1997a: 25). Consequently, “the extent to 
which power is concentrated or diffused... appears to be a dimension relatively 
independent of whether the system is parliamentary or presidential” (Rockman 1997a:
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27). In Table 6.3 this independent dimension finds its place.37 As strange as it may seem, 
the concentrationist presidency has tended to present itself as a coalitional executive, at 
least in South America (Deheza 1997; Amorim Neto 1998; Altman 2000). This 
occurrence resembles the coalitional parliamentarism cell at the opposite corner rather 
than the American model of presidentialism.38 However, as will be examined later, it 
would be a mistake to assume that the presence of coalition governments has reduced the 
paramount capacities of the executive vis-à-vis other key institutions and actors.
To assess the degree of concentration/diffiision of power I will use the veto 
player theory and the agenda setter approach (Tsebelis 1994, 1995, 1999). According to 
the former, “a veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement (by 
majority rule for collective actors) is required for a change in policy’ (Tsebelis 1995: 
301). Such analysis leads to the conclusion “that the policy stability of a political system 
[i.e. the preservation o f the status quo] increases when the number of veto player 
increases, when their congruence decreases and when their cohesion increases” (Tsebelis 
1995: 322). This is so since “a significant policy change has to be approved by all veto 
players, and it will be more difficult to achieve the larger the number of veto players, ... 
the greater the ideological distance among them”, and the less cohesive they are 
(Tsebelis 1999: 593). There are two main categories o f veto players: institutional and 
partisan.39 While the former are typical o f presidentialism -via the separation of power 
principle—  and multicameralism -usually due to federalism— , the latter would be typical 
of parliamentarism and multipartyism.
Regarding agenda-setting, the property is that “the veto player who has the 
power to propose will have a significant advantage in policy making” (Tsebelis 1995: 
325). Although the theoretical argument is impeccable, its empirical evidence is faulty. 
Tsebelis claims that “in parliamentary systems the executive (government) controls the 
agenda, and the legislature (parliament) accepts or rejects proposals, while in presidential
37 Although this four-cell grouping apparently coincides with Lijphart’s (1995), his second category 
considers the electoral system -whereby the assembly is elected— instead of the degree of power 
concentrated in the presidency. Hence, his resulting table equates Latin American presidentialism with 
Western European parliamentarism, which is at odds with the case made here.
38 As in a looking glass, the other diagonal -linking cells [b] and [c]—  brings together the cases of 
single party executives.
39 Tsebelis (1995: 323) also recognizes other categories of institutional and de facto veto players, such as 
“courts, super majorities, referendums, corporatist structures of decision making, local governments and 
other institutional devices.”
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systems the legislature makes the proposals and the executive (president) signs or vetoes 
them (Tsebelis 1995: 325). The latter claim -even if restricted with respect to 
legislation— is erroneous, the source of the mistake being -again, as in Weaver and 
Rockman (1993a)—  the generalization of presidential features from the single American 
case.
The main advantage of Tsebelis’s formulation is heuristic: it paves the way for 
cross-institutional comparison, thus adding refined complexity to a simple institutional 
analysis. The main disadvantage is of substance: it is biased towards parliamentary 
regimes (see Tsebelis 1999), whether for insufficient data or for inaccuracy in the 
empirical appraisal of presidentialism. Be it as it may, its main insights are fairly 
coincident with those advanced here, not the less important of which is the counter­
intuitive categorization of Italy and the United States as members of the same grouping 
(multiple veto players) against the United Kingdom (with only one)/0
Italy, the US and the UK may well be seen as archetypes of three of the four cells 
delimited in Table 6.3 -respectively [d], [c], and [b]. To build up a theoretical ground for 
cell [a], I draw upon two elements. In the first place, I reinstate a category that Tsebelis 
dramatically downplayed after having introduced it as a pillar of its model: the veto 
player cohesion. In the second place, I correct his inaccurate perception of 
presidentialism as an executive format that intrinsically concedes agenda-setting power to 
the legislature. Following these steps, the presidential executive emerges as a veto player 
“with very high cohesion,”40 1 which increases its power vis-à-vis other veto players. 
Furthermore, the agenda-setting power with which many constitutions -and political 
traditions— entitle the president adds still another determinant factor to out-power the 
contrasting veto players.
40 Lijphart’s index of executive dominance, based on cabinet durability, also clusters Italy with the 
United States at the ‘balanced’ extreme, while keeping Britain as utmost example of the opposite 
‘dominant’ extreme. However, his index is assumedly built to fit parliamentary government, hence the 
values of presidential regimes are “impressionistically, ...arbitrarily” assigned (1999: 128). All this 
notwithstanding, Lijphart’s classification -albeit not his persona! impressions— tendcncially agrees 
with the point made here, as it ranks South American executives as more dominant than the American’s 
-in  spite of just considering two of the weakest cases, Colombia and Venezuela. Had Argentina and 
Brazil be included, they would conceivable stand even closer to the dominant pole -at least the former.
41 Tsebelis (1995: 315) himself originally acknowledged this fact.
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';■■■ : J ; ;  ; „ Table 6 .4 ; «-a  y 
Enlarged typology o f democratic reg im es^fMMI
Head of
government: fixed 
term
Reelection Executive 
concentration (a)
Multiple, 
asymmetric veto 
players (b)
Multiple, balanced 
veto players (c)
Yes Argentina Brazil USA
Yes
(presidentialism) No Mexico Uruguay 
Costa Rica
Chile
No
(parliamentarism)
Yes UK
New Zealand
France
Portugal
Germany
Italy
France (4th Rep.) 
Switzerland
(a) Executive stronger than legislative; executive as agenda-setter; weak or non-activist judiciary
(b) Executive as agenda-setter; strong judiciary; it may include strong federalism
(c) Equilibrium executive-legislative; strong or activist judiciary; it may include strong federalism
An enlarged and more detailed framework of Table 6.3, as resulting after having 
considered the veto player and agenda-setting arguments, is displayed in Table 6.4. It 
incorporates such features as presidential reelection and federalism, which will be further 
analyzed in more depth. The following chapters are to provide empirical support to this 
typology. A crucial question can now be raised: to what extent do different types of 
executive format affect government capabilities?
Conclusion, on presidentialism, performance capabilities, and integration
The strongest charges against presidentialism were made as a consequence of its
-supposedly—  poor record concerning democratic stability. By the end of the century, 
an ample majority of the democracies inaugurated in the last two decades seem 
appreciably consolidated. It is thus reasonable to change somehow the approach to the 
different institutional formats, considering their performance in other areas, apart from 
regime survival, in order to appraise further advantages and disadvantages.
Presidentialism, due to its usual practice of popular elections for the head of 
government, has been said to provide additional democratic legitimacy for the system 
and, hence, for the overall decision-making process. This is so because it offers a more 
direct mechanism of vertical accountability, together with a greater identinability of its 
top official, than parliamentary regimes. The other advantages advanced by Shugart and 
Carey - th e  presence of checks and balances, and the role of arbiter-, however, are not 
present in every presidential regime: in fact, most Latin American democracies do not 
have them. In O’Donnell’s terms, they lack horizontal accountability (O’Donnell 1998).
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What presidentialism is supposed to feature, regardless of its subtypes, is predictability -  
based on a fixed term for office that allows relevant social and economic actors to plan 
their activities and investments over a known timetable. Taking democracy for granted, it 
is often harder to get rid of a president than to dismiss a prime minister. The former 
requires an election, an impeachment, or a serious disease. On the contrary, the strongest 
chief executive in the most concentrating and bipartisan parliamentary regime, Margaret 
Thatcher, was ousted without undergoing any of these circumstances.
Latin American recurring turmoil since the 1990s somehow questions this 
assertion. The successful impeachment of Brazil’s Collor, Ecuador’s Bucaram and 
Venezuela’s Pérez, along with the anticipated resignation or ousting of Argentina’s De la 
Rúa, Bolivia’s Siles Suazo, Ecuador’s Mahuad, Paraguay’s Cubas Grau and Peru’s 
Fujimori are proof that institutional instability is far from over. However, it is worth 
noticing that its return is due to policy failure rather than to policy deadlock -as the 
traditional argument claimed. It could be said that, in many concentrationist presidencies, 
concentration stays as presidents go.
In addition to the characteristics proper to the general type, the concentrationist 
subtype -i.e. most Latin American cases—  also involves the reduction of veto points, 
thus potentially increasing the capacity for individual initiative, rapid response, and 
executive-driven decision-making. These characteristics are more likely to be effective in 
certain policy-areas than in others, depending on a set of diverse variables. Blondel and 
Cotta (1996) underline three cases in which the government acquires greater autonomy 
with respect to the supporting parties: emergencies, technical cases, and implementation. 
As seen in chapter 5, presidents tend to enjoy greater room for maneuver from both 
institutional and political constraints as foreign policy regards. Schlesinger (1974: 279) 
has underlined how, even in separationist presidentialism such as the American, “it was 
from foreign policy that the imperial Presidency drew its initial momentum.” Rogowski 
(1999) hypothesizes that more secure terms of office enhance foreign credibility. 
Although he acknowledges that the presence of less veto points may undermine such 
credibility, this would be compensated by improved stability and policy coherence.
Beyond their differentiated performance across issue areas, concentration and 
diffusion of power also impact diversely upon general governmental capacities. As 
Weaver and Rockman (1993c: 454) have stated, “those arrangements that concentrate 
power... tend to perform better at the steering tasks of government than those that
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diffuse power.” Concentration o f power is seen as more able to deal with active policy­
making; whereas, its diffusion is more closely related to maintenance -stick to 
commitments— and political -w ide representation and social peace—  capacities 
(Rockman 1997b). The application of these propositions to Latin America may well be a 
fruitful endeavor: when the region was suffering from political instability and lack o f 
legitimacy, preeminent or concentrationist presidencies were unable both to solve social 
conflicts and persist. Once traditional causes of conflict had receded -whatever the 
reasons had been—  and new challenges for governance had to be faced, steering 
capacity (effective decision making) developed an increasing importance -sometimes 
even more remarkable than political capacity (legitimate representation). Only recently 
did some scholars begin to pay greater attention to the link between presidentialism and 
public policy (Haggard and McCubbins 2001), although they do not focus on foreign 
policy but on budgetary and regulatory policies.
As for regional integration, a renewed formidable task for Latin American 
democracies, some considerations are in order. What institutional capabilities would 
foster higher effectiveness in this field? There are at least three domains involved in it: 
foreign affairs, trade policy, and maintenance o f international commitments. Although the 
former may be considered as encompassing the other two, I refer by foreign affairs to the 
overall capacity o f  targeting priorities and selecting macro-orientations in world politics. 
On the other hand, maintenance o f international commitments means continuation rather 
than targeting, whereas trade policy implies micro or meso-orientation at the most.
In one o f the few investigations linking executive format with international 
performance, Helen Milner has argued that “differing political institutions in Great 
Britain, France, and the United States have not led to major differences in their ability to 
make and maintain international commitments in the trade sector” (Milner 1993: 347). 
The fact that the United States do not outperform their contrasting parliamentary 
democracies is not contradictory with my point above, since presidentialism is not better 
equipped than parliamentarism regarding maintenance capabilities. However, two 
significant questions rise from Milner’s conclusion: in the first place, regional integration 
is much more complex and daunting an enterprise than just sticking to commitments 
already attained. In the second place, only three out of four of the executive types above 
defined -i.e . separationist presidentialism, parliamentary cabinet government and 
parliamentary coalitional executive—  were analyzed. A logical interrogation rises: how
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would the type left apart -i.e. concentrationist presidentialism— have performed, even 
regarding just maintenance rather than steering capacities?
The argument advanced here is that the essential characteristic of the presidential 
type, that is fixed term of the president, working together with the characteristic of the 
concentrationist subtype, that is executive concentration, allows higher certainty, along 
certain areas -usually held distant from the assembly—, that a given policy or 
orientation will be kept without reversal or institutional blockades in the medium run. 
Simultaneously, it provides relevant actors with direct access to top decision-makers and 
permits a rapid response from the latter. In the Southern Cone, as I will show, 
concentrated rather than separated power has proved better suited to deal with 
integration.
In sum, a given government’s capabilities are an outcome of the fit among three 
factors: “the nature of its policy challenges, its institutional arrangements, and the 
conditions that facilitate and limit institutional effects” (Weaver and Rockman 1993b: 
40). The remaining chapters of this section deal with the latter two factors in Latin 
America, while the third section is intended to cope with the policy challenges derived 
from the newly process o f regional integration in the Southern Cone.
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C H A P T E R  7
P R E S ID E N T IA L IS M  A N D  P O LIT IC A L C U LTU R E  IN T H E
S O U T H E R N  C O N E
Introduction
The goal o f this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it aims at controlling for the 
non-institutional factors that may affect presidential performance. On the other, it 
amounts to a contextual comprehension o f actual institutional attainment. If the contents 
presented here turned out to be crucial, this dissertation would substantially lose sense -  
inasmuch as it holds institutional design as the main independent variable. However, 
other elements that additionally influence institutionalized behavior should not be 
dismissed beforehand.
As late as 1990, an author could claim that all “what does exist concerning the 
presidency in Latin America consists largely of chapters in country studies covering 
formal-legal aspects o f presidential power. Missing are examinations of the philosophical, 
intellectual, cultural and historical bases of presidential power” (Sondrol 1990: 416). 
Today such an assertion is no longer valid, but still many times both lines of analyses are 
carried out in parallel -what is tantamount to saying that they rarely converge. At any 
rate, their reciprocal influence is hardly ever disregarded at present. As Weaver and 
Rockman (1993a: 11, emphasis added) argue, “such factors as the histories o f programs, 
successful responses in the past, dominant beliefs among leaders, and the political 
culture o f the society may be especially vital in determining how institutions actually 
function.” Mainwaring and Shugart (1997: 436, emphasis added) support the same claim 
when they state that “the quality o f leadership, the nature of social cleavages and political 
conflicts, the level of economic development, and the political culture strongly affect 
how democracy works, ... how presidentialism functions.” Martz (1994: 251, emphasis 
added) goes as far as to assert, “in the 1990s, any contemporary reassessment of 
comparative politics must embrace political culture as an important dimension.” 
Furthermore, Seligson (1996) displays empirical data in order to show how political 
culture accounts for the difficult combination between Latin American polities and 
democracy.
It has been noted that, even for the American government, the rather insubstantial 
differences exhibited across periods of unified government and divided government have
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to do with a “component of deep-seated individualism among American politicians... 
[that] seems to be a matter of political culture” (Mayhew 1991: 199, my emphasis). 
However, the relation between political institutions and political culture varies according 
to the type of society. In Dahl’s terms (1989: 252), “a modem dynamic pluralist society 
disperses power, influence, authority and control away from any single center toward a 
variety of individuals, groups, associations and organizations”. Hence the less modem, 
dynamic and pluralist the society, the less dispersed the power. As dispersion is the 
opposite to concentration, to focus on these societal features amounts to highlighting 
even further the contrast between American polities relative to their location either 
northwards or southwards from the Rio Grande.
The next sections are intended to come to terms with some historical features of 
political culture in the Southern Cone. It should be noted, however, that Latin America -  
not the Southern Cone—  is usually considered as a single object of reference when this 
topic is analyzed. Therefore, many concepts such as populism, clientelism or 
movimientismo have also been applied to contexts that are ostensibly different from 
those approached here. Some main differences between the Southern Cone and the rest 
of Latin America are that the former countries have a much smaller proportion of 
peasant and native-Indian population, a higher level of economic development, and a 
higher rate of literacy and educational attainment. This gap has extended steadily along 
the last two decades, distancing Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay from the Andean 
and Central American countries. Mexico, due to its vicinity with the U.S., is experiencing 
instead a similar division within its own territory, undergoing a fragmentation between an 
underdeveloped South and the richer and better integrated Center and North. Paraguay, 
as seen in the next chapter, presents characteristics closer to the Andean countries, but 
its participation in Mercosur has kept it somewhat tied to its wealthier neighbors.
Historical roots
Latin American presidentialism stemmed from a series of European traditions 
rather than from a pure North American model. Hence Nohlen and Fernández (1998: 
111-115) argue, “el presidencialismo latinoamericano, por lo tanto, en su origen es un 
producto sui generis, en cierto modo un híbrido producto de varios componentes, tanto 
doctrinarios como empíricos, de la teoría y de la práctica de los procesos políticos. 
Entre ellos es posible destacar los siguientes: doctrina de la separación de poderes
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versus tradición monárquica centralista, ... constitucionalismo versus autoritarismo ... 
[y] soberanía popular (nacional) versus gobierno oligárquico
This blend of local traditions and imported institutions reflected the complex 
situation faced by the nascent countries: not only had they to create a political regime but 
the state itself and, furthermore, the very identity of each new nation. As the subsequent 
developments have shown, the persistence o f borbonic traditions and monarchical ideas 
proved much stronger than the liberal elites had initially thought. It has been 
consequently argued that “a clash of values occurred in the importation of a new, alien, 
liberal and secular constitutional arrangement juxtaposed to the feudal, organic, 
aristocratic and Catholic cultural traditions o f Latin America” (Sondrol 1980: 419). The 
latter description is however somewhat exaggerated, and it must be tempered especially 
regarding the Southern Cone. The Catholic influence, for example, was not actually 
significant in Uruguay ever or in Argentine national politics until the 1930s (Zanatta 
1996). Moreover, neither in these countries nor in southern Brazil have the larger cities 
been exposed to feudal arrangements, and it should be remembered that the urbanization 
rate of this region is higher than both the European and the American cases. Finally, 
Latin America has also developed a tradition of liberal thinkers, however minoritarian, 
and their ideas have not been ignored by and large. Irrespective of these specifications, 
the general claim concerning the clash of values still holds.
There are two additional features o f Latin American politics that are usually 
reckoned as being both strong and enduring: the lack of distinction between state and 
society and the influence o f militarismo. The former has its main expression in Brazil -  
featuring the phenomenon of coronelismo42— , whose pattern of political development in 
the 19th century “terminou inviabilizando... a distinçâo, crucial para as sociedades 
modernas, entre a esfera pública e a esfera privada” (Tavares 1998: 157). This 
amalgam, which was not exclusively Brazilian, gave birth to a compromise between two 
contradictory logics: “a do patrimonialismo estamental estatizante e centralizador e a 
do feudalismo descentralizador e anárquico” (1998: 160). Militarism, in turn, emerged 
as a consequence o f the military path to independence followed by many of the young
42 Coronelism was “a system of local bossism that bridged levels of government and organized 
intergovernmental relations” (Hagopian 1996: 47). It was based on pacts between public authorities and 
local private power holders, known as coroneis because of ancient titles given to their forerunners.
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republics, and its hierarchy and personalism are thought to be simultaneous with, and 
influential over presidentialism (Nohlen and Fernández 1998: 117).
One o f the most traditional labels put to the Latin American societies has been 
that of populismo (Germani 1962). Many others followed, either referring to global 
features or to political patterns, such as caudillismo, movimientismo, plebiscitarianism, 
corporativism, authoritarianism, delegative democracy, new populism, and the like 
(Wiarda 1973; Dix 1989; Sondrol 1990; Alberti 1991 and 1996; O ’Donnell 1993, 1994, 
1996 and 1998; Malloy 1996; Philip 1998). What stuns along most of the literature is 
that the usual patterns observed by western, liberal societies do not apply 
straightforwardly in this region. All those descriptions converge, one way or another, 
into a general conclusion: the institutional weakness is a ubiquitous and persisting 
characteristic of these countries, and not a temporary ‘disease.’ Given the institutional 
approach of this research, some o f the above interpretations deserve a brief attention. 
The remainder of this section will focus on traditional populism, caudillism, 
movimientism, and also personalism; the next section is to deal with corporativism, 
authoritarianism, delegative democracy, and new populism.
Sondrol (1990: 417) has distinguished the unique tradition o f Latin America as 
made up of three key aspects: caudillism, personalism and elitism, whose outcome would 
be an ejecutivismo allegedly intrinsic to the region. According to this approach, which 
follows the nation/state-building pattern mentioned above, “ejecutivismo in Latin 
America has been a device to guide and control the extremist and centrifugal forces 
characteristic of the region, and to forge unifying symbols essential to nationalism in 
lands rife with separatist tendencies and political factions” (Sondrol 1990: 419; also 
Botana 1977; Mayer and Gaeta 1998).
Caudillism can be defined as a type of charismatic leadership exerted by a 
landowner or likewise grand man over his subordinates or neighbors, based on de facto 
power and personal worship. Personalism consists in the identification of the caudillistic 
leader with the state itself, thus erasing any difference between the person and the 
institution and paving the way for clientelism -as a particular social structure founded on 
personal, dyadic and asymmetric relationships. Elitism, on the other hand, refers to the 
intellectual orientation of most Founding Fathers of the Latin American countries; in 
their view, the only conceivable rule was the rule of reason, an idea that distanced them 
from a pure democratic conception and dragged them closer to a more aristocratic one.
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The concept of populism , as already mentioned, has a long history and many 
allocated meanings. Some times understood as a multidimensional notion that combines 
political, economic, social and cultural characteristics (O’Donnell 1973; Germani 1978; 
Conniff 1982), in other occasions defined in economic terms (Sachs 1989; Dombusch 
and Edwards 1991), both interpretations have lately lost much of their conceptual grip. 
Weyland’s (1999: 381) definition of populism as a political strategy seems more suitable, 
provided that three characteristics are present: “a personal leader appeals to a 
heterogeneous mass of followers who feel left out and are available for mobilization; the 
leader reaches the followers in a direct, quasi-personal manner that bypasses established 
intermediary organizations, especially parties; if the leader builds a new or revives an old 
populist party, it remains a personal vehicle with a low level of institutionalization.”43 
This definition comprehends both variants o f populism, namely old -o r classical—  and 
new, to which I will return later.
Finally, Alberti calls for the rehabilitation of the political culture approach as the 
necessary one to account for movimientismo in Latin America. He argues that 
“movement and institution are two different, contradictory and mutually exclusive 
principles o f social life” (1996: 261). Movimientismo is thus defined as “a particular way 
of playing politics in which all major interests in society are expressed and loosely 
organized in movements led by charismatic leaders, which claim to represent the ‘true’ 
interests o f the nation... and identify personal leadership with State institutions” (1996: 
254). McGuire (1997: 7) similarly defines political movements as “a set of people who 
share a common political identity and whose leaders aspire to full and permanent control 
of the state through the most readily available means, electoral or not.” It is simple to 
conclude that all the above described phenomena are tightly related -when not 
overlapped—  to each other, all them stemming from a common denominator: 
particularism, the hard core of Latin American politics.
43 Notwithstanding the distrust that populists generally feel toward institutions, populist movements 
varied widely. They ranged from the highly personalized style of Argentina’s Perón and Brazil’s Vargas 
to more organized movements such as the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in Peru, 
the Acción Democrática (AD) in Venezuela and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in 
Bolivia (Malloy 1996). All too strange, Southern Cone populism showed less ‘institutional orientation* 
than its Andean counterpart.
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Recent trends
Particularism is logically antithetic to universalista, yet it could also be conceived 
of as opposite to organicism; however, the latter is not necessary the case. Latin 
American ideological melting pot has gone as far as to reconcile some of its most 
particularistic features with the typically rationalistic pattern of bureaucratic 
administration, if only in the Southern Cone. Corporatism has ever become more o f a 
technical-managerial device rather than a harmonic model o f social organization. 
Between the 1960s and the 1970s, traditional authoritarianism and corporatism mixed up 
with somehow new bureaucratism to give way to a singular novelty: bureaucratic 
authoritarianism.
First theorized by O’Donnell (1973), bureaucratic authoritarianism-or BA, as it 
came to be known—  was a new conceptual framework intended to give count of 
Brazilian military rule after 1964 and its Argentine correlate from 1966. Later in 1973, 
also Chile and Uruguay joined the group. The BA took place not in the less developed 
countries, but in those whose modernization processes were more advanced -and 
therefore, were more disruptive to the traditional society. It differed from other 
authoritarian types such as traditional -e.g. Paraguay—  and populist -as in previous 
Argentina and Brazil— , drawing on Weber’s typology of legitimate domination while re­
adapted to illegitimate contexts. However, not all the BA cases were alike, the basic 
difference concerning corporatism. Whereas both Argentine and Brazilian dictatorships 
developed a functional approach to socio-political organization, the Chilean military 
under Pinochet carried out a neoliberal economic program based on free market and 
foreign investment.
Analysts have given two main meanings to the concept o f corporatism: either 
they refer “to a pattern of interest group politics that is monopolistic, hierarchically 
ordered, and structured by the state” or “to a broader cultural and ideological tradition of 
the region that they viewed as patrimonial and statist” (Collier 1995: 135). In turn, the 
former can be further subdivided into two components: a type of interest intermediation 
-a s  opposed to pluralist intermediation— and a type of policy formation -as opposed to 
pressure politics (Schmitter 1979, 1982; Collier 1995). While this meaning of 
corporatism belongs to the decades coming after the 1950s, the other definition bears 
older connotations. As one of the latter’s main supporters has stated, “the ‘corporative 
framework’ ... refers to a system in which the political culture and institutions reflect a
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historic hierarchical, authoritarian, and organic view of man, society and polity” (Wiarda 
1973: 222). Whether seen as consecutive, contemporary or competitive, the two types of 
corporatism have lost significance even before the last wave of transitions to democracy 
took place. Indeed, Malloy (1996, first published in 1977) had already categorized 
corporatism as a subtype of authoritarianism, and neither all 1970s dictatorships44 nor the 
1980s democracies intended to foster it any further. On the contrary, after the late 1970s 
most Southern Cone administrations advanced either market-oriented policies or modes 
of pluralistic representation, or both.
Working on democracy just as he had done on authoritarianism, O’Donnell 
(1994, first published in 1991) advanced a concept to explain the singularities of the new 
South American regimes: delegative democracies. Within such a framework, “whoever 
wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, 
constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally 
limited term of office” (O’Donnell 1994: 59). Although O ’Donnell originally highlighted 
the relevance of cultural factors, in further works he reconsidered the weight of 
institutions to properly account for the political processes throughout the region 
(O’Donnell 1993, 1996a, 1996b). In his later conclusions he recognizes some persistent 
non-institutional characteristics o f  Latin American politics, but at the same time 
acknowledges that some degree o f institutionalization -albeit atypical—has been reached 
(O’Donnell 1996a, 1998). At least, leaders’ actions are now performed with regard to 
the institutional frame, be them channeled within or aside it. It may still be a paradox that 
delegative democracies -i.e. different from institutionalized democracies— took place 
precisely in the same countries where bureaucratic authoritarianism -i.e. the most 
institutionalized subtype o f  authoritarianism—  had flourished two decades before: 
Argentina and Brazil.
Regarding democratic politics, Dix (1989) has described another particular 
feature o f the region, namely that its national party systems are culturally rooted on 
different cleavages from Europe. Hence, it makes little sense to approach Latin American 
politics in terms of the right-left dimension, for the regional cleavages were due to
44 For example, after the 1976 coup the Argentine military government married the Chilean option for 
neoliberal policies, although with much less success. Few alternatives could have been farther from the 
corporatist orientation adopted by the previous military rulers after the 1966 coup (Schamis 1991; 
Malamud 2001b).
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conflicts other than class-based ones. A major consequence is that Latin American 
parties do not appear as capable of aggregating interests, representing the people, 
recruiting leaders, and governing the state as in the countries where party models 
originated. Rather, their ‘inefficiency’ gave way to other forms of accomplishing those 
tasks, like already mentioned corporatist intermediation or chief decisionism. In this line, 
Mainwaring asserted for the case of Brazil, “the counterpart to the individualism of 
politicians is the atomization of interests in Brazilian civil society. Interests are not 
aggregated in political parties, and the parties do not express social cleavages to the 
same extent as they did in the classical European cases” (1990a: 29). Accordingly, “the 
loose relationship between presidents and parties in Brazil has made politics more ad- 
hoc, more personalistic, and less institutionalized. It has also contributed to the 
possibility of institutional deadlock and immobilism” (1990a: 22-23).
The mixed social bases of party politics, together with the economic crises 
underwent through the 1980s, are among the main causes for the emergence of a late 
phenomenon: the so-called new populism. It differs from traditional populism in many 
respects, especially since the latter was ‘statist’ -though not socialist. Its declared goals 
were to assert national economic independence -namely anti-imperialism—, to break 
local semi-feudal structures so as to liberate human and material resources for economic 
development, and to promote social justice for all sectors of the nation (Malloy 1996: 
129). New populism, in contrast, takes an-opposite stand in its approach to the economy. 
As a matter of fact, it is tightly associated with cases o f structural, market-oriented 
reforms such as those implemented by Argentina’s Menem, Brazil’s Collor de Mello, 
Peru’s Fujimori, Venezuela’s Pérez and Caldera, and also Russia’s Yeltsin and Ukraine’s 
Kuchma (Philip 1998;Weyland 1999).
If particularism was the strongest constant of regional politics since the 
independence wars, the new one seems to be neoliberal policies, a rather universal and 
universalistic phenomenon. The emerging dilemma is how both features came to be 
compatible, bringing not just popular support but even reelection to most populist 
reformers. The reasons must be looked for at three different levels: economic -  
particularly regarding hyperinflation crises and global forces—, institutional -especially 
concerning presidentialism— and cultural -mainly respecting the persistent demand for 
strong and personal leadership.
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Politicai culture and presidential leadership
Bolivar early noted that “the new states of America, originally Spanish, need
kings with the title of President” (cited by Sondrol 1990: 426). Presidentialism in South 
America was originally designed to concentrate more power on the executive than the 
North American model. Historical developments, among them war, military rule and 
economic crisis, increased instead of lessening such concentration. Underlying both 
institutional design and historical practices was political culture, acting as subtle but 
permanent reinforcement of the concentrationist forces any time at work.
Although there were sporadic attempts at regime change,45 “every Latin 
American nation which experimented with other forms of the executive invariably 
returned to the strong presidency, concentrating power in the hands of one individual 
who had virtually la suma del poder" (Sondrol 1990: 418, original emphasis and 
Spanish). Although most of these experiments did not actually imply a drastic change 
away from presidential design -and being aware that la suma del poder is a rather 
exaggerated concept— , the recurrence of presidentialism as the only plausible choice is 
apparent to observers. And so is presidential preeminence: as an analyst stated by the 
early 1960s, “the most widely professed fact in the field of Latin American politics is 
unquestionably the dominant role of the president” (Gomez 1961: 81).
The diffusion o f bureaucratic authoritarianism in the region became still another 
thrust for executive centralization. In Brazil, “o alto nivel de tecnificagào e de  
centralizagdo e concentragào da estrutura de poder, do planejamento e das decisòes 
estratégicas, ao redor da Presidència militarizada, levou està ultima a empenhar-se na  
articulagào de govem os estaduais que... assegurassem a adequada implementagào, no  
nivel regional, das metas do planejamento nacionaF  (Tavares 1998: 224). Argentine 
federalism, traditionally weaker than Brazilian, was undermined even further by the 
centralization brought about by military governments, be them bureaucratic-authoritarian 
-from 1966 through 1973—  or openly neoliberal -from  1976 through 1983.
The fact that neither authoritarian nor democratic presidents could make sure that 
they would accomplish their tenures without being violently ousted resulted in high levels
45 Among others, Peru (1822 and 1823) and Uruguay (1918-1934 and 1951-1966) tried diverse forms of 
collegiate executive, and Brazilians rejected via referendum a shift into parliamentarism on April 21, 
1993. Furthermore, throughout the 1980s Argentina, Bolivia and Peru either appointed commissions or 
held official conferences in order to draft projects on constitutional reform toward more parliamentary 
forms of government.
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of uncertainty. As pointed out by Wynia (1984: 37), “what is intriguing about Latin 
America is not the amount of power [the presidents] appear to wield, but how they use 
their power to cope with the uncertainty that arises when a consensus on political rules is 
lacking.” By the same token, he noted that “what limits the exercise of presidential 
power is the ability of other players to constrain the president by using their political 
resources against him” (1984: 37); that is, not institutions but social and political actors 
themselves used to be the sole limit to presidential power. Whereas in the past not such a 
mighty actor existed but the military, what fostered great uncertainty about democratic 
stability, for the time being powerful economic agents seem to have assumed that role. 
This is good news for democracy, though it may not be so for social justice.
Despite the new conditions for the exercise of executive power, Latin American 
traditions are far from disappearing -although they might be gradually fading, at least at 
the centers. As Dix noted, not just the head of government is the locus of personalistic 
authority. Rather, even political parties “have centered around key personalities, not only 
in their formative years, but often for a long time thereafter as well” (Dix 1989: 82), in 
contrast to the European pattern. Although local tyrannies can exist in a system that 
disperses authority such as the American (Rockman 1997a: 31), when authority is 
concentrated the top office cannot be much different from local structures. The 
persistence of such ubiquitous traditions led Wynia (1995: 73) to argue, specifically 
referring to Argentines, that they “became accustomed to a very personalistic, 
hyperpresidential regime.”
Constitutional presidentialism, populist practices, and economic crisis set the 
stage for the emergence o f new populism. Be it successful, as with Menem, or failed, as 
with Collor, this new brand of populism did not jeopardize formal democracy -regardless 
of how much it affected its substantive performance. Philip (1998) remarks the symbiotic 
relationship between populism, whether old or new, and presidentialism. Similarly, he 
raises a similar point to that supported here: that in Latin America during the 1980s, “a 
temporary period of hyper-presidentialism was much less damaging to democracy than 
would have been the likely alternative -namely prolonged institutional crisis of a kind 
threatening democratic stability” (1998: 82). Next chapters will discuss the extent to 
which a likewise beneficial influence was to support regional integration, besides just 
national democracies.
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Presidential defenders, populists and neoliberal supporters would find a solid 
common ground to agree on. As Weyland (1999: 389) states, “populist leaders and 
neoliberal reformers need a strong institutional base. Despite their current anti-state 
rhetoric, both populists and neo liberals therefore seek to concentrate power at the top o f  
the state, especially in the presidency.” To be sure, institutions are not enough to 
determine any given outcome; it is thus at this point that leaders’ ability comes into the 
scene. Philip (1998: 91) observes that, to account for different results among the several 
new populist experiences, “the key factor seems to be the ability of some individuals to  
enhance the powers already vested in the presidential institution.”
Remarks,  on presidentialism (design) and concentrationism (practice)
In a masterful book, Neustadt (1980) defined the approaches that could best
scrutinize presidential performance. According to him, “there are two ways to study 
‘presidential power.’ One way is to focus on the tactics, so to speak, of influencing 
certain men in given situations: how to get a bill through Congress, how to settle strikes, 
how to quiet Cabinet feuds, or how to stop a Suez. The other way is to step back from 
tactics on those ‘givens’ and to deal with influence in more strategic terms: what is its 
nature and what are its sources? What can this man accomplish to improve the prospect 
that he will have influence when he wants it? Strategically, the question is not how he 
masters Congress in a peculiar instance, but what he does to boost his chance for 
mastery in any instance” (Neustadt 1980: 4). The latter, the strategic approach, is what 
justifies to look beyond institutional design into behavioral choice. The matter of this 
chapter has accordingly been how political practices, embedded in political traditions, 
combined with executivist constitutions to produce a concentrationist presidency in 
South America.
Table 7.1 shows the variety o f regimes that Southern Cone countries have 
featured along the last half-century. Two broad patterns are so delineated, namely civil 
and military rule. Each type features three subtypes, half of which are concentrationist- 
like irrespective of its broader type. M ost of these regime patterns are rooted in the 
political culture and practices of these countries, and certainly not in their institutional 
design. Even along classic democratic periods, the ‘routine’ o f executive concentration 
has conditioned effective performance as much as institutional provisions.
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r f e . » ' y‘ ' Table 7>1 * - 
iR eg im e typ es in the Southern Cone betw een 1940 and 1999;- . O
Traditional 
(or populist*)
. . 1943-46 
Argentina 1 9 5 5 .5 s
Military rule
Bureaucratic-
Authoritarian*
1966-73
Neoliberal
1976-83
Old
Populism*
1946-55
Civil rule
Classic
Democracy
1973-76
1983-89
New
Populism*
1989-99
Brazil 1964-85 - 1930-451950-54
1954-64
1985-90
1990-92
(1992-99)
Chile - 1973-90 - 1950-731990-99
-
n 1954-89* Paraguay - - - 1989-99 -
I Uruguay 1973-85 - 1942-731985-99
-
* Most concentrationist subtypes.
SOURCE: own elaboration, based on criteria from O’Donnell 1973, Schamis 1991, Philip 1998, and 
Weyland 1999.
As can be seen from the figures, Argentina -especially— and Brazil clearly take 
the lead in what diversity regards, but also concerning regime quality: most of the last 
half century they have lived under concentrationist subtypes. Chile, in turn, is the 
opposite case, with Uruguay ranking somewhere in the middle46 and Paraguay exhibiting 
a long-lasting concentrationist -albeit quasi-traditional— dictatorship. The case of Brazil 
since 1992 is rather atypical, as president Cardoso was not a populist nor was his party, 
but he was supported by regional populists -such as PFL leader from Bahia Antonio 
Carlos Magalhaes— in order to implement thorough neoliberal policies.
It has been recognized that a “fixed term in office allows presidents to employ 
populist tactics and maintain distance from parties without endangering their 
continuation in power” (Weyland 1999: 389). This has not always been the case, since 
constitutional impeachment is still a powerful arm that parliaments can appeal to.47 
Therefore, “populist presidentialism is... more likely to succeed where non-presidential 
institutions are seem by their electorates as corrupt and self-interested and the populists 
as sincere reformers” (Philip 1998: 94). In such case, presidents may enjoy a further 
delegation of legal, and even constitutional, powers.
46 Analytical labels notwithstanding, Chile’s ‘neoliberaf dictatorship was not less concentrationist than 
the Uruguayan BA though.
47 Three successful impeachments have taken place in South America during the 1990s: besides Brazil’s 
Collor de Mello, also Ecuador’s Abdala Bucaram and Venezuela’s Carlos Perez were dismissed through 
congressional decision -or resigned shortly before.
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Why do assemblies delegate authority -be it decree authority or other kind—  to 
executives? Drawing on Carey and Shugart, Power (1999) advances a cluster o f 
hypotheses. To start with, there are two collective action problems: ‘The first is that 
legislative decision making is generally a slow process and that delegation to a unitary 
executive could be an attractive option; the second is that legislators seeking policy 
change have a difficult time deciding among various acceptable initiatives to the status 
quo, and thus they may choose to assign the final decision to the executive” (Power 
1999). A third reason is that “legislatures may delegate decree authority on issue-areas in 
which information and policy expertise are concentrated in the executive branch.” 
Finally, “assemblies may delegate authority to the executive to avoid responsibility for 
policies that they believe to be necessary but expect to be widely unpopular.” A last 
hypothesis, rather ‘genetic’ than process-oriented, is that not only parliaments but also 
constitutional assemblies delegate power, since they do not act in a vacuum but 
pressured by the urgencies of the moment. Henceforth, countries perceived to be 
permanently in crisis -like Brazil—  will have more delegative constitutions (Power 1999: 
221/2).
Cavarozzi (1998) has also remarked on the depth of the crisis to account for the 
new political patterns. In his view, the emergency has its roots in the retraction o f the 
state after the crisis of the accumulation model -th e  so-called import-substitution 
industrialization. As main consequence o f the dilution o f  the state-centric matrix, politics 
became de-centered. Accordingly, hyperpresidentialism would be a reorganizing 
response to such turmoil in reestablishing its latitude to politics. Just as the presidency 
assumes the domestic role of the utmost institutional rule-maker, it does so regarding the 
new integration tasks at a regional level. Cavarozzi, in consequence, sees the institutional 
features -institutional deficit— o f regional integration as mirroring the domestic 
processes o f Mercosur member countries.
In his later works, O’Donnell (1996a) has reached another conclusion though. In 
his view, countries like Argentina and Brazil are “informally institutionalized 
democracies” rather than non (or weakly) institutionalized ones. He sets forth that 
informal/particularistic practices are indeed institutions, and in so doing he calls attention 
to the fact that traits such as corruption, nepotism, and clientelism are not isolated 
episodes in specific governments, but a long-standing and stable features of several new 
democracies. Drawing on O’Donnell’s insights, it follows that Mercosur actual
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proceedings would be better scrutinized in a different light from that illuminating its 
alleged institutional deficit. Instead, inter-presidential operation could be thought of as an 
informal institution, a subtle but semi-routinized mechanism through which the region 
managed to work out its way.
One of the conditions Haas (1968: xxxvi) claimed -long ago— to be necessary 
for the formation of regional political communities is that the joining societies “are 
governed by the traditions and assumptions of parliamentary (or presidential) democracy 
and constitutionalism.” Why would he write “presidential” between brackets? 
Irrespective of the reasons, the historical circumstances raised what may be called ‘the 
presidential paradox’: whereas for many analysts this institution has traditionally 
constituted a risk for national democracy, it seems to have actually functioned as 
safeguard of the integration process. Thus, through a feedback effect, it has provided 
national democracies with indirect support.
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C H A P T E R  8
P R E S ID E N T IA L IS M  IN  M E R C O S U R  C O U N TR IE S  
introduction
Institutional instability has been a historical constant in Latin American until the 
middle 1980s. Since then, market-oriented leaders with popular support have been a 
factor as significant as institutional procedures in order to complete the political 
transition and face the economic emergency -a s  seen in the previous chapter. Since both 
the lack o f efficient national bureaucracies and the urgency to recover the lost decades 
were strong constraints, the appeal to a rapid mechanism of decision-making and 
problem solving appeared to have been the only way to deal with those drawbacks. 
However, while charismatic leaders worked well in the short run as the main support and 
safeguard of economic reforms and regional integration, the demand for stronger 
institutional respect -e.g. seguridad jurídica—  has remarkably increased along the last 
decade, aimed at diminishing the risks of discretionality.
This chapter focuses on the governmental institutions and processes o f the 
Southern Cone countries, especially those o f Mercosur. Most of the general dynamics 
analyzed here are common to Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, but also to Chile. Unlike 
them, Paraguay would more properly cluster with the Andean nations, concerning both 
socio-economic indicators and political (in)stability. In the following country sections, I 
will revise the political situation o f each Mercosur member in order to give count o f 
national differences as well as regional commonalties.
The polities under scrutiny have become democratic through the formal respect 
of a minimum set of institutions: regular elections, congressional representation, and 
judicial review. Nevertheless, the most powerful institution continues to be the 
presidency. This specific power site, under democratic conditions, is the convergence 
point of the popular legitimacy with the authority of command, the intersection between 
citizenship and leadership. All over the region, the stable exercise of presidential power 
submitted to institutional restrictions is a novelty; and so is regional integration. 
However, while today the consolidation o f democracy seems to be out of question at the
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national level,48 at the regional level the problem does not regard democratic 
accomplishment but institutional void.
Coping with institutional issues in Latin America was a rather daunting -and 
useless— effort some decades ago. Now, it appears not only worthy but also necessary. 
The problems related to the creation, persistence and functioning of institutional 
arrangements are increasingly relevant in the region, and so will be the answers offered 
to face them. As far as this research is concerned, one of the first emerging questions is 
whether the institutional deficit of Mercosur will be addressed or neglected by its 
member countries. If the latter becomes true, the following question is whether it may 
result innocuous to integration or, far worse, bring about the reversal of the process. 
Hence, the dilemma would be if any kind o f linkage is likely to emerge between 
presidential power, needed so far to propel and direct the integration process, and the 
institutional mechanisms -be them national or supranational— required to stabilize it. 
Only after having assessed the effective power of the presidents will be possible to relate 
it to regional integration, in order to assess their reciprocal impact.
Categories for assessing presidential power
The most refined typologies for assessing presidential power were advanced by
Shugart and Carey (1992) and Shugart and Mainwaring (1997). Whereas the former is 
more comprehensive in accounting for regime types other than sheer presidentialism,49 
the latter is especially devised to cope with presidential regimes. Moreover, it focuses 
particularly on Latin America.
Shugart and Carey appraise presidential capacities as composed of two sets of 
properties: legislative and non-legislative powers. In turn, the latter are further divided 
into two subsets: separate survival from the assembly and control over the cabinet. So- 
called presidential regimes are characterized by separate survival and full control over 
appointment and dismissal of ministers, whereas hybrid and mixed types -president- 
parliamentary, premier-presidential, and assembly-independent— lack of at least one of
48 Despite the criticism that the regime performance may deserve regarding corruption, poverty, 
clientelism and the like, there is a broad consensus that democracy will both persist and handle political 
conflict in a quite acceptable way. This judgment should be suspended as far as Paraguay regards, as 
already mentioned. In Chile, the wide powers constitutionally recognized to the Armed Forces spells out 
the still unfinished state of its transition.
49 This framework is as comprehensive as to include every regime type whose chief of state is called 
president, irrespective of his o her real powers -thus including many pure parliamentary systems.
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these characteristics. Except for Bolivia and Peru, the authors include every presidential 
regime -understood as that in which the heads of state and government coincide in the 
same person— within the broad presidential category-regimes that feature an official 
called president. It thereby goes from the USA to Nigeria, passing through the 
Philippines and all Latin American countries -even Cuba! Such an encompassing 
typology renders itself of little use when it comes to distinguishing among full-fledged 
presidential regimes.
Shugart and Mainwaring offer a more suitable taxonomy for the purposes 
followed here. They differentiate between constitutional and partisan powers of 
presidents. The former are basically the above-mentioned legislative powers, although 
they incorporate an extra variable, namely agenda-setting, in addition to legislative 
initiative, decree power, and veto power. While the last attribute is typically reactive, the 
first three pave the way to proactive presidential intervention. Partisan powers, on the 
other hand, depend on both the number of parties (broadly speaking, the party system) 
and party discipline (relative to party structure and organization, but also to institutional 
determinants). Accordingly, the size of the presidential party -o r coalition—  in 
Congress,50 the fragmentation and polarization of the party system, and the degree of 
party discipline strongly condition the capacity of the president to push ahead his or her 
agenda. The distinction between constitutional and partisan powers -along with the 
consideration of agenda-setting capacities—  is remarkably coincident with Tsebelis’s 
veto player theory. However, while Tsebelis considers constitutional powers as intrinsic 
to presidentialism and partisan powers to parliamentarism, Shugart and Mainwaring 
combine both in order to account for different cases within presidential regimes.
Table 8.1 presents a typology to assess presidential powers in Latin America. 
While Argentina is undoubtedly located in the ‘strongest’ comer (upward right four 
cells), Brazil -since 1988— , Paraguay -since 1991— and Uruguay appear within either 
of the ‘medium’ comers (upward left and downward right). In sum, no Mercosur 
country is currently located in the ‘weakest’ comer, where the U.S. would fit if it were 
to be included in the sample. This typology measures potential power, not actual 
performance. However, “when observers classify presidents in terms of being ‘strong’ or 
‘weak,’ they tend to mean presidents’ ability to put their own stamp on policy -to  get an
50 In a still exploratory research, Altman (2000) argues that the number of effective opposition parties is 
more significant than the size of governing parties to account for coalition formation and survival.
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agenda enacted” (Shugart and Mainwaring 1997: 40). It thus may be that presidents 
‘outperform’ their predicted powers -i.e. they get a better outcome than expected 
according to the typology. I will argue that this is the case of Brazil, and will elaborate it 
further in the pertinent section.
R e la t io ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ id e n ts ' constitutional and partisan powers in Latini
Constitutional powers
over legislation Very low
Potentially dominant Chile (1989) 
Ecuador
Presidents’ p: 
Medium low
Colombia (1968
utisan powers 
Medium high
Argentina
Very high
Proactive Brazil (1988) Colombia (1991) 
Peru
Reactive Brazil (1946) 
Chile (1925)
Bolivia El Salvador 
Uruguay
Dominican Rep.
Potentially marginal Costa Rica 
Paraguay (1991) 
Venezuela
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
S o u r c e : Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b: 432 .
If it is correct to affirm that presidentialism performance is affected by party 
configuration, the reverse is also true. Presidential design is likely to have an impact on 
the number of parties by changing the relative importance of other institutional 
determinants. As Mainwaring and Shugart (1997b: 417-8) point out, “although 
magnitude has been termed the ‘decisive’ factor in determining the number of parties, ... 
the data sets on which such conclusions have been based have overwhelmingly consisted 
of parliamentary systems. In presidential systems, on the other hand, the importance of 
the presidency serves to reduce the number of parties, at least when the president is not 
elected by majority runoff and elections are concurrent. Thus, the special features of 
presidentialism override the impact of magnitude”. However, they would “not 
characterize magnitude as irrelevant in presidential systems -just less important than the 
electoral cycle and the means of electing the president, and also less important than the 
presence or absence of party lists” (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997b: 418). Concurrent 
elections and presidential plurality rule are, therefore, paramount factors in increasing the 
partisan powers of the president.
In addition to constitutional and partisan constraints, in some countries 
presidential power faces still another mighty institutional constraint: federalism. The
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literature recognizes three main forms of organizing territorial politics in a federal way: 
the American, Canadian and German models (Scharpf 1988; Sbragia 1992; Katz 1999). 
In the American model, members of the Second Chamber (the Senate) represent the 
electorate cum individuals of their respective states; they do not represent the corporate 
interests of the government of their respective state. Canadian federalism, unlike the 
American, does not stem originally from constitutional provisions but has grown out of 
historical practice. Besides, although the provinces do not empower their representatives 
with an indivisible mandate either, they keep a crucial veto power since unanimity among 
provincial governments is required to approve amendments to the constitution -  
contrasted with the three-fourths majority required in the United States. Finally, German 
federalism differs from the previous types in that it endows the Länder with competence 
over national policy-making. While the federal level -in  which the Länder are represented 
as such in the Second Chamber (Bundesrat)—  legislates, administration falls under the 
states* jurisdiction. Politikverflechtung, as it has come to be known -o r  interlocking 
politics—  furthermore refers to the “horizontal and vertical linkages among state and 
non-state actors on the regional and national levels” (Risse-Kappen 1996: 61). It entails 
the direct involvement of the Länder in the federal process o f government.
Argentine and Brazilian federalism resemble the American model more than any 
of the others. The provinces o f the former and the states of the latter do not participate 
as such in national policy-making. Nor do they implement policies decided at that level. 
In contrast, responsibilities are divided by policy areas, and federal and subnational 
governments carry them out autonomously from one another. The primary characteristic 
of federalism is “a guaranteed division o f power between the central government and 
regional governments. The secondary characteristics are strong bicameralism, a rigid 
constitution, and strong judicial review” (Lijphart 1999: 4). Later on in this chapter, I 
will show that the only of these characteristics at work in Argentina has been strong 
bicameralism -and, to a lesser extent, division of powers. Brazil, on the other hand, has 
turned out to be much more strongly federal.
An additional feature often runs parallel to federalism: the degree of 
independence or autonomy of central banks (Lijphart 1999). Such independence has not 
been the case in Argentina or in Brazil throughout the 1980s. Lijphart (1999: 233) claims 
that “central banks that are subservient to the executive fit the concentrated-power logic 
of majoritarian democracy.” In the index developed by Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti
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(1992: 380-81), Argentina and Brazil -unlike Uruguay—  are ranked at the bottom of a 
scale that measures central bank independence in seventy-one countries. In contrast, the 
likewise presidential U.S. is at the top of the ranking together with the also strongly 
federal states of Germany and Switzerland. This contrast partially accounts for the 
inclusion of Argentina and Brazil within the ‘centralized federalism’ category defined by 
Lijphart. Although both countries have conceded an increasing independence to their 
central banks throughout the 1990s, when the first steps toward Mercosur were taken 
the presidents still held paramount authority over monetary policy.
It would be misleading, however, to limit the analysis of South American 
presidentialism only to its institutional connections. Mettenheim and Rockman (1997b: 
239) point that, while presidentialism “provides a forum for executive leadership to rise 
above the hurly-burly of particularistic interests, this form of government also normally 
requires that executives come to terms, at least partially, with the claims of these 
interests, which are often articulated in the legislative arena.” Often is not always, 
though; in South America, as shown in chapter 7, large interest groups were seldom 
represented in the legislative arena. Instead, corporatist pressures and ‘praetorian’ 
interventions have frequently been directed to the executive in search of response 
(Huntington 1968; Collier 1991; De Luca and Malamud 1994). Such a situation 
increases the number of contingent, usually not institutional, players while reducing the 
veto power of each -a s  a consequence of greater dispersion. The executive, on the 
contrary, remains a single, unified site of power -whereas social groups have frequently 
colonized the state apparatus.
Presidential cabinets deserve a final word. It has been accepted, at least since the 
Roosevelt administrations in the U.S., that cabinet members are no longer the main 
assistants to the president. They have been displaced by other organizations such as the 
Executive Office of the President, especially the White House Office (Milkis 1993; 
Virgala Foruria 1994). Their members neither respond to parties nor to pressure groups, 
but only to presidential confidence. Nor do they need congressional approval. South 
American cabinets, by contrast, usually reflect the electoral and partisan distribution of 
power (Deheza 1997). However, formal representation should not conceal the fact that, 
frequently, the principal ministers are appointed and dismissed in accordance with the 
will o f the president. Only rarely does a minister achieve as high a profile as to deserve 
an independent analysis within the executive.
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The next sections are devoted to a more specific study of executive capacities in 
each Mercosur country, paying heed to constitutional as well as party features, and also 
to other characteristics such as the impact of federalism -when present—  on government 
capabilities. In addition, further emphasis will be placed regarding the roles lately played 
by the presidents and their foreign ministers.
The larger countries: Argentina 
Constitutional powers
As in every presidential regime established during the 19th century, the Argentine 
constitution was replicated from the American one. However, its Founding Fathers 
decided to increase presidential powers in order to empower the chief executive with the 
capacities necessary to drive the process of socio-economic development (Botana 1977; 
Mayer and Gaete 1998). The president was thus entitled to initiate legislation, remove or 
suspend provincial governments (intervención federal), and declare a state o f  siege 
{estado de sitio). Added to the political practices described in the previous chapter -such  
as the iterated coups d'état and the recurrent state of emergency from 1930 onwards— , 
these institutional features led to the progressive strengthening of the executive office.
During the fifty-three years running from 1930 to 1983, Congress was at work 
only during thirty one years. The executive and judicial branches did not cease to exist as 
institutions and managed to preserve a legal51 and working continuity. Although each 
military take-over entailed the removal of the president, his cabinet of ministers and, 
usually, all judges of the Supreme Court, the number of ministers and justices was kept 
the same. This rutina golpista induced an extra-constitutional increase o f the already 
strong constitutional powers o f the presidency, since it amounted to a tighter control of 
the administration while simultaneously preventing the legislature from institutionalizing 
any effective supervision -by banning elections and closing Congress. Even limiting the 
analysis to constitutionally endowed powers, the paramount role historically played by 
the presidency led Carlos Nino to label Argentine political system as hyper-presidentialist 
(Nino 1992). However, presidential powers had not yet achieved their maximum score 
when Nino coined this sometimes-abused category.
51 The decree-laws (decretos-leyes) issued by the military rulers would be numbered following the 
regular legislative sequence and later recognized as constitutionally valid by the Supreme Court.
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It was only after 1989 that Menem’s extensive use of decree power “transformed 
the Argentine president’s legislative powers from being ‘reactive’ to being ‘potentially 
dominant’,” whereas “the constitution-based classification... correctly labels the 
Argentine system as ‘reactive’” (Jones 1997: 288). Such a mismatch between presidential 
powers de jure and defacto  was bridged shortly later. As two analysts have pointed out, 
“President Carlos Saul Menem’s tenure, which began in 1989 and [was] characterized by 
an increasing concentration of power in the executive branch, consummated in the 
adoption of a new constitution in 1994” (Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 1998: 33). Decree 
authority, hitherto delegated or usurped, gained strength and legitimacy through 
constitutionalization. This event crowned the historical process of strengthening the 
power of the presidency.
Partisan powers
Regarding the Argentine party system, not only its nature but also its very 
existence has long been called into question (Cavarozzi 1984; De Riz 1986). De Riz 
supported such a claim on the basis that parties never considered each other as legitimate 
parts of the same competitive arena, but adopted strategies aimed at excluding each 
other. Cavarozzi, in turn, agreed about the weakness of the party system, yet he argued 
that it coexisted with a strong identification o f social groups around parties. More 
recently, however, Mainwaring and Scully (1995a) have classified the Argentine party 
system as an institutionalized one, according to four criteria: (a) regularity in the patterns 
of party competition, (b) stability of party roots in society, (c) perceived legitimacy of 
parties as means of determining who governs, and (d) solidity of party organization. 
Within this frame, Mark Jones (1997) has not drawn on Catterberg’s (1989) simplified 
category of two-party system but rather on Grossi and Gritti’s (1989: 53) innovative 
concept of a “sistema a doble partido con intención dominante.” Accordingly, he 
described Argentina as having a “two-party-dominant system.” McGuire (1995: 226), in 
turn, strictly applies Sartori’s typology to argue that “Argentina would fall somewhere 
between the ‘moderate multiparty’ and the ‘two-party type’,” while recognizing some 
particularities regarding strong sub-cultural -rather than ideological— polarization.
Regarding the effective number of parties and party discipline, Argentina 
displayed between 1983 and 1989 an average o f 2.5 for the former and a qualification 
from moderate to high level for the latter (McGuire 1995; Jones 1997). By year 2000,
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the level of party discipline has not changed, but the effective number of parties has 
slightly increased with the emergence of the Frente por un País Solidario (FREPASO, 
with a center-left orientation). For the first time since mass politics was introduced in 
1912, a genuine coalition has been governing since 1999, yet the dynamics o f party 
competence remain bipolar. It is thus necessary to illuminate the process by which 
presidential rule and congressional activity have accommodated to one another.
According to Mustapic (2000), executive-legislative relation in Argentina should 
be constitutionally and historically understood as role-complementary, under the formula 
“liderazgo presidencial, fiscalización p a r la m en ta r ia She calls into question M. Jones’s 
figures for party discipline, and argues that parliamentary discipline was not a given but 
was produced by the congressional process. Her figures slightly vary from government to 
opposition and from the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR, a center party) to the Partido 
Justicialista (PJ, or Peronist party) -showing more discipline in the former case of each 
dyad. Nonetheless, she recognizes that presidents have been relatively successful in 
carrying forward their agendas, and this tempers the significance of potential party 
indiscipline. Bipartisan competition and informal rules give priority to presidential 
legislative initiatives, which -unlike Brazil and Chile—  lack any constitutional 
preference. Mustapic concludes by recognizing that presidential preeminence holds as far 
as general policies are concerned, while affirming its compatibility with a large room for 
maneuver by legislators to respond autonomously to their constituencies respecting 
particular issues -thus, limiting presidential leadership to a lesser extent.
Federalism and other features
Jones (1997: 290) has pointed that, “between 1983 and 1994 the combination of 
three (under Alfonsin) then five (under Menem) principal partisan and institutional 
factors made the Argentine president extremely powerful: (1) a large and relatively well- 
disciplined partisan legislative contingent, (2) the federal government’s strong position 
vis-à-vis the provinces, (3) strong veto and partial veto powers, (4) the ability to issue 
decrees o f urgent necessity (Menem), and (5) a co-opted Supreme Court (Menem).” The 
first part of this section will consider factors two and five, since the others were 
previously examined.
In Argentina, the federal government has historically been much stronger than the 
provincial ones -a s  seen in chapter 7. Table 8.5 shows how, despite being ranked as the
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second most federal country in South America, Argentine figures for central government 
revenues and expenditure are much higher than Brazil’s. The limited autonomy of the 
provincial governments has become a crucial factor in strengthening presidential powers 
(Jones 1997). Furthermore, the 1994 constitutional reform that opened the possibility of 
presidential re-election slightly undermined the political power hitherto held by the 
provinces.32 While some analysts, such as Jones, consider that the reform could reduce 
the zone of presidential discretion in the future, this has not occurred during Menem’s 
second period.
Regarding the submission of the Supreme Court to the executive, Larkins (1998) 
considers that it is by reason of the ‘delegative’ features of Argentine democracy. 
Following O’Donnell, he claims that the lack of impartiality of most judges, along with 
the broad institutional scope of their authority, is due to the characteristics of such type 
o f presidential regime. On the contrary, it could be argued that Menem’s control over the 
judiciary was built upon institutional measures, quite similar to those attempted by 
Franklin Roosevelt and later American presidents to enlarge the Court in order to 
prevent it from blocking their policies. It is true, however, that the subordination of the 
C ourt’s judges to the executive was apparent during Menem’s presidency; yet this was 
due to the economic emergency, and to the perception that the president was the only 
one able to face it. The best proof that subordination is not an enduring regime feature is 
that President De la Rua, when elected in 1999, managed to govern with the same 
composition of the Court and did not even attempt to change its members.
As for the use of complementary mechanisms in order to foster the participation 
o f  other social actors, such as socio-economic concertation, Argentina’s democracy has 
exhibited a poor record. Haggard and Kaufman (1995: 341) have pointed out, as a 
general rule, that “the organizational weakness of the relevant players, including both 
interest groups and parties,” makes concertation very difficult -thus increasing the room 
for the executive to decide alone. In Argentina organizational weakness and pluralism 
w ere more evident as far as interest groups regard -especially on the business side— , 
unlike Brazil where it is the parties that were highly fragmented and organizationally 
weak. 52
52 The reform went as far as to change the rules for electing the president. The new system establishes a 
popular and direct election, what greatly dilutes the power previously yielded by the provinces through 
their overrepresentation in the Electoral College intended to elect the president.
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Throughout the 1980s and especially the 1990s, the pluralism of organized 
business interests increased (Acuña 1995, 1998) and trade unions became progressively 
weaker and more fragmented. Pluralist concertation failed during Alfonsin’s tenure 
(Portantiero 1987) and was informally achieved during Menem’s (Etchemendy and 
Palermo 1998). Argentina’s so-called ‘corporatism’ has evolved into a pluralist system  of 
oligopolistic lobbying, rather than either a traditional or a neo-corporatist system 
(Ducatenzeiler 1990). Since the executive is always the strongest power site, it is also the 
priority target for interest groups -unlike the U.S., where Congress and its committees 
offer attractive sites for exerting influence.
The Cabinet and the Foreign Minister
According to the Argentine constitution, ministers are not formally part o f the
executive power (arts. 94-99). They are advisers to the president and are appointed and 
dismissed by him or her, to whom they respond by their actions. The cabinet does not 
exist as a collective body, although the 1994 reform created the figure of a Chief o f the 
Cabinet of Ministers, who is appointed by the president but may be dismissed by an 
absolute majority of each chamber. This office is too recent to assess its performance, 
but thus far it does not seem to have changed the position of the president as primus 
solus — nor is this likely to occur in the short run.
.• 'Table8.2". a-
’  Cabinet Stability: Argentina 19834999E~....7JM
Ministry* 
Foreign Affairs
Alfonsin (1983-1989) 
66 months ;;
2
Menem I & II (1989-1999) 
126 months 
2
Interior 3 6
Economy 4 5
Defense 4 6
Education 4 4
Health 4 7
Labor 5 6
Public Works (1983-1991) 5 
Justice (1991-1999)
6
* The denomination of some Ministries has changed slightly along the periods under consideration. 
SOURCE: own elaboration upon data from Molinelli, Palanza and Sin 1999: 588-89.
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Within the cabinet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been the most stable 
position in both presidential tenures since the re-democratization (sec Tabic 8.2). 
Alfonsin and Menem had just two Foreign Ministers each, and in cither cabinet the 
longest-lasting member was one of these. This durability record may be assigned to 
many causes, the most plausible being the lower degree of conflict concerning this area 
and the strong interest, on the part of the presidents, in leaving their personal imprint in 
the international field. Be this as it may, one of its most consequential effects was the 
high level of continuity that foreign policies exhibited within presidential tenures -if  not 
• always across them. The special relation with Brazil was one of the few crucial issues in 
which both administrations coincided.
Both presidents sought to exhibit a high profile in the international arena. 
Alfonsin developed somewhat radical politics: he founded, together with other five world 
leaders,53 the Group o f Six aimed at worldwide nuclear disarmament, integrated the 
Grupo de Apoyo a Contadora for peace in Central America, carried out an independent 
policy on nuclear research and trade, and went as far as to defy the president of the 
United States with an improvised speech at the White House. Furthermore, his foreign 
minister Dante Caputo was nominated to the presidency of the United Nations assembly, 
over which he presided between 1988 and 1989 with the support of most Third World 
countries.
In contrast, Menem high profile was based on an openly admitted subordination 
to the United States. Accordingly, he offered to mediate personally in the Middle East 
process, sent troops to the Gulf War (Argentina was the only Latin American country to 
do so), proposed the creation of the White Helmets corps in the framework of the United 
Nations, dismantled the plans for developing an autonomous missile launcher, and retired 
Argentina from the Non-Aligned Movement, receiving in exchange the category of Extra 
NATO Partner of the U.S. His foreign ministers, Domingo Cavallo and Guido Di Telia, 
were both economists and intended to give the Cancillería an economic emphasis that it 
had never had until then. It is no clear whether they succeeded in doing so, since for 
president Menem politics were always above economics.
53 They were the chief executives of Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania.
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The larger countries: Brazil
Constitutional powers
The concentration of power in the Brazilian presidency is also rooted in the 19th 
century. As heir to an empire, the successive Brazilian Republics since 1889 were 
historically marked by the central role of the head of government relative to the 
legislature. However, this supremacy was not always absolute with regard to the federal 
units of the country: the states. Some specialists have even argued that federalism, not 
the traditional organization inherited from the empire, is the foundations of the Brazilian 
institutional matrix. Teixeira Neves de Pinho Tavares (1997: 14) contends that “é fa to  
notòrio que a grande movimentagào politica ocorrida no firn do Impèrio leve urna 
conotagào muito mais federalista do que, propriamente, presidencialista... Sendo 
federativa a escolha politica, a opgào presidencialista fo i  dela corolàrio.”54
Just as in Argentina, Brazilian political history passed a watershed in 1930. The 
ascent of Getùlio Vargas to the presidency led to a populist, direct relation between the 
state and most social actors, in a country that -unlike Argentina—  had not yet developed 
a structured civic society. The ephemeral Estado Novo, whose institutional arrangements 
were left undismantled by the governments of 1946-64 (Stepan 1989), and much later 
the bureaucratic authoritarian regime between 1964 and 1985 (O’Donnell 1988; 
Skidmore 1989), contributed to centralizing power simultaneously in the state and, 
within the state, in the executive -a s  happened in most of the Southern Cone. However, 
when compared to similar dictatorships at the same time (e.g. Argentina, Uruguay, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal), Brazilian military rule featured a striking exceptionality: the 
coexistence of an authoritarian, non-elected executive with a working -albeit weak—  
Congress and indirect popular, local elections. However controlled the latter were, these 
institutions would condition the democratization process and its institutional aftermath.
The continuity of congressional activity was parallel, during the military rule, to 
the survival of traditional elites (Hagopian 1996). Congress was a channel that allowed 
rural landowners to keep alive patronage and intimidation practices, which their 
representatives safeguarded giving the national assembly a particularistic stand. The slow 
liberalization process set off in 1974 led finally to the indirect, parliamentary election of
54 “It is a known fact that political actions that took place by the end of the Empire had a more federalist 
than presidentialist connotation... Having chosen federalism as the first political option, the 
presidenti ali st option was but a corollary” (author’s translation).
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Tancredo Neves in 1985, a popular politician who might also have won a direct election. 
However, Tancredo’s sudden death before his inauguration left José Samey, a 
conservative politician, elected vice-president as the factotum of the democratization 
process. Most political actors soon saw the reform of the constitution as a necessary 
device for drawing a clear distinction with the past.
The constitutional reform of 1988 granted Brazilian presidents the strongest 
institutional autonomy in Latin America (Shugart and Carey 1992: 155; Mainwaring and 
Shugart 1993; Deheza 1997).55 This autonomy comprises both proactive and reactive 
powers, and provides the executive with more resources than the previous constitution 
did (although the latter also established solid presidential powers). The president is 
allowed to enact legislation alone (medidas provisórias com força de lei) “em caso de 
relevância e urgência” (art. 62 o f the Constitution). As Power (1999) sustains, the 
‘transplant’ of the Italian provvedimenti provvisori from a parliamentary to a presidential 
arrangement virtually left the assembly without resources to control the executive. The 
president also holds exclusive prerogatives concerning the initiation of budget and 
taxation legislation, and has the right to demand urgency procedures in bringing bills up 
for a vote (Mainwaring 1997; Power 1999; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). As observed 
by Tavares (1998: 271), “o resultado liquido consiste em que o espaço de poder do 
presidente nesta matèria toma-se praticamente ilimitado”56
Power (1999: 222) highlights the continuity of the Brazilian political tradition 
according to which “the executive acts and the legislature reacts.” The impeachment that 
led to the conviction of Collor de Mello must be considered an aberration rather than a 
systemic change. During the democratic period that began in 1985, “executives took 
what was already a broad delegation and tried to expand it further” with ample success 
(Power 1999: 224). Having reviewed in this section the constitutional basis of such a 
broad delegation, let now turn to the partisan determinants o f its further expansion.
Partisan powers
The Brazilian party system has been classified as “inchoate,” due to its almost 
zero degree of institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Mainwaring (1995a:
55 As far as legislative powers regard, it was only surpassed by the Chilean presidency under the 1925 
Constitution.
56 “The result is a jurisdiction in which the power of the president becomes virtually unlimited” 
(author’s translation).
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354) goes as far as to argue that Brazil “may be a unique case of party 
underdevelopment in the world,” since its parties are identified by “their fragility, their 
ephemeral character, their week roots in society, and the autonomy politicians of the 
catch-all parties enjoy with respect to their parties.” Moreover, the fragmentation of the 
party system has soared since the inauguration of the New Republic, increasing the 
effective number o f legislative parties from 3.2 in 1985 to 6.9 in 1997 -and peaking at a 
striking 9.4 in 1992 (see Table 8.3). Polarization, on the other hand, was not meaningful 
in traditional ideological terms. It has though been moderately significant since the first 
presidential ballottage took place in 1990, when Collor de Mello defeated labor leader 
Lula, and during the former’s following tenure until his impeachment.
{• >5>r4 :>
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Effective Number o f Legislative Parties: Brazil 1985-1997
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 I 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
3.2 3.3 2.8 4.1 5.5 7.1 8.7 9.4 8.5 8.5 8.1
SOURCE: Amorim Neto 1998: 101.
Regarding the actor level rather than the systemic one, Mainwaring (1990b: 5) 
has pointed out how “the extremely loose nature of Brazilian parties has added to the 
problems caused by the permanent minority situation of Presidents’ parties. Presidents 
could not even count on the support o f their own parties, much less that of the other 
parties that had helped elect them.” Although Mainwaring’s claim is coincident with a 
number of scholarly analyses -am ong them, those by Sartori (1994) and Linz and 
Valenzuela (1994)—  and has become common knowledge, recent investigations by 
Figueiredo and Limongi (2000) strongly question it. They show that party discipline is 
actually high in the Brazilian Congress -about 85.6% for the presidential coalition. Due 
to institutional variables, as Mustapic argues for the Argentine case, “party discipline is 
enforced in the legislative arena” (Figueiredo and Limongi 2000: 152).
The combination of presidentialism with multipartism has usually been thought to 
be problematic for democratic stability and govemability (Mainwaring 1993 and 1995b). 
However, this combination has become both predominant and sustainable all over Latin 
America. The problem has been apparently overcome through the expedient of 
governmental coalitions. Coalition government is one of the resources that presidents 
have in a multiparty system to build support in the Congress (Abranches 1988; Deheza 
1997; Mainwaring 1997; Chasquetti 2000; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). However,
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coalition government in a presidential system is not identical with a parliamentary 
coalition: in Brazil, “por decisáo solitaria, o presidente compoe ou recompoe o 
ministério. E  precisamente porque a Presidencia se define como una entidade 
extrapartidária o superpartidária, os partidos e seus representantes parlamentares nao 
se consideram, em regra, vinculados ao presidente nem responsáveis por seu 
govemo”57 (Tavares 1998: 261). This phenomenon led Abranches (1988) to define 
Brazilian presidentialism as “imperial,” while simultaneously -not contradictorily— 
labeling it “presidencialismo de coálizáo.” In this kind of ‘coalitional presidentialism,’ 
the president becomes, at the same time, the ‘arbiter’ and the ‘target’ of divergences 
between the parties -and, eventually, between the regions— making up the coalition.
As Mainwaring (1997: 75-80) notes, “a multiparty government in a parliamentary 
system differs in three ways from a multiparty presidential government. First, presidents 
are generally freer to dismiss ministers and rearrange the cabinet than prime ministers 
are... Second, (in parliamentary systems) individual legislators are more or less bound to 
support the government unless their party decides to drop out of the governmental 
alliance... Third, (in parliamentary systems) the parties themselves are co-responsible for 
governing”. Presidential coalitions are more unstable, less ‘fair’, and less ‘binding’ -both 
for the president and for each participating party— than their parliamentary counterparts 
(Chasquetti 1997/98; Amorim 1998; Altman 2000). This is so because, while the latter 
depend basically on institutional rules, the former depend on a combination o f 
institutional rules and agent behavior.
Mainwaring (1997: 80) reasonably claims, “regardless of the system of 
government, party indiscipline is inimical to stable coalition building.” What Figueiredo 
and Limongi prove is that Brazil displays a high level of party discipline (see table 8.4). 
Moreover, presidential coalitions effectively support presidential initiatives. Such support 
is fostered by (and not despite of) presidential legislative powers, which the president 
utilizes in order not to circumvent but to control the legislative process. With regard to 
the executive structure, the president performs the pivotal role and usually keeps a 
positively disproportional share o f the cabinet and the most significant ministries, either 
for his party or for technicians that respond solely to him (Deheza 1997; Altman 2000).
57 “The President alone nominates and reshuffles his cabinet. It is precisely because the presidency is 
defined as extra-partisan or supra-partisan that parties and legislators do not consider themselves linked 
to the president nor responsible for his government” (author’s translation).
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By these means, Brazilian presidents have developed along the last decade a cooperative 
rather than a conflictive strategy vis-à-vis Congress. Mainwaring (1997: 74) has even 
argued that “the breadth o f the parties represented in the cabinet obeyed a logic closer to  
consociational than majoritarian democracy.” Nevertheless, presidents have not resigned 
their preeminent attributions. As Figueiredo and Limongi (2000: 168) show, “in Brazil 
the president controls the legislative agenda.” This contradicts Tsebelis’s case concerning 
presidentialism, but coincides with the argument advanced in chapter 6.
'V* ;  ^•* -Table 8.4 ^
1 Average Proportion o f Disciplined Votes by Political Party? BraalÜ98^1998Sf
P arty
PT
% discipline 
98.4
N ° o f registered ro ll calls
’........ 533
PDT 92.1 505
PSDB 90.7 538
PMDB 85.0 538
PTB 87.9 506
PFL 93.1 531
PPB 87.4 Í 509
Source: Figueiredo and Limongi 2000: 159.
Federalism and other features
The significance of federalism in Brazilian politics is larger than in any other 
country of the continent. As Tavares (1998: 174) put it, "fo i ... o federalismo, e nao a 
república, a idéia Jorga que, associada ao ressentimento do escravismo contrariado, 
derrubou o Impèrio.”58 Although Brazilian federalism is institutional rather than 
contractual -the latter a feature of the U.S. and Argentina alike— and, therefore, has a 
constitutional nature instead of a pre-existent one, the indissolubility of the federal state 
has not been challenged in practice.
The clearest indicator to measure the strength o f Brazilian federalism is shown in 
Table 8.5. It ranks as the only Latin American country in which the share of both total 
government tax revenue and expenditure are higher at the intermediate level than at the 
central one. As a corollary, central government controls less than half of overall public 
resources. This feature of Brazilian politics, unlike those concerning party system and
58 “It was federalism, not republicanism, the ideal that -along with the resentment of former slave 
owners— brought down the Empire” (author’s translation).
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discipline, clearly has a much more negative impact on presidential power. Even so, some 
authors underline the “executivecentric character” of Brazilian federalism to distinguish it 
from the American one (Mettenheim 1997).
■ .. - : - T ab le8.5 •
D istrib u tion s Resources by Level o f Government, Six Latin American Countries
Share of Total Government Tax Revenue 
Collected by Level of Government
Share of Total Government Expenditure by 
Level of Government
Central Intermedi
ate
Local Total Central Intermedi
ate
Local Total
Chile
1992
1 0 0 .0  ~ - o .o ....... 100 87.3 .. - ' 12.3 100
Venezuela
1989
96.9 0.1 3.1 1 0 0 77.7 15.7 6.5 100
Mexico
1992
82.7 13.4 3.9 100 87.8 9.5 2 .8 100
Colombia
1991
81.6 11,1 7.3 10 0 67.0 15.7 17.3 100
Argentina
1992
80.0 15.4 4.6 1 0 0 51.9 39.5 8 .6 1 0 0
Brazil
1988/93
47.1 49.4 3.6 1 0 0 36.5 40.7 2 2 .8 10 0
SOURCE: Garman, Haggard, and Willis 1999: Table 4.
This dissertation supports a two-fold argument concerning the Brazilian 
presidency. First, it argues that it should be considered a strong institution, especially 
when compared to other presidential offices -especially the separationist ones such as the 
American, though not only. Second, it claims that such strength has been a paramount 
factor in the success of Mercosur. By the same token, I will argue that Brazilian 
federalism is one of the major restrictions both to presidential power and to smooth 
integration. The negative impact of federalism upon integration is due to a double effect: 
first of all, it directly undermines intergovernmental agreements, which cannot be 
enforced against the constitutionally recognized autonomy of the states/provinces.59 In 
the second place, federalism hinders regional integration indirectly by means of 
weakening the presidency (Mainwaring and Samuels 2000).
59 After the so-called ‘Caipirinha’ crisis of 1999, some Brazilian states initiated a race to outbid rival 
units regarding the location of firms within their territories, through granting tax exemptions and other 
privileges. Argentine response, both at the national and provincial levels, and its consequent impact on 
Mercosur are analyzed in chapter 10.
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Just as strong federalism undermines presidential power, so bureaucratic 
centralization has contributed to empower the presidency -albeit with legislative assent 
(Mainwaxing 1997). Amorim Neto (1998: 181) affirms that, “given that the Brazilian 
legislature in particular, and Latin American legislatures in general, are weaker than the 
American Congress in terms of oversight capacity, a presidential strategy of bureaucratic 
aggrandizement aiming at bypassing partisan constraints is more likely to succeed in the 
former countries than in the US.” The expansion of and control over the bureaucratic 
apparatus of the state become other ways for presidents to carry out non-statutory o r 
non-partisan strategies.60 This process and its consequences were described by Alimonda 
(1998: 145-6): “«« perfil de actuación estatal que, al mismo tiempo en que se 
automutila como estructura y se retira de sus funciones reguladoras, adopta un estilo  
decisional altamente centralizado... Esta centralización... implica inclusive un refuerzo  
del predominio del Poder Ejecutivo sobre el Legislativo y  el Judicial. Así, el proceso de 
Reforma del Estado acaba reforzando vicios tradicionales de la cultura política  
latinoamericana.”61
The Cabinet and the Foreign Minister
An eloquent circumstance that illuminates the potency of Brazilian executive is
the repeated instance of a president who, not having been elected as such but as vice- 
president, was still able to endure and finish the constitutional period without major 
inconvenience. Although both José Samey and Itamar Franco62 lacked popular support 
and an automatic majority in the Congress, they could perform their constitutionally 
prescribed tasks in a regular way. Their situation somewhat resembled Gerald Ford’s, 
although American democracy was never thought to be endangered by a constitutional 
procedure that, in most Latin American cases, was previously deemed much more 
hazardous.
60 This is also the conclusion arrived to by Milkis (1993) regarding the strategies of the American 
presidents since the New Deal. However, the American Congress is still much stronger than its Latin 
American counterparts.
61 “A mode of state intervention that, while self-damaging as a structure and retiring from its regulation 
functions, adopts a highly centralized decision-making... This centralization entails the strengthening of 
the Executive predominance over the Legislature and the Judiciary. The process of state reform ends up 
by reinforcing traditional vices of Latin American political culture” (author’s translation).
62 Unlike Altman (2000), I do not see Franco as a caretaker but as a full-fledged constitutional president. 
His position was in no institutional sense inferior to that of Samey after Tancredo’s decease. Moreover, 
it was during his administration that the ambitious -and successful— economic plan of Minister 
Cardoso was launched.
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Table 8*6 . . . .  
l& yC a b in e t Stability: Brazil 1985-1998.
Samey Collor Franco Cardoso I
Ministry (1985-1990) 
60 months
(1990-1992) 
30 months
(1992-1994) 
27 months
(1995-1998) 
48 months
Foreign Affairs 2 2 3 1
Agriculture 2 2 7 2
Communications 1 - 3 2
Culture 5 - 3 1
Education 5 3 1 1
Environment and Urbanization 3 - 3 1
Finance 5 2 6 1
Health 4 2 2 3
Industry and Commerce 4 - 3 3
Justice 4 3 2 4
Labor 4 4 3 2
Mines and Energy 3 - 4 1
Science and Technology 5 - 1 1
Social Security and Welfare 4 2 4 2
Transportation 2 1 3 2
Others ( in te r io r )  3 
(A g ra ria n  
R e fo rm ) 7
( in fra s tru c tu re )
3
(R e g io n a l 
In teg ra tio n ) 3
(B u d g e t)  3 
(S ta te  R efo rm ) 
1
NB: Military and extraordinary ministries are not included.
SOURCE: own elaboration upon data from Covemos da República (1997) and
http://www.georgetown.edu/pdba/Executive/Brazil/cardoso94.html, accessed 15/01/00.
In Brazil, ministers are part of the executive power, as in Bolivia, Colombia, 
Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (Deheza 1997). Two cabinet posts are usually considered 
the strongest: Finance and Foreign Affairs. Whereas the former has taken the lead 
regarding Brazilian economic reforms (ant they have been many along the last fifteen 
years), the latter is the head of the most efficient bureaucracy in Brazil and the continent: 
Itamaraty, as the Brazilian diplomacy is known. In contrast with the zigzagging 
Argentine foreign policy, Brazil has defined a foreign policy direction since the early 
1970s and has not failed to meet it. Whether under military or civilian rule, the 
predictability of Brazil’s international stance -albeit not its rigid definition of interests— 
has become an assumption with which the integration process can count on.
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The link between cabinet stability and executive success may be inferred from the 
list o f policy areas that Mainwaring (1997: 99/101) offers to show the degree to what 
presidents were unable to implement their preferred policies between 1985 and 1994. 
The inability o f presidents was basically limited to socio-economic areas and even this 
has progressively changed since then.
The smaller countries: Paraguay
Constitutional powers
That the Treaty founding Mercosur is named after the Paraguayan capital city, 
Asuncion, is both a paradox and a telling occurrence. It is a paradox since Paraguay is 
clearly the weakest member o f the bloc, concerning economic development as well as 
geopolitical influence. It is a telling occurrence because the Treaty was signed there 
precisely to bolster the incipient process of democratization, set off in 1989 with the 
ouster of Stroessner. Democracy was a necessary condition to join the group, and so was 
symbolized through the election of Asunción as city of birth of Mercosur.
Ten years later, Paraguayan democracy has not improved its record a great deal. 
However, its constitutional rule has been decisively supported by the Protocol on 
Democratic Compromise, signed in 1998 in Ushuaia by all Mercosur members -bo th  full 
and associate. Enduring political turmoil, along with the difficulties of the incumbent 
party to process democratically its internal differences, have ended up in the assassination 
of vice-president Argaña in 1999 and, shortly thereafter, the destitution of president 
Cubas. Only the decisive action of the United States and Mercosur partners prevented 
democratic breakdown in that occasion; nevertheless, Paraguayan democratic stability 
remains fragile at the best.
In 1992, the Constitution was reformed with a view to attaining political 
equilibrium through banning consecutive reelection to  the president, while 
simultaneously establishing concurrent elections for the chief executive and both 
chambers of Congress. The aim was that an elected president could enjoy as much of a 
supportive legislative contingent as possible, yet limiting his or her power via the 
restriction to one term in office. As far as legislative capacities regard, the president did 
not benefit from any exclusive power concerning initiation. On the other hand, he or she 
was entitled to issue decrees countersigned by the respective minister, and the 
Constitution is ambiguous as to the character of such decrees -whether regulatory or
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legislative (Carey, Amorim Neto and Shugart 1997). In Congress, the legislators 
required to override a veto are equivalent to the absolute majority in each house. 
Congress, both chambers acting together, is also able to summon and interpellate 
ministers and even to recommend that the president remove them; however, cabinet 
appointments and dismissals are only subject to presidential will (Simón 1998).
Concerning the territorial form of the state, Paraguayan citizens are enabled to 
elect directly the governors and legislatures {Juntas Departamentales) of the seventeen 
departments. However, each governor “representa al Poder Ejecutivo en la ejecución de 
la política nacionaV1 (art. 161), unlike Argentina and Brazil where governors represent 
the federal government in order to enforce the federal law. The difference is not lesser: 
the executive power is more restricted than the federal government, which also implies 
congressional acquiescence; likewise, to enforce the federal law comprehends a wider 
range -more institutional and less partisan—  than to merely implement national policies. 
Finally, the central bank participates with other governmental organisms in the 
formulation of the monetary policy and leads its implementation, yet always in 
accordance with the economic policy of the administration (art. 285).
Partisan powers
The Paraguayan party system, as Abente (1995: 298) points out, “is one of the 
most underresearched and misunderstood in Latin America.” Yet its parties rank among 
the oldest in the continent, behind only to those of Colombia and Uruguay. Departing 
from the Constitutional reform of 187063, a two-party system was bom in 1877 after the 
foundation of the Asociación Nacional Republicana (or Colorado party) and the Liberal 
party. Both parties governed a civilian-ruled Paraguay -w ith only minor interruptions—  
until 1954, when General Stroessner took over power and established a regime based on 
the fusion between the government, the Colorado party and the military, regime that 
would last thirty five years. Along this period, formal congressional activity was kept and 
fraudulent elections were held; the president was granted indefinite reelections, and non- 
permitted opposition was persecuted and thrown into exile. The party system thus turned 
into a pragmatic hegemonic one (Abente 1995; Simón 1998).
63 Hie reform was one of the outcomes of the Paraguayan defeat in the War of the Triple Alliance, 
fought against Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.
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The coup d'état of 1989 paved the way to the implementation of legitimate 
elections, which were held the same year, and for a constitutional reform carried out in 
1992. After the latter, consecutive presidential reelection was forbidden and new 
electoral rules were established. The president is now elected by plurality rule, whereas 
proportional representation is utilized to elect senators -in  a countrywide single 
district— and deputies -distributed across the seventeen departments on a demographic 
basis.
The resultant party system, after three post-democratization elections, is still 
developing. New forces have grown up, especially based on the urban social classes, and 
even managed to win the city government of Asunción. However, the capital city 
represents no more than one third o f the electorate, and rural regions are mostly under 
Colorado control. Although the Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico -heir o f the old 
Liberal Party— , the Febrerismo, Encuentro Nacional and some other minor parties are 
permitted free participation and elections are relatively fair, the party system is still 
strongly dependent on the majoritarian Colorado party and the vagaries of its inner 
divisions.
The present fragmentation of the Colorado party makes impossible for the 
president to count on a unified legislative support. In fact, the parliamentary bloc is as 
divided as the extra-parliamentary party leaders, and many times one of the groups votes 
together with the opposition -thus leaving the government with a parliamentary minority. 
Such situation brings about a permanent instability in the cabinet, as parties and fractions 
alternate support with opposition to the government. Another enduring feature o f 
Paraguayan politics is the influence o f the military, some o f whose leaders have not 
accepted to resign the power they held until 1989 -and even thereafter, since first 
democratic president Andrés Rodriguez was also an army general. The rebellion of 
General Oviedo in 1996, his consequent imprisonment and later escaping, along with the 
political unrest that all these events generated, are a symbol of how feeble the 
Paraguayan civilian rule still is.
The smaller countries: Uruguay
Constitutional powers
The many particularities o f the Uruguayan political system have turned this 
country into an object of heated debate both among politicians and academics. Its form
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of government has been catalogued as presidentialist (Buquet, Chasquetti and Moraes 
1998), quasi-presidentialist (González 1995), and even semi-parliamentary' or neo- 
parliamentary (Casinelli Muñoz 1971). Some authors have opted for including it into a 
hybrid category (Lijphart 1992). I will argue here that Uruguay features, and has 
continuously featured since 1830, an essentially presidential system, according to both 
constitutional design and political practices.
The reasons for considering Uruguay a presidential system are lucidly displayed 
by Buquet, Chasquetti and Moraes (1998). In the first place, the president (as both head 
o f  state and government) is elected for a fixed term -what would be enough to define the 
system as presidentialist according to the minimal definition provided in chapter 6. In the 
second place, the president is directly and popularly elected, and enjoys significant 
powers over legislation.
The reasons that led some authors to classify the Uruguayan system otherwise 
than presidentialist were also constitutionally embedded. The Constitution effectively 
kept, regardless of the multiple reforms of 1918, 1934, 1942, 1952 and 1966, “algunos 
de los aspectos secundarios del parlamentarismo, como por ejemplo el derecho de las 
Cámaras de interpelar o censurar a los ministros” (De Sierra 1998: 440). Sundquist 
(1993, cited in Rockman 1997a: 25) would also agree on the ‘quasi-parliamentary’ label 
on grounds that the system brings the legislative and executive branches into electoral 
synchronization and political harmony, aiming at a greater concentration of political 
power. Lijphart (1992) and others were driven to appraise the system as hybrid by the 
fact that the executive was not unipersonal but collegiate between 1918 and 1934, and 
again between 1952 and 1966. However, as discussed in chapter 6, a unipersonal 
executive is not a necessary condition o f a presidential system. The 1966 reform 
abolished the nine-member collegiate and granted the president stronger powers than 
ever before. He won the right to nominate and dismiss the ministers, who are 
constitutionally considered as part o f the executive branch, and was enabled to dissolve 
the Parliament without any consequence for the duration of his term -even if defeated in 
the new parliamentary elections (De Sierra 1998; Buquet, Chasquetti and Moraes 1998). 
Although dissolution could be seen as a parliamentary feature, the truth is that the 
unidirectional power to dissolve the other branch breaks every institutional equilibrium, 
granting the preeminence to the executive. Uruguay is still the one presidentialism, only 
together with the U.S., in which the selection o f ministers is not an exclusive attribution
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of the president. However, the latter keeps his primacy over Congress through the right 
to nominate the new minister in case of congressional dismissing, and even to dissolve 
the Legislature should an insoluble conflict arise.
As in the cases of Argentina and Brazil, military rule exacerbated the powers o f  
the executive, which had nonetheless began strengthening its might short before the coup 
d'état of 1973 -especially since the constitutional reform of 1966. Such reform  
empowered the president with attributions such as “ initiatives reservadas, ley es de  
urgencia, [y] vetos totales o partiales a leyes votadas por el parlamento" (De Sierra 
1998: 446). It also provided him with budgetary initiative, together with the capacity to 
establish deadlines to automatically convert into law those executive initiatives that are 
not treated by Congress during a given period. The latter feature leaves a door open for 
the executive to legislate by default (Buquet, Chasquetti and Moraes 1998). By the same 
token, the ability of Congress to control presidential power was reduced by increasing 
the majorities needed to override a veto and the quorum required to pass some 
legislation.
All the above said calls forth a question: why is Uruguayan presidentialism 
considered as reactive instead of proactive, as shown in Table 8.1, if presidential powers 
are as strong as claimed here? The reason is that the reactive label does not correspond 
only to the constitutional attributions o f  the presidency relative to the legislature, but also 
takes into account the many other veto players present in the Uruguayan system. Among 
them the citizenry is especially significant, since it is always likely to be convoked to 
referendum by non-majoritarian political actors in order to oppose crucial government 
decisions.64 The limited control of the president over the parties, along with the presence 
of other strong veto players, gave way to what has been called “un Poder Ejecutivo 
institucionalmente fuerte, pero politicamente débit’ (Buquet, Chasquetti and Moraes 
1998:61).
64 The Constitution establishes in its article 82 that national sovereignty “sera ejercida directamente por 
el Cuerpo Electoral en los casos de elección, iniciativa y referéndum, e indirectamente por los Poderes 
representativos que establece esta C o n s titu c ió n thus, it widely differs from cases such as the 
Argentine, whose Constitution mandates that “el pueblo no delibera ni gobierna sino por medio de sus 
representantes” (art. 22). Article 79 of the Uruguayan Constitution also establishes that “e/ veinticinco 
por ciento del total de inscriptos habilitados para votar, podrá interponer, dentro del año de su 
promulgación, el recurso de referéndum contra las Leyes y ejercer el derecho de iniciativa ante el 
Poder Legislativo" -albeit it further temperates such franchise through disallowing referendum in cases 
where initiative right is exclusive to the Executive.
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Partisan powers
The Uruguayan party system is one of the most institutionalized in the continent» 
together with those of Chile and Costa Rica (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).65 However, 
it has undergone important changes since the early 1970s, changes that grew in extent 
after re-democratization took place in 1985. Henceforth, what had traditionally been a 
two-party system became a limited -yet still moderate—  party system, the effective 
number of parties growing from about 2.5 in 1942 up to 3 in 1994 (Buquet, Chasquetti 
and Moraes 1998: 36 and following).
Since 1942, the Uruguayan electoral system remained essentially unmodified until 
1996, when it was radically changed via constitutional reform. Therefore, the presidential 
elections of 1985, 1990 and 1995 took place under the old system, which is the one 
considered here. It has been described as composed of four features: (a) plurality applied 
to the presidential election, (b) proportional representation applied to the legislative 
election, (c) multiple simultaneous vote (also called double simultaneous vote -DSV), 
and (d) closed and rigid lists, that ban any possibility of ticket-splitting whether vertically 
-between national and local elections— or horizontally -between branches (González 
1995; Buquet, Chasquetti and Moraes 1998). The former two are common all over Latin 
America, whereas the latter two are an Uruguayan peculiarity. The DSV converted the 
general elections into contemporary primary elections, thus affecting intra-party 
behavior; in turn, the closed and rigid lists transformed the competition for the first prize 
-i.e . the presidential election—  into the driving force of the system.
As Chasquetti (1997/98: 36) noted, “el sistema electoral uruguayo configuró 
efectos contradictorios: por un lado, estimuló la fragmentación del sistema de partidos, 
pero por otro, lo contuvo e impulsó hacia la competencia b i p o l a r The long lasting 
“fractionalized two-party system” worked well until 1971, when it started to expand as 
mentioned above. The current blend of presidentialism, proportional representation for 
the legislature, a multiparty system, and party fractionalization has led the president to a 
situation of increasing dependency relative to other political agents (Chasquetti 
1997/98). However, dark prognosis regarding system performance as those forecasted 
by González (1995) did not become true, and successive presidents proved able to deal
65 Although Colombia and Venezuela were catalogued within the same group when Mainwaring and 
Scully first published their book, it is no longer the case. Argentina already was a borderline case, yet it 
is still valid to consider its party system as institutionalized.
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with an increasing number of parties -though displaying a steady level o f  
ffactionalization. How did they manage to do so?
It has been acknowledged that, in spite of all his institutional attributes, the 
Uruguayan president is structurally just one fraction’s leader, the only group over which 
he wields control and enforces discipline. However, Buquet, Chasquetti and Moraes have 
proved that party discipline is consistently high (see Table 8.7), and that the Legislature 
has been far less restrictive for presidential projects than popular referenda -th e  latter 
usually bringing about a defeat for the president’s stand, irrespective of his party. From  
• Bordaberry on, cabinets always featured members that did not belong to the presidential 
party, and were appointed in exchange for parliamentary support (Mancebo 1991; 
Chasquetti 1998; Buquet 2000). Since the last democratic restoration, the consecutive 
presidents conformed an uninterrupted series of coalitional cabinets. In 1985 it was the 
Gobierno de Entonación Nacional, in 1990 the Coincidencia Nacional, in 1995 the 
open coalition between Colorados and Blancos, to end up in 2000 with the two 
traditional parties running together in the second turn of the ballottage.
: : Table a i . " ^ ^ ■ ¡]jg tl|ÍÍÉ iM p >
Party. Discipline in Significant legislation Umguaya985^199
Sanguinetti
P. Colorado 
..........0.91...... ...
P. Nacional 
0 94
F. Amplio
" " T
N. Espacio
Lacalle 0.87 0.90 1 1
Source: Buquet, Chasquetti and Moraes 1998: 74,
It is not exaggerated to affirm that the Uruguayan political system is, in South 
America, the one that diffuses power the most -thus the least concentrationist. The 
president is not the leader o f a party but a fraction, what necessarily entails a 
congressional minority situation; he may also face binding referenda that, more often 
than not, have turned out in defeat for the president’s stand. Furthermore, he lacks the 
possibility of consecutive reelection. Since the Constitutional reform of 1996 has not 
changed the structural underpinnings o f Uruguayan institutions, this situation is not likely 
to change in the short run. If Uruguay had accomplished a key role in Mercosur creation 
and performance, the outcome may have well been different. The next chapters will show 
how most Mercosur processes were actually handled by Argentine and Brazilian 
governments, which only later on participated their minor partners of their decisions.
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Conclusion
To put it succinctly, the already strong constitutional powers of Mercosur 
presidents have been strengthened lately through constitutional reforms in Argentina 
(1994), Brazil (1988 and 1997) and Uruguay (1996). The Paraguayan reform (1992) 
stands out as the only exception to this trend, although it did not weaken the presidency 
as much as it just tempered the extreme authority hitherto granted to the office under 
Stroessner. Partisan powers, in turn, are remarkably strong in Argentina and, to a lesser 
degree, in Brazil, while they are somewhat weaker in Paraguay and Uruguay. Finally, 
other relevant veto players are present in Brazil (the most powerful states), Paraguay 
(the military) and Uruguay (popular referenda). The bigger Mercosur countries seem 
therefore to concentrate more power in executive hands than the smaller states, but even 
the latter present a mixed picture of concentration and balance. Table 8.8 displays such 
picture through gauging executive capacities relative to those of other significant veto 
players.
\  ■' T a b le8 .8  . y 
^ « E x ecu tiv e  Capacities v is -à -v is  Other Veto Players In M ercosur^
Veto players
Concentrationist 
presidency: 
ideal type
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
Number *
(significant players) Low Low Medium Medium-High Medium-High
Congruence b 
(other players) High Medium Medium Low Medium
Cohesion b 
(the Executive) High High Medium Medium-Low Medium
Cohesionc 
(other players) Low Low Low Low Low
Agenda-setting d 
(the Executive) High High High Medium Medium
a - Apart from the presidency. Low ranges from 1 to 2; medium from 3 to 4; and high from 5 on. 
b - By the negative, ideological or value-oriented distance between veto players (higher congruence = 
closer distance).
c - Internal cohesiveness of veto players (average), 
d - Capacity to establish the public agenda and/or to initiate legislation.
* Other players refer both to institutional (Congress, the judiciary, the states or provinces in federal 
countries) and non-institutional players (parties, interest groups, exceptionally the military) as 
developed in the accompanying text.
Note: Criteria concerning categories and country qualification are spelled out in chapters 6 and 8 
respectively.
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The widespread strengthening of Latin American presidential powers, during the 
last two decades, was mainly due to the presidents’ strategies to manage the economic 
crisis and conduct structural reforms. Building upon a tradition of already strong 
executives, many heads of government sought the capacity to formulate and enforce 
technical measures through confidential planning and circumventing both public and 
legislative debate. However, when consensus was considered to be necessary, presidents 
proved usually able to build coalitions in support of their policies.
As the number and consistency of veto players varies across policy areas, so does 
presidential margin of maneuver. Although strengthened by the economic emergency, 
presidents enjoyed larger room for autonomous decision-making in foreign as opposed to 
domestic issues. This was also due to the fact that constitutional provisions were more 
relaxed and public interest and knowledge farther away from foreign affairs. Therefore, 
international cooperation and integration itself virtually became an executive domain, 
where presidents felt freer to decide policy orientations and abler to achieve (at least) 
symbolic success. Since the president is the only politician whose constituency is the 
whole nation, he is better equipped than Congress to provide the impulse for a policy 
entailing diffuse benefits and specific costs. This has been the case of Mercosur every 
time that economic turmoil put into question its raison d'etre. For many observers it is 
clear that Collor “y Menem alteraron sustantivamente los parámetros de la integración 
de sus países... Sin duda, los principales actores de esa historia han sido los 
presidentes de Argentina y BrasiP’ (Cavarozzi 1998: 13). What is more, Cavarozzi 
extends his argument to also encompass the two following Brazilian presidents, thus 
noting how it was the institution that kept playing a role and not its contingent agents.
Governors and congresses blocked both Argentine and Brazilian presidents from 
time to time during the last fifteen years. Such blockages did not affect substantially, 
however, the steering capacity o f the presidents regarding foreign affairs. Moreover, 
even regarding the most obstructive area of domestic politics: the constitutional domain, 
Menem and Cardoso managed to have their respective Constitutions reformed in order 
to permit their previously banned re-election. Since written constitutions are admittedly a 
consensual feature of political regimes, given the super-majorities usually required 
changing them (Lijphart 1999), the Argentine and Brazilian cases show how fragile such 
a restriction was in these countries. It was unable to prevent majoritarian-like 
concentrations o f power. The way in which both presidents obtained Constitutional
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reform and, subsequently, their own re-election, is revealing about the extent to which 
political power is effectively -and increasingly— concentrated in presidential hands.
Consecutive reelection is in fact becoming a common landscape throughout 
South America. Originally allowed only in Paraguay (yet afterwards prohibited by the 
constitutional reform of 1992), the recent incorporation of Argentina and Brazil are not 
an exception but rather a trend. Also Peru, and shortly later Venezuela, have joined the 
club during the 1990s. Even in Chile there has been some debate about the possibility to 
allow reelection, but so far it has not prospered. This continental trend, fostering 
constitutional reforms everywhere, makes even more explicit the extent to which 
governmental powers tend to concentrate in the executive branch.
Some may maintain the opposite thesis, that is, that presidential offices are not 
increasingly concentrating power but relinquishing it to coalition partners. Thibaut 
(1998), for instance, compares Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay and argues that 
only Argentina under Menem can be considered a case o f presidential supremacy, while 
all other cases are better understood as having ‘coordinated’ rather than ‘subordinated’ 
relations, given the president’s need to reach agreements with parliamentary parties. 
However, if my argument is correct, coalitional presidentialism is precisely an expression 
of concentration of power in the executive, rather than the contrary. This is so because, 
in separationist presidentialisms such as the American, coalitions are not only 
unnecessary but also contradictory, since they entail a linkage between both branches of 
government -and not their separation. South American presidents build coalitions in 
order to govern effectively, not to give up the power to do so. Subordination, so to 
speak, would be achieved through coordination. Whereas in most parliamentary 
democracies coalitions are formed as a functional response to the logic of the system -in  
order to establish a government and make it function—, in most presidential democracies 
coalitions have strategical rather than functional causes -in  order for the entering parties 
to take advantage of the resources that only the executive holds.
Shugart and Mainwaring’s (1997) claim that the fragmentation of the party 
system is a key factor to explain the performance of presidential regimes is significant, 
and extremely useful to analyze Mercosur actuality. At the turn o f the century, all four 
full members plus the two associate ones have left behind any -previous or not— two- 
party format and feature coalition governments without exception. However, no 
presidency seems to have diminished its grasp whether over politics or policy. On the
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contrary, as a bipolar mechanics of competence consolidates in Argentina, Brazil and 
also Chile, the negative impact of party system fragmentation upon presidential power 
turns weaker.
As reviewed throughout this chapter, Mercosur countries are no longer an 
exception to the claim that “institutions matter.” Presidents have, nonetheless, managed 
to promote their agendas regardless o f institutional and non-institutional impediments. 
Presidents have not become all-mighty rulers though, as the delegative democracy label 
may have led us to believe. Przeworski (1999: 15) has spelled out this situation by 
affirming that, “a m  cuando los presidentes brasileños y argentinos parecieran 
conseguir la mayor parte de lo que desean, es dudoso que se encuentren menos 
restringidos institucionalmente que los primeros ministros de España o Inglaterra 
However, it is also dubious that either the Spanish or the English premier would have 
been able to afford such a significant endeavor as integration with the same freedom of 
maneuver that Mercosur presidents have displayed so far. The remainder o f this 
dissertation is to analyze how presidents effectively performed to make Mercosur 
possible.
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PART 111
THE IMPACT OF THE EXECUTIVE FORMAT UPON THE
INTEGRATION PROCESS
Andrés Malamud - European University Institute 153
Presidential Democracies and Regional Integration. An Institutional Approach to Mercosur (1985-2000)
C H A P TE R  9
IN S T IT U T IO N  B U IL D IN G  
T h e  crea tion  and d eve lo p m en t o f M erco su r
introduction
This chapter and the following one carry out an empirical assessment o f 
Mercosur actual proceedings, focusing respectively on institution building and policy­
making. Having analyzed the structure and practice of presidential government in each 
member country in the previous section, the current goal is to gauge the influence that 
the presidents have effectively had over the process of regional integration. In order to 
do so I have drawn on three main sources: official documents (i.e. Mercosur treaties, 
main resolutions and declarations), other documents produced by key politicians or 
negotiators (i.e. unofficial reports, speeches, public interviews, or publications), and 
personal interviews conducted in the frame of this research.66
These two empirical chapters are considerably different from one another, both 
theoretically and substantially. In this chapter I follow a grand-bargain approach, alia 
Moravcsik, thus concentrating on the succession o f four main treaties that led to 
institutional change. In the next chapter I will focus instead on two specific policies and 
one grand crisis. The two policy areas, the automobile and sugar regimes, have become 
central issues of Mercosur -and automobiles are usually said to be the equivalent to coal 
and steel for the early European Community. While the negotiation of an international 
treaty chiefly belongs to the sphere o f diplomacy -so-called high politics—, the
66 The interviews referred to in chapters 9 and 10 were carried out by the author between 1998 and 2001. 
The quotations are thus extracted from the following sources: Félix Peña (former Argentine 
Undersecretary of Foreign Trade, interviewed in Buenos Aires in August 1998, December 1999 and 
February 2001), Monica Hirst (Director of the Centro de Estudos Brasileiros in Buenos Aires, August 
1998 and March 2001), Norberto Moretti (Secretary of the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, 
September 1999), Dante Caputo (former Argentine Foreign Minister, Buenos Aires, September 1999), 
Juan Manuel Casella (appointed Argentine ambassador to Uruguay, Buenos Aires, September 1999), 
José Alfredo Graça Lima (Brazilian Undersecretary of Regional Integration, Brasilia, December 2000), 
Carlos Marcio Cozendey (Director of the Brazilian Divisât* do Mercosul, Brasilia, December 2000), 
Mauricio Fávero (Divisâo do Mercosul, Brasilia, December 2000), Celso de Tarso Pereira (Divisâo do 
Mercosul, Brasilia, December 2000), Evandro de Sampaio Didonet (advisor to Brazilian Deputy Foreign 
Minister, Brasilia, December 2000), Carlos Da Fonseca (Divisâo do Mercosul, Brasilia, December 
2000), Ruy Pachedo de Azevedo Amaral (advisor to former Brazilian President José Sarney, Brasilia, 
December 2000), Sérgio Danese (minister of the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, February 2001), 
Jesús Sabra (Argentine diplomatic, Buenos Aires, February 2001), Luis Alberto Lacalle (former 
Uruguayan President, Montevideo, May 2001), Julio Maria Sanguinetti (former Uruguayan President, 
Montevideo, May 2001), and Diego Guelar (former Argentine ambassador to Brazil, the European 
Union and the United States, Buenos Aires, June 2001).
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bargaining of sectoral trade agreements are more clearly rooted in the sphere of 
commerce -o r  low politics. Although both spheres are likely to overlap or mix up over 
time, I attempt here to disaggregate them for analytical purposes. As for the grand crisis, 
I so refer to the one set off by the Brazilian currency devaluation in 1999, its tortuous 
management and its aftermath.
Even the crudest intergovemmentalists accept that some degree of supranational 
or bureaucratic bargaining may be performed in the face of non-strategic issues. 
Likewise, whole-hearted supranationalists concede that intergovernmental bargaining is 
the prevailing rule for arriving at momentous agreements. What this research attempts to 
prove, still and all, is that the politicization generated either by actual presidential 
intervention or by its possibility, outweighed both diplomacy in the political sphere and 
technical management in the commercial sphere, thus becoming the engine as well as the 
steering wheel of the integration process.
m ^ H f c * * * - *  Table 9 .1
Mercosur: fundam ental treaties* t  ^ jf- .. .. . .......
Stage Date Treaty Institution Signatories
November 
30th 1985
Declaration of Iguazú High Level Bilateral Commission Argentina, Brazil
I July 29th 
1986
Argentine-Brazilian 
Integration Act
Program of Economic Integration 
and Cooperation (PICAB or PICE)
Argentina, Brazil
II November 29,h 1988
Treaty on Integration, 
Cooperation and Development
12 sectoral protocols Argentina, Brazil 
(Uruguay)
July 6 lh 
1990
1
Act of Buenos Aires Agreement on Economic 
Complementation (with ALADI)
Argentina, Brazil 
(Uruguay)
III March 26,h 
1991
Treaty of Asunción MERCOSUR: Common Market 
Council and CM Group
Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Paraguay
IV December ! 17th 1994
Protocol of Ouro Preto Customs Union, legal personality 
and Commission of Trade
Argentina, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Paraguay
The four sections that come next stem from and enlarge some contents already 
discussed in chapter 5, and follow a chronological order. The first section deals with the 
grand bargain that would lead, some years later, to the creation of Mercosur: the path to 
the Argentine-Brazilian Integration Act. The second, analyses the bargain that 
transformed the previous agreements from a set of sectoral protocols into a more general 
framework for cooperation and integration. The third, describes the bargain that ended 
up in the signature of the Treaty of Asuncion, entailing the formal creation of Mercosur
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with the inclusion of Paraguay and Uruguay into the bilateral association and the 
remaking o f both objectives and deadlines. The fourth, tackles the bargain conducive to 
the Ouro Preto Protocol, which protracted the previously established terms and settled 
down the current structure of Mercosur. Table 9.1 shows the main benchmarks o f  
Mercosur since its primitive inception in 1985 up to 1995, when the transition period 
concluded and the customs union was established.
Grand bargain: the genesis (from iguazú, 1985, to the PiCAB, 1986)
What and who?
The inauguration of Brazil’s Tancredo Neves on March 15th, 1985, was the last 
move to complete the democratization of the three countries of the Plata basin. 
However, Tancredo was seriously ill and could never take office, dying a few days 
afterwards. His vice-president, José Samey, succeeded his running mate and initially kept 
Tancredo’s cabinet and policies. Together with Alfonsin and Sanguinetti, with whom he 
would build a lasting friendship, he shared the conviction that their countries had a 
superficially divided past but a common destiny, and was decided to work out such a 
destiny. In his words, with Argentina “nunca tivemos divisoes de fundo, problemas de 
fronteira, guerras; sempre foram rivalidades superficiais: nâo existía o que houve entre 
a Alemanha e a França. Eslava na minha cabeça o Tratado Franco-Germánico” 
(Dáñese 1999: 376, n.117).
Samey’s (2000) preferences towards Argentina (“siempre fu i un brasileño que 
tuve un gran amor y admiración por la Argentina”) and his convictions about regional 
integration were decisive to set off the process. As an Argentine negotiator has observed, 
the choices faced by the Argentine government were quite reduced, and most diplomatics 
and public officials shared a positive orientation towards Brazil (Campbell 1999). 
Instead, Brazilian options were wider and its leadership was not yet defined; in this 
context, Sarney gave a strong support to the Latin-Americanists in Itamaraty and became 
“uno de los principales motores del proceso de integración” (Campbell, Rozemberg and 
Svarzman 1999: 62).
The main advisors to Samey were experienced diplomats such as Rubens 
Recupero and Luiz Felipe de Seixas Correa initially, and foreign minister Roberto de 
Abreu Sodre and Francisco Thompson Flores later. Many years thereafter, the Brazilian 
deputy foreign minister Seixas Corrêa would express the importance they accredited to
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the process by stating that “el Mercosur es el proyecto más importante de política 
exterior de Brasil” (Seixas Correa 1999: 229).
Evandro Didonet, advisor to Seixas Correa, observed on Samey “urna disposigáo 
presidencial, urna forte inclinagao pessoal de um presidente que promove a 
aproximagüo com a Argentina” (Didonet 2000). He reported that, in a personal 
conversation, Thompson Flores had corroborated the crucial role accomplished by 
Samey in bringing together the two countries. Samey and his advisors always took pride 
on being the ones that changed Brazil’s foreign orientation regarding South America in 
* general and Argentina in particular.
Samey’s first international trip was to Uruguay, from August 12 to 14, 1985, 
where he met Sanguinetti. On November 29 and 30 he met Alfonsih in Iguazú for the 
inauguration of the international bridge between Foz de Iguazú (Brazil) and Puerto 
Iguazú (Argentina), which was named after Tancredo Neves. Both presidents signed the 
Declaration o f Iguazú and a Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy, and later that very 
day Alfonsin paid an unscheduled visit to the Itaipú dam (Seixas Correa 1999).
Alfonsin (2001: 4-5) would later remember, “desde un primer momento se 
desarrolló una profunda amistad personal [with Samey,] basada en la mutua 
comprensión de los serios problemas y  enormes desafíos que debíamos superar juntos 
ambos países... Recuerdo que yo deseaba dar una muestra clara de nuestra decidida 
vocación integradora, por lo que le sugerí al presidente Samey visitar la represa de 
Itaipú,... actitud que le produjo una agradable impresión”, Such a move, involving the 
object of historical disagreements and taken against the opinion of some of his advisors, 
was intended to increase the process of confidence building between both countries and 
their rulers. It worked: Samey would later acknowledge that, “aquel día, Alfonsin dio el 
primer paso importante para cambiar la imagen de nuestras diferencias. Fuera del 
programa, contra los consejos de sus asesores, visitó Itaipú. Fue apenas una foto, pero 
sepultó la guerra por las aguas del Paraná” (La Nación 15-10-1999). In his opinion, the 
subsequent agreement “marcó el inicio del proceso histórico más importante de 
Sudamérica desde la independencia” (Samey 2000).
Alfonsin had always been a persuaded Latin Americanist. So recalls Félix Peña, 
who served on Mercosur related issues and foreign trade with both Alfonsih and Menem, 
drawing from his personal experience with Alfonsih as a young politician that dated back 
to the 70s. Raul Alfonsih "era alguien que hacía mucho tiempo venía pregonando la
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necesidad de una fuerte dimensión latinoamericana de la política exterior argentina... 
Era y  es un hombre plenamente convencido de que, en la estrategia de inserción 
exterior argentina, América Latina y  Brasil en particular ocupaban un lugar 
prioritario” (Peña 2001). As to his motivations, Peña (2001) argues that “por 
experiencia, Alfonsín debía saber cuán importante era el factor militar en la 
desestabilización política y  en la institucionalidad democrática en la Argentina”. 
Argentine diplomat Jesús Sabra (2001) supports the claim that one of the main 
motivations underlying the change of foreign policy between Argentina and Brazil was 
the need for the new governments to reduce not only the power but also the substantial 
budgets of their armed forces. All in all, personal disposition and political reasons were 
tantamount on the Argentine side, just like they were in the Brazilian case.
Diego Guelar, former Argentine ambassador to Brasilia, Washington and Geneva, 
affirms that “todavía no ha habido ningún hecho posterior a los acuerdos Alfonsín- 
Samey que tenga la importancia de ese gesto inaugurar (Guelar 2001). He goes 
further to say that “el hecho más importante de la integración regional ha sido la 
apertura de los programas nucleares”. Guelar’s vision is significant, not only for his 
familiarity with the issue but especially for being a well-known representative of the PJ -  
then in the opposition. Therefore, he may hardly be suspected o f exaggerating Alfonsín’s 
credits.
As for the institutional instruments crystallized in the agreements, the Declaration 
of Iguazu established the Comisión Mixta de Alto Nivel para la Cooperación e 
Integración Bilateral, which would be integrated by public experts and business 
representatives and presided over by the Foreign Ministers. According to Oscar Romero 
(1988), a key Argentine negotiator, the intention was that those people who took over 
the follow-up of the process should hold effective power, avoiding bureaucratic and 
time-wasting intermediation.
After the signature of the Declaration, the rapport between Argentina and Brazil 
steadily continued to improve. The crucial next step was the Argentine-Brazilian 
Integration Act (Acta para la Integración Argentino-Brasileña), which was endorsed on 
July 30, 1986, in Buenos Aires and set up the Integration and Cooperation Program 
CPrograma de Integración y Cooperación entre Argentina y Brasil, known as PICAB or 
PICE). In that occasion, Samey became the first Brazilian president to be received by the 
Argentine Congress after Getúlio Vargas in 1935. Alfonsín paid it back from December 9
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to 11. On December 10, they signed in Brasilia the Acta de Amistad Argentino- 
Brasileña, which is, according to Alfonsin (2001: 6), ltel documento que de manera más 
fiel traduce [la] aspiración transformadora ...de construir una verdadera comunidad y 
no sólo una asociación”. Uruguay’s Sanguinetti was also present, and from then on he 
was to attend every meeting to be held by his colleagues (Danese 1999: 379) -  
consistently involving Uruguay into the hitherto bilateral process.
In spite of Alfonsin’s claims, the Acta para la Integración turned out to be more 
consequential than the Acta de Amistad. Its outcome, the PICAB, was the successful 
result of a demanding bargaining. Four commissions (Economy and Trade, Transport 
and Communications, Science and Technology, and Energy) carried out the negotiations 
and previous work that would conduct to the agreement. The Act was complemented by 
twelve protocols -ten  on economic issues, one on nuclear accidents and emergencies, 
and one on aeronautic cooperation—, which were instrumentally conceived of as the 
main pillars of the accord. Four years (1986/1989) and five meetings later, the protocols 
would add up to twenty three, six o f which regarded productive sectors, other six 
regulated commercial issues, four were linked to science and technology, four to 
infrastructure and the other three to diverse topics (Campbell, Rozemberg and Svarzman 
1999: 65).
The Declaration of Iguazu had called for the participation o f all social sectors in 
the process of integration. In contrast, the Act signed in 1986 downgraded such a call 
and just mentioned the businesspeople as an active element of integration (Vigevani et al. 
2000: 17). The low level of regional interdependence had brought about a negligible 
commitment to the integration project from main national social forces -even though, 
apart from minor exceptions, resistance to integration was also negligible. Henceforth, 
the launching and progressive affirmation o f the process was exclusively due to the 
political will of the two governments (Seixas Correa 1999: 234) -thus barely different 
from the previous steps towards regional cooperation.
Why and how?
The rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil was not written in the stars. 
There were little incentives to change the traditional pattern o f mutual indifference. 
Therefore, to account for the new moves toward regional cooperation it is necessary to
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understand the motivations, institutional resources and personal dispositions that drove 
and shaped the process*
As seen in chapter 5, the Argentine-Brazilian agreements in the first place, and 
Mercosur later, were built upon political rather than economic reasons -albeit they 
sought economic, not political, integration as main instrument (Baptista 2001). The goal 
to protect the newly inaugurated democracies led their leaders to try to reduce external 
threats in order to diminish the domestic role of the military. Consequently, the private 
sector had little - i f  some—  influence along the first stages, and commercial agreements 
were but a political instrument to get the neighbors closer and to discourage attempts at 
fostering rivalry. Carlos Márcio Cozendey, Director o f the Mercosur Division at 
Itamaraty, explicitly supports this view, as he states that “el periodo iniciado en J 985/86 
tiene, evidentemente, una motivación política y una acción directa de los presidentes 
muy importante..., pero el instrumento que se utilizó para hacer esa consolidación 
[política] fue com erciar (Cozendey 2000).
Despite the consensus about the purposes underlying the first moves, some 
disagreement has been raised about the motivations that kept the process in motion. On 
the one hand a key protagonist, Dante Caputo, affirms that Brazil has always conceived 
of Mercosur as a platform for an enhanced insertion in the political and international 
arena, whereas Argentina usually held a double standard, seeking Brazil for commercial 
ends while aligning with the US in political and military issues. On the other hand, a 
likewise crucial actor such as José Graça Lima -later Brazilian undersecretary of regional 
integration— presents a more tempered view on such divergence, as he believes that “d 
sobretudo razoes políticas por detrás dessa busca de maior aproximaçâo que tem, jà  no 
final dos anos 80, raizes num passado até recente de urna certa confrontaçâo, de urna 
certa disputa...” (Graça Lima 2000).
Regardless o f the divergence between Argentina and Brazil concerning the utility 
of the association, the main protagonists acknowledge the primacy of politics. Alfonsin 
remembers that, “cuando junto al presidente José Samey iniciamos el proceso de 
integración, estaba claro el sentido político del proyectó” (Alfonsín 2001: 3). The vision 
of the economy as instrumental to such a project was also clear: “el presidente José 
Samey quería a la Argentina, comprendía cabalmente sus necesidades y estaba 
dispuesto a hacer gestos de significación... La primera medida que tomó como 
presidente en 1985 fue  precisamente ordenar la importación de 1,3 millones de
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toneladas de trigo... a los efectos de reducir el déficit de la balanza comercial que tenía 
nuestro país con B rasir  (Alfonsín 2001: 4).
Sergio Dáñese, a Brazilian diplomat who interviewed Samey for his book 
“Diplomacia presidencial”, recalls that “conociendo un poco como fue el inicio del 
proceso, se nota que hubo mucho de voluntad presidencial en eso. Los presidentes de 
los dos países tenían, en aquella época tal vez más que hoy día, un control sobre las 
máquinas, sobre el aparato del Estado..." (Dáñese 2001). The presidents seemed to be 
aware of their control over the process, and “Samey lo muestra de manera muy clara 
como algo que tenía que ver con una inspiración personal de éV\ However, Dáñese 
tempers Sarney’s claim by affirming that there were also objective conditions for the 
rapprochement to be effective, and most of them laid on economic grounds.
Partly due to the subjectivity of the actors, who tend to present a magnified 
version of their personal role, it is hard to find out where the idea of strengthening ties 
between the two neighbors originated. Peña (2001) believes it possible that the 
Argentine-Brazilian conversations between the newly elected presidents began with 
Alfonsín and Tancredo Neves, previous to the inauguration of Samey. Unfortunately, 
Neves lived not enough as to explicitly manifest what his view was concerning regional 
integration, but his legacy was clear as regarded good vicinity with Argentina. Brazilian 
scholar Monica Hirst, unlike other Brazilian observers, considers that the initiative “fue  
mucho más argentina que brasileña, [pero Samey] muy rápidamente se entusiasmó" 
(Hirst 2001). Along with Dáñese, she reckons that there were some objective conditions 
that fostered the process, but locates them on political grounds (i.e. democracy), timing, 
and personal dispositions rather than on the economy. She remarks that the initial 
economic conditions were terribly bad to support integration, so it should come as no 
surprise that the first solid advances took place in the area of foreign policy -as opposed 
to economic policy. This fact would long shape the integration process, whose matrix 
continued to be politicized and highly dependent upon the presidents and the foreign 
ministers ever since.
Evandro Didonet concurs with Hirst’s stance regarding politicization and foreign 
policy. He claims that, “no inicio, o Mercosul fo i claramente um projecto dos 
presidentes e das chancelarias..., [que] precisavam vender o projecto do Mercosul aos 
outros ministérios, á so ci edad e .."  (Didonet 2000). Such an occurrence is more visible 
when compared to the situation ten years later; as he remarks, “no Brasil o Mercosul
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está hoje na agenda de todos os ministérios, nao e mais apenas um projecto da 
chancelaria como fo i no inicio".
Former Argentine foreign minister Dante Caputo corroborates the crucial task 
accomplished by the cancillerías in the design and launching of the process. He 
remembers the probability of failure as one of his main concerns: “a ml, particularmente, 
me preocupaban mucho las experiencias fallidas... Entonces uno se preocupa de no 
empezar una tarea que culmine en el mismo fracaso que ya vio, esto de subir sin llegar. 
Mi evaluación era que en la etapa de despegue, si se independizaba el sistema de 
dirección de la voluntad política más directa, el riesgo de burocratización primero y  
desaceleración para culminar era alto” (Caputo 1999). By fostering a “direct political 
steering” of the process, Caputo intended to avoid two visible drawbacks that burdened 
other integration projects: alleged excessive bureaucratization as in the European Union, 
and early but feeble institutionalization as in the Andean Pact.
The decision not to create regional institutions was all but intentional. Its 
deliberate consequence would be to allocate every controlling and management 
responsibility in top executive offices. Caputo (1999) declares that, “para sobrevivir 
durante un lapso más o menos considerable... me pareció que era muy importante no 
institucionalizar. Y la contrapartida de la no institucionalización era que la decisión 
política no era delegada y, por lo tanto, quedaba al más alto nivel, ministros de 
Hacienda o Economía y Exteriores y  presidentes. Si uso la primera persona para 
hablar de estas cosas es porque fu i un activo militante de esta visión del asunto contra 
una visión más institucionalizada que podía haber en algunos lugares, y  yo activamente 
me opuse a esto. La institucionalización corre el riesgo de desplazar la voluntad 
política directa, de presidentes y  ministros, y  si no hay voluntad política directa las 
fuerzas dispersantes van a tener más capacidad que las centrípetas. Hasta que no se 
diera cierta altura de crucero la institucionalización no debía tener lugar".
Graga Lima (2000) agrees with Caputo on that institutional flexibility (or plain 
institutional absence) was an intended feature, so decided by the initiators of the project 
in order to keep control over it. The decisions concerning institutional design were 
certainly motivated by learning from other regional experiences, but also responded to 
the wish o f executive officials not to give in the operation of the new creature to other 
unpredictable actors.
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So far, this section has discussed the motivations for the actors to start the 
process and the reasons that explain institutional choice. Now it turns to another 
sensitive issue, which is to elucidate why the first agreements did not remain limited to 
Argentina and Brazil but went on to include Uruguay first and Paraguay later. What is at 
stake, apart from substantive matters regarding regional geopolitics and economic goals, 
is the part that the presidents of the smaller countries -especially Uruguay— played on 
the history and configuration of Mercosur.
Julio Sanguinetti, the first Uruguayan president after the military rule, underlines 
the importance of regime change for the rapprochement between the newly inaugurated 
authorities. As he describes, “el proceso de democratización en los años 80 generó un 
clima de aproximación entre los países, de solidaridad entre los líderes democráticos 
que emergían luego de un proceso de internas militares” (Sanguinetti 2001). 
Strengthening the ties between the neighboring countries was also a historical and 
personal mandate; Sanguinetti takes pride to vow that, in his case, “la integración como 
concepto es una prédica de toda la vida”. His claim cannot go overlooked, as his 
regional vocation is widely recognized as a significant push towards increasing 
cooperation in the Plata basin. Alfonsin (2001: 3) straightforwardly recognizes that “la 
incorporación del Uruguay [al bloque regional fue] resultado del inteligente impulso 
del presidente Julio Sanguinetti.
Personal relations between the presidents were paramount. Sanguinetti (2001) 
recalls that with Alfonsin “existía una empatia natural que venía de la época de la lucha 
contra la dictadura, donde nos habíamos conocido, y luego nos encontramos con un 
Samey con el cual no teníamos una relación anterior pero que pasó a ser para nosotros 
una agradable s o r p r e s a Samey won his colleagues respect “porque fue  un hombre que 
aplicó, primero, un gran esfuerzo en entender al Río de la Plata, hizo el esfuerzo de 
aprender español y de decir sus discursos en castellano en las visitas que hacía a 
nuestros países y, en segundo lugar, [porque era] un hombre de cultura, de formación 
histórica que, por lo tanto, tenía una actitud abierta
Led by Sanguinetti, Uruguay would accomplish a crucial function in the relation 
between Argentina and Brazil. In his words, “nuestro rol fue de articulación, un rol 
activo de bisagra”. As a hinge, this buffer state would mediate and moderate the 
tensions as they arose. According to Sanguinetti (2001), “la presencia de Uruguay 
actuaba como un agente catalizador. Algo que le daba a la relación Argentina-Brasil
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no el carácter de una negociación cerrada, entre dos partes que llegaban allí con 
prejuicios frente a la otra, sino realmente la naturaleza multinacional. Esto es un 
cambio cualitativo s u s ta n t iv o Sanguinetti considers that there was a trilateralization o f 
the regional relations since the very beginning, as explicitly acknowledged in the 
Declaration o f Alborada.67
From a different standpoint, the significance of the Uruguayan part in general, 
and o f Sanguinetti’s role in particular, would be later lessened by next president Luis 
Alberto Lacalle. In his view, the agreements signed before 1990 and the role played by 
Sanguinetti accounted for no more than the follow-up of the previous bilateral 
agreements that Uruguay had signed with Argentina (CAUCE) and Brazil (PEC) 
(Lacalle 2001). Lacalle’s stance opposes Alfonsin’s and Samey’s, who concede 
Sanguinetti more credit in bringing their countries together. In fact, there existed an 
Argentine and Brazilian request for increased Uruguayan participation; this request was 
channeled through ulas diplomacias y los presidentes”, and positively responded by 
Uruguay.
It is significant that Sanguinetti underlines the importance of presidential and 
diplomatic channels, as some observers believe that other public officials and social 
actors may have played a greater role. Regarding the division of functions within the 
presidential cabinet, the Uruguayan president affirms that the ministers of economy 
“nunca son los que articulan estos procesos, pero sí los que administran sus 
im p ed im en to son the other hand, “las cancillerías siempre están prontas a negociar ’ 
(Sanguinetti 2001). As to the social actors, he plainly denies having received any demand 
for integration emerging from the civil society. Politics, once again, carried the day vis-à- 
vis economics and society -although political parties were absent.
Guelar (2001) agrees with the description made by Sanguinetti, and offers a 
coincident analysis for understanding the articulation between the large and small states 
in the integration process. He criticizes the mercantilist vision o f Mercosur that conceives 
of it as merely business. In his view, the fundamentals of the region stem from the need 
of stabilizing the Argentine-Brazilian relation and the will o f denuclearizing the zone, 
turning it into a security community after decades o f harsh rivalry. The inclusion of
67 In April, 1988, the presidents of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay signed in Brasilia the Acta de 
Alborada, establishing the conditions for the incorporation of Uruguay to the integration project. The 
Act stated gradualism, flexibility and equilibrium as ruling principles of the process.
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Paraguay and Uruguay was not accidental in this context, but responded to the logic of 
“buffer zones” expected to moderate the conflicts between the bigger states.
Some years later, Guelar would wonder why the region lacks a clear destiny. His 
answer is that “no existe [el] pensamiento de Estado, o sea, el pensamiento de Estado 
apareció como flashes, fue un flash que tuvieron, indudablemente, Alfonsín y  Samey” 
(Guelar 2001). The absence of leaders with either a region-wide vision or a regional 
responsibility, such as Schuman and Monnet, left every thrust towards regional 
integration in the hands of national executives, Alfonsín and Samey being their utmost 
expression. Many observers call their names when asked about Mercosur Founding 
Fathers, and only a few times do somebody equals Menem and Collor to them. Notably, 
neither bureaucrats or technicians nor politicians other than the presidents appeared to 
have individually accomplished more than a minor role in building integration.
Grand bargain: a leap forward (Treaty of Integration, 1988)
What and who?
On November 29, 1988, in Buenos Aires, Alfonsín and Samey manifested their 
decision to consolidate the rapprochement between their countries through the signature 
of the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and Development (Tratado de Integración, 
Cooperación y  Desarrollo). Of the many sectoral protocols signed thus far, the most 
important referred to capital goods and trade on wheat and oil. However, the 
coincidences between both governments had grown farther at the political and 
international sphere rather than at the economic and commercial one; therefore, the 
presidents now aimed at reinforcing the latter. The Treaty contemplated the lifting of all 
tariff and non-tariff barriers and the coordination of macroeconomic policies within a 
period of ten years. The subsequent treaties, signed in 1990 and 1991, would ultimately 
anticipate the former goal -barrier lifting— , henceforth making more evident the failure 
to meet the latter -macroeconomic coordination, what would still remain 
unaccomplished at the end of the ten-year period.
The economic turmoil and political uncertainty that the Argentina and Brazil 
were undergoing by 1988, added to the near end of Alfonsín’s and Samey’s tenures, 
were limiting the capacity of the presidents to actively further the integration process. 
The new Treaty was therefore interpreted as a leap forward (Campbell, Rozemberg and 
Svarzman 1999), setting the conditions that would permit their successors to advance
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steadier and faster. It is conceivable that the metaphor of the bicycle and the tricycle 
usually employed to analyze the European Union may also be applied to this case: had it 
not been for the decision to go ahead, in spite of all the domestic tribulations, the process 
may have resulted enduringly endangered.
Apart from the deepening objectives settled by Argentina and Brazil, there w as a 
parallel -yet less visible— process taking place: inchoate enlargement. Remarkably, the 
Uruguayan president Julio Sanguinetti participated in a meeting with Alfonsin and Sarney 
the day after the signature of the agreement. In this occasion, the three presidents issued 
a declaration expressing the common will of associating Uruguay to the process as soon 
as the circumstances were deemed convenient. The formal document was still two-sided, 
but the door was open for third countries to join up with the venture.
The bilateral accord started a drastic change of approach vis-à-vis the previous 
steps, though this would not be completely evident until the following agreement -signed 
by the subsequent presidents—  ratified the new direction in 1990. The importance o f  the 
Treaty o f 1988 as a defining moment has not been fully recognized yet, although some 
authors single it out as a major underpinning of Mercosur (Baptista 2001). The twelve- 
article agreement kept the principles of gradualism, flexibility, equilibrium, and symmetry 
(art. 2), but foresaw the gradual switch from partial and sectoral agreements to the 
progressive establishment of a common economic space (art. 1). Although Alfonsin 
(2001) remarks that the common market was only foreseen as a second stage, that 
should take place after the ten-year period, the definition of a “common economic space” 
suggests that the signatories were aspiring to go much beyond the PICAB. In order to 
monitor compliance, an executive commission, made up of four ministers per country 
and coordinated by the foreign ministers, was created. Later on, with the signature o f the 
Act of Buenos Aires in 1990, the presidents o f Argentina and Brazil would be appointed 
as co-presidents o f the commission.
Celso Lafer (1997), an academic who was Brazilian foreign minister with both 
Collor and Cardoso, is among those who consider this agreement as one of the main 
benchmarks in the Argentine-Brazilian relationship. In his view, it is at this point that a 
new phase in regional cooperation is set off, as the mutual objectives go deeper than the 
previous bilateral accords and prefigure the following steps that would push integration 
forward. Also Jorge Campbell, Argentine negotiator and Secretary of International 
Economic Relations at the foreign ministry between 1994 and 1999, sees the Treaty as
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involving “un drástico cambio de enfoque y un salto cualitativo en la marcha del 
proceso de integración iniciado tres años antes” (Campbell, Rozemberg and Svarzman 
1999: 103).
In sum, the late 1980s were characterized for a historical turnaround, as 
expressed by the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement. This process may be understood as 
unfolding through two main instruments of regional cooperation, therefore being 
characterized by the ensuing combination of liberalization and public steering. As 
Lavagna (1999: 6) puts it, the key was a methodological principle “que básicamente 
consistía en una combinación de liberación comercial automática y políticas 
sectoriales, de comercio y  eventualmente de inversiones y  The national governments 
would therefore keep a firm grasp on sectoral policies, while tying themselves to the 
commitments arrived at with the regional partner. This formula was supposed to bring 
together the better of two worlds: a wide room for maneuver along with a strengthened 
foreign and domestic credibility.
Why and how?
The agreement of 1988 explicitly displayed much of the spirit that had inspired 
the previous steps since 1985. The presidents were proud o f what they had accomplished 
regarding regional cooperation, and aspired to leave a lasting legacy by pushing the 
process still further. Their successful example and point of reference was the hitherto 
most ambitious attempt at integration: “en cierta forma, la Comunidad Europea nos 
empujaba hacia la integración regionaT\ as Alfonsm (2001: 4) would later recall. Both 
Alfonsm and Samey conceived of as their primary national mission to consolidate the 
democratic institutions at home, and only secondly to advance economic reforms. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that their regional priorities resembled very much their 
domestic ones. The primacy of politics and institutions over the economy was plainly 
acknowledged: “el Tratado de Integración era mucho más que un acuerdo económico. 
Se preveía la constitución de una Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta de Integración 
asociada al proceso de toma de decisiones” (Alfonsín 2001: 6).
At the domestic level, the background conditions for the politicization of the 
relation had clear institutional expressions. In Argentina, the team that had negotiated the 
first protocols and bilateral agreements was being gradually dismantled. Simultaneously, 
the competence and responsibilities were being transferred from the Secretary of
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Industry to the foreign minister, what resulted in a “devaluación del contenido 
económico-comercial de la iniciativa en favor de su componente estrictamente político” 
(Campbell, Rozemberg and Svarzman 1999: 102).
Alfonsín and Samey had crafted the process following the Monnet method of 
integration. They believed in the necessity of taking few and firm steps at the time, 
“dejando de lado de manera definitiva las quimeras de los grandes proyectos de 
integración que sólo condujeron... a la desilusión depresiva de los visionarios” -as  
Thompson Flores put it (Campbell, Rozemberg and Svarzman 1999: 66). In order to do 
so, they planned that the process be oriented to the common market and based upon 
sectoral integration, looking for successive advances that would prevent impasses to 
occur. They were thinking of positive, not just negative, integration; therefore, 
negotiation -as  opposed to automatism— was the key concept (Samey 2000).
The choice for an incremental strategy was perceptible in the substantive 
continuity of the agreements. In this respect, Cozendey (2000) observes that “e/ 
movimiento desde 1985 hasta 1988-89 es una continuidad, una profundización de un 
mismo movimiento y de un mismo tipo de acuerdo... Tiene la forma de una serie de 
acuerdos sectoriales”. Didonet also sees the 1988 accords as a step forward in the 
established direction. As he observes, “tampouco eu via motivos de política interna mas 
sim urna disposigáo de acelerar a integragáo sobre a base daquilo que já  havia” 
(Didonet 2000). It is no wonder that Brazil’s Samuel Pinheiro Guimaraes, who had 
crafted the process since the beginning together with Argentina’s Roberto Lavagna, was 
among the main writers of the treaty, as he advocated -and continues to advocate—  a 
sectoral and gradual strategy instead of a more general and liberal one. Both Pinheiro 
Guimaraes and Lavagna would therefore become distressed with the later developments 
of the integration project, as they interpreted that the strategy adopted from 1990 on was 
at odds with the originally planned.
Nostalgia for the allegedly missing original design has been widespread ever 
since. Not even Alfonsín, unquestionably one of the strongest defender of Mercosur, is 
exempt from feeling so. In spite of the fervent tribute he dedicates to the process, he 
laments some features it has acquired. As he regretfully puts it, “a pesar de recibir la 
aprobación de los Congresos y entrar en vigor, serán otros protagonistas, con otras 
ideas, quienes retomarán el proceso de integración a principios de la década de los 90” 
(Alfonsín 2001: 7).
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Grand bargain: the change of strategy (from Buenos Aires, 1990, to 
Asuncion, 1991)
What and who?
In the wake of the presidential elections held in Argentina in 1989 and in Brazil in 
1990, both new governments converged on the implementation of market-oriented 
policies based on liberalization, deregulation and privatization. Regional integration 
would become an instrument for facilitating and locking-in domestic reforms, driving 
presidents Menem and Collor to the signature of the Act of Buenos Aires on July 6. 
.Through this agreement, the deadline for the constitution of a common market was 
anticipated to December 31, 1994, and the nature of the 1986/88 treaties resulted 
modified. From this stage on, integration would become characterized by automatic, 
linear and progressive liberalization, with the outstanding exception of sugar, the 
automobile regime, and a few other areas.68 9 The Treaty of Asuncion would crown this 
‘negative integration’ approach shortly thereafter (on March 26, 1991) via twenty-four 
articles and five annexes, all of which dealt exclusively with economic, commercial or 
administrative issues (Vigevani et al. 2000). This is to say that cultural, social and even 
political issues were kept out of the institutional agenda.
The signature of the Act o f Buenos Aires in 1990, instituting the Agreement on 
Economic Cooperation (Acuerdo de Complementation Economica) between Argentina 
and Brazil, entailed the virtual enlargement of the still formally bilateral process. This 
was so because the president of Uruguay, Luis Alberto Lacalle, took part in the 
encounter together with Menem and Collor. The Uruguayan participation was not yet on 
an equal footing with the two original partners, so at first Lacalle decided not to sign the 
resulting document (Lacalle 2001). However, the declared intention of all participants 
was to incorporate Uruguay, as well as the recently democratized Paraguay, into the 
regional agreements. The subsequent registration of the Act with ALADI made clear that 
the signing states conceived of the nascent association as both part o f a broader region 
and an open step toward further integration, hopefully aiming at encompassing most of 
Latin America.
68 Whereas some scholars and protagonists believe that the agreements between Menem and Collor 
implied a drastic reorientation of the project, others understand them as the relaunching of a stalled 
process rather than a change in its direction. The ensuing debate is dealt with next.
69 Among them, information technology, capita! goods, and a few items contained in the Exception Lists 
that would expire by 1999 for Argentina and Brazil and by 2000 for Paraguay and Uruguay.
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Despite the formal text, neither the Act of Buenos Aires nor the Treaty o f 
Asuncion instituted a common market- Instead, they established the mechanisms and 
deadlines for its creation by the end of 1994 and set the procedures that would direct the 
process during the so-called transition period. If  the proclaimed objective o f the 
agreements was to establish a common market within a short deadline, the main 
instruments to reach such goal were four. Together with trade liberalization, it mentioned 
the coordination o f macroeconomic policies, the setting of a common external tariff 
(CET), and the adoption of sectoral agreements. The mechanisms through which the 
instruments were to be applied were stipulated in the annexes. The first annex established 
the deadlines for tariff liberalization, the second dealt with rules of origin, the third 
sketched the draft for a dispute settlement system, the fourth instituted safeguard clauses, 
and the fifth created ten working subgroups within the GMC. The decision-making 
structure, limited to the CMC and the GMC (already sketched in the Act of Buenos 
Aires), kept a mechanics of administration by unanimity and full presence quorum, based 
on strictly intergovernmental principles. The supreme body of Mercosur, the CMC, 
would meet as many times as it deemed convenient, but at least once a year it should 
gather with the participation of the presidents of the member states (art. 11). As it turned 
out to be, presidential summits would finally take place twice a year ever since (see Table 
9.2), following the track of the European Council since its creation in 1974. 
Furthermore, some key joint presidential decisions would be taken before similar 
measures were sanctioned in the European Union. As an example, the democratic clause, 
establishing sanctions that arrived up to the exclusion from the bloc for those countries 
that underwent an insurrection against the constitutional order, was instituted in 1996 -  
to be later expanded to Bolivia and Chile in 1998. In the EU, such a clause would only 
be incorporated by the Treaty o f Amsterdam in 1997 and entered into force one year 
later.
Andrés Malamud - European University Institute 170
Presidential Democracies and Regional Integration. An Institutional Approach to Mercosur (1985-2000)
1  ..'“J \  \ - T s b lß  9 J2m¡ ■ 1
1  Presidential Summits at Common Market Council m eetings (1991-1999) I
Year Place and date 
1991 Asunción, March 26
Presidential declaration or new 
institution 
Treaty of Asuncion
Brasilia, December 17 Protocol of Brasilia
1992 Las Leñas, June 26 and 27
Montevideo, December 28
1993 Asunción, July 1
Colonia, January 17
1994 Buenos Aires, August 4 and 5
Ouro Preto, December 16 and 17 Protocol of Ouro Preto
1995 Asuncion, August 4 and 5
Punta del Este, December 6  and 7
1996 Buenos Aires and San Luis, June 24 and 25 Mechanism of Political Consultation
Fortaleza, December 16 and 17
1997 Asunción, June 18
Montevideo, December 15
1998 Buenos Aires and Ushuaia, July 23 and 24 Democratic Clause and Peace Zone
Rio de Janeiro, December 10
1999 Asunción, June 15
Montevideo, December 7
The Treaty of Asuncion also institutionalized other features that had been 
previously materialized in the daily operation of the PICAB. Among them, the direct 
participation of top governmental officials -especially from the highest ranks of the 
foreign and economy ministries— and the nonexistence o f common bodies integrated by 
independent experts significantly added momentum to the presidential summits. 
Informally, the operation of bilateral diplomatic channels -especially through the 
respective ambassadors in Buenos Aires and Brasilia— for the administration of the 
relationship and the solution of commercial conflicts was also maintained.
Between the signature of the Act o f Buenos Aires and that of Asunción a febrile 
schedule was met. The Act was approved in Buenos Aires on July 6, and from then on a 
series of crucial encounters took place until the meeting in Asunción on March 26. In
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August, Paraguay and Uruguay were invited to join the process. On September 5 and 6 
the four countries met together, and all the four would participate in the regional 
gatherings always since. On October 22 and 23, the partners met in Rio de Janeiro and 
on December 13 and 14 they did alike in Buenos Aires. On December 20, the ACE 14 
(Acuerdo de Complementation Económica 14) was registered with ALADI in the 
presence of representatives of all four countries.
Why and how?
In the ceremony of signature o f the Asunción Treaty, Menem (Instituto de 
Relaciones Internacionales 2000) categorically underlined the reasons behind the project: 
“nuestra apuesta en favor de la integración no es ideológica; por el contrario, se trata 
de un medio para sumar eficiencia”.70 Regionalization was thus instrumental to 
implementing domestic market-oriented reforms, as it should enlarge markets, improve 
business opportunities and attract foreign investment. In order to reach its goals, the 
accord needed to differ from traditional Latin American pattern of ambitious engagement 
and poor accomplishment. As a result, the Treaty was deliberately short and simple, 
aiming at attaining credibility after years of undelivered promises concerning integration. 
In Peña’s view, the agreements should depict a clear goal and design specific instruments 
to achieve it, rather than pretending that the objective would be reached by a mere act of 
political will. The initial stage has therefore been imagined as four years long, “sabiendo 
que era un periodo corto pero que era la única manera en que podíamos mandar una 
señal fuerte" [both to countries and markets] that this time integration was there to stay 
(Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales 2000).
The main reason for anticipating the deadline that established the settlement of a 
common market was to secure credibility for the regional commitments, since such a 
short timetable was coincident with the tenures of the incumbent presidents -w ho would 
therefore officiate as personal and institutional guarantors.71 In turn, regional 
commitments were oriented to securing domestic reforms through external compromises.
The link between the domestic and regional levels appears clear in Hirst’s 
accounts. In her view, the exhaustion of the dirigista (state-centered) model led to
70 Notwithstanding Menem’s downplaying of ideology, Peña (2001) remarks that he had traditionally 
had an inclination for Latin America similar to Alfonsin’s.
71 The ulterior impeachment and removal of Collor came unexpected in 1992, but his successor in the 
presidency stuck with the accorded timetable.
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dismissing the strategy of sectoral and partial agreements. Therefore, the establishment 
of Mercosur would express the regional response to recurrent economic crises, sided by 
the predominance of the Washington Consensus as main recipe to handle greater policy 
changes. However, Mercosur was far from an altogether neoliberal project; instead, it 
was seen as a “shortcut” -especially by the Brazilian businesspeople, who preferred a 
gradual and limited openness rather than a more general one. In Hirst’s (2001) words, 
“hay, en un primer momento, la idea de que es un proyecto que va a doler poco. Lo que 
duele es todo lo demás [the economic reform], y esto incluso puede aliviar un poco el 
dolor”.
President Lacalle presents the expanding regional integration since the 90s as a 
surprising novelty -thus neither a direct continuation nor a turning point of previous 
endeavors. He tells the story in a peculiar way: “llegamos al gobierno, empezamos a 
ocupamos de la tarea gubernativa y  en julio de 1990 nos enteramos que la Argentina y  
el Brasil tenían pronto para firmar un tratado de formación de un mercado común sin 
conocimiento previo del U ru g u a y His decision was to send his chancellor, Héctos Gros 
Espiell, “a golpear la puerta a Brasilia [where an Argentine-Brazilian meeting was 
taking place], porque Uruguay no puede quedar ajeno” (Lacalle 2001).
The presence of Paraguay and Uruguay in the bloc deserves closer scrutiny. 
According to Lacalle (2001), the very name of Mercosur was suggested by himself to the 
Uruguayan ambassador Bertet*, who wrote “Mercomsur” on a napkin. (Later that day, 
the press would take the name and inadvertently drop the cacophonic “m”). The 
Uruguayan president wanted his country to play the role of “bisagra integradora”, much 
in the same vein as previously defined by Sanguinetti. However, it is conceivable that 
Lacalle (2001) exaggerates his personal part when he affirms that “el hecho de que fuera 
el presidente y  la vieja relación con el Paraguay, de muchos años de Partido Nacional 
y de mi familia, creó las condiciones para que Paraguay ingresara”. In any case, it is 
clear that key decision-makers in both smaller countries had in mind what came to be 
known as “la política de los meridianos”, which attempted to go beyond the Argentina- 
Brazil axis to build up stronger links between Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia. This 
horizontal axis would act as buffer and facilitator of the relation between the bigger 
countries, and simultaneously would provide an opportunity for the hinterland countries 
to improve their access to the sea.
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The level of consensus reached by the Uruguayan elites and society to integrate 
the bloc was remarkably high. Lacalle’s (2001) narration is eloquent: “cuando se firm a el 
Tratado de Asunción y es necesario ratificarlo, nosotros consultamos a todas las 
fuerzas políticas del Uruguay; en la casa de gobierno estábamos todos, el General 
Seregni, el Doctor Vázquez, el Doctor Batlle, el ex presidente Pacheco Areco, el ex 
presidente Sanguinetti, todo el partido Nacional, todos los líderes colorados". 
Sanguinetti tells a somewhat different version: in his view, “Lacalle no era un militante 
de la integración; él asumió primero una actitud de mucho recelo ante el Mercosur,... y  
fue recién sobre el final que Uruguay se incorpora''1. Unlike Menem and Cardoso, who 
willfully continued the strategy of integration already outlined by their antecessors, 
Lacalle needed to be pushed into the process by most national political leaders. Once 
inside, he took the flag and followed suit.
As seen before, Peña asserts that the original motivations that led to the creation 
of Mercosur in 1991 were political rather than economic -just like the previous stages 
undergone since 1985. The similitude also holds with the driving forces that originally 
backed the European Union; moreover, the timing between the settlement o f the 
European single market -planned for 1992—  and the creation of Mercosur was not 
casual, as the former acted as a model for the latter.72 However, Peña (Instituto de 
Relaciones Internacionales 2000) departs from the European parallel when describing the 
formula o f Mercosur as a deliberate equilibrium between institutional flexibility and 
political will, therefore leaving little room for spillover or any kind of automatic or 
feedback mechanisms. Peña (1998: 51/2) is crystal-clear about what he believes to be at 
the underpinnings of Mercosur: “iniciativa presidencial, audaz como la que caracterizó 
a los procesos nacionales de r e f o r m a If it is true that both spheres, i.e. regional 
integration and domestic economic reform, were subject to the initiative of the 
presidents, it is also true that personal audacity may not have sufficed. After being 
elected under populist manifestos and campaigns, the popular legitimacy of Menem and 
Collor and the institutional autonomy o f  the presidency vis-à-vis the Congress helped 
both presidents to turn upside down most of their policy programs. They could 
consequently pursue and secure policies that might have encountered greater resistance 
in a parliamentary environment, as the party or parliamentary coalition that supported the
72 Bush’s Initiative for the Americas also acted as direct stimulus, since it pushed the Southern Cone 
countries to join efforts for the upcoming hemispheric negotiations.
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chief executive would plausibly be more committed to their electoral manifesto and could 
therefore have blocked or vetoed the executive turnaround.73
There is little debate about the conditions of possibility of Mercosur. According 
to Cozendey (2000), it became possible “en la medida que hubo un cambio de política 
comercial que vino con el presidente Collor y su e q u ip o As already seen, the same can 
be said on the Argentine side. A greater discussion has instead unfolded around the 
nature of the Treaty of Asunción, whether it is conceived of as continuity or rupture with 
respect to the preceding process. Didonet (2000), for example, asserts that “os acordos 
de 90 e 92... mudam o ritmo e a perspectiva do p r o je c to The two main protagonists of 
the previous stages bitterly agree: whereas Alfonsin (2001: 7) bemoans that, 
“lamentablemente, con la firma del Tratado de Asuncion en 1991 el hilo conductor 
político se diluyó”, Samey goes still further. He rhetorically asks, “¿dónde nos 
e q u iv o c a m o s just to immediately reply, “cuando en julio de 1990, por el Acta de 
Buenos Aires, los presidentes Collor y  Menem decidieron cambiar los rumbos, y en 
lugar de trabajar por un mercado común, le dieron prioridad al área de libre comercio 
y  a la  unión aduanera” (Samey 2000).
In contrast, Peña (2001) declares, “no estoy de acuerdo en que hubo un cambio 
de objetivo, hay que ser realistas... En 1989, lo hecho a partir de 1986 estaba en estado 
de hibernación... Esa idea de que en 1990 se cambia el rumbo de un barco que iba en 
una cierta dirección es como mínimo discutible, porque el barco estaba en puerto, 
estaba p a r a d o For its part, Dáñese agrees that regional integration was stalled in 1990, 
and suggests that the process crowned in 1991 with the signature of the Treaty of 
Asunción was somehow automatic, a continuation of the original boost given by Alfonsin 
and Samey. Yet he reckons that this process was not automatic but needed the 
presidential intervention, at first provided by Collor and later by Franco. Both of them 
lacked past Samey’s “fuerza inspiradora” or next Cardoso's “political will”, but played 
nonetheless a critical role (Danese 2000). The personal involvement o f Collor should not 
be overlooked: the very day after his inauguration, he agreed with Menem on the 
institution o f an executive commission as established by the Treaty of 1988, and signed a 
joint declaration expressing the historical relevance of such agreement.
73 Even though New Zealand offers an exceptional example to the contrary (see Vowles and Aimer 
1993).
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It appears somewhat puzzling that the two Brazilian presidents who signed the 
two most important agreements (i.e. Collor the Treaty of Asunción, and Franco the 
Protocol of Ouro Preto) were less personally engaged with integration than both their 
predecessor Samey and their successor Cardoso. Two reasons may help explain such 
phenomenon: first, the continuity of Brazilian foreign policy as guaranteed by Itam araty’s 
direct involvement; second, the institutional resources of the presidency, that allowed the 
presidents to extract political benefits from a policy area that they could command 
notwithstanding their previous lack of concern. If it is true that the national negotiators 
played a remarkable role, it is equally true that the presidents increased their level o f 
engagement as the culminating moment got closer. Danese (2001), although 
downplaying the importance of Collor and Franco, cannot help arguing that “el 
Mercosur es una obra de diplomacia presidencial... En todos los grandes momentos del 
Mercosur hay alguna forma de diplomacia presidencial
Little contest has been raised concerning the superior role played in M ercosur by 
top executive officials with respect to other actors. However, some controversy exists as 
regards the relative importance of the presidents vis-à-vis their foreign ministers. On the 
one hand, Hirst (2001) claims that “el Mercosur es un proyecto de cancillerías que poco  
a poco se transformó, creó una dinámica intergubemamental, interburocrática, pero  
todavía muy disociada de los intereses reales [ económicos f \  On the other, Danese 
(2001) recognizes that “es necesario que haya un cierto liderazgo, imponer ciertas 
voluntades, y para eso funcionan los presidentes bastante bien hasta cierto punto”, only 
to subsequently state that “los cancilleres funcionan como agentes directos de los 
p r e s id e n te s As seen in chapter 8, ministers in the Southern Cone presidential systems 
lack autonomous capacity and, all the more important, their legitimacy emanates from 
their appointment by the president.
If the primacy of the presidents over their cabinets and other governmental 
branches is clear, the predominance of the public sector over the civil society is even 
more impressive. Raúl Rocatagliata, representative of the Sociedad Rural Argentina -  
peak association o f the larger rural owners— affirmed that “el Mercosur comenzó y 
parecía una propiedad del gobierno; el sector privado no existió al principio” (Instituto 
de Relaciones Internacionales 2000). In the same vein, César Tortorella from the 
Confederación General Económica (association of the small and medium businesspeople) 
would later claim that “nos hemos quejado muy duramente... porque han desconocido
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realidades del sector privado, y esto se ha pagado caro” (Instituto de Relaciones 
Internacionales 2000). As regards Mercosur routine operation, Jorge Zorreguieta from 
the Unión Industrial Argentina (peak association of the big national businesspeople) 
sorrowfully recalled, “hemos pedido intervención antes, durante y  después de las 
reuniones del GMC... Por las normas del Mercosur, no podemos estar en la misma 
habitación donde se desarrollan las discusiones,.., o sea, estar integrados al proceso” 
(Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales 2000). Also Guelar (2001) suggests that no 
significant role was played by the private sector before the 1990s, as he explains that “el 
Mercosur generó un mecanismo muy fuerte de encuentro de las sociedades civiles: 
empezó a funcionar muy bien la frontera, empezó a haber rasgos importantes de 
integración cultural, de acercamientos que nunca habían existido”. Integration, as 
delineated in chapter 5, turned out to be the cause -no t the consequence— of 
interdependence.
Although the political nature o f Mercosur has been extensively illustrated in the 
precedent sections, a paradox still remains. According to Guelar (2001), “en Asunción 
existía espíritu fundacional pero ya estaban las limitaciones planteadas, es decir, el 
miedo a la integración p o l í t i c a Hence, politics simultaneously shaped the inner core 
and the external limits that were defining the integrative enterprise.
Grand bargain: the latest structure (Ouro Preto, 1994)
What and who?
On December 17, 1994, the current features of Mercosur were established 
through the signature o f the Ouro Preto Protocol. The Protocol resolved over a broader 
domain than planned, since it validated the modifications that some CMC decisions had 
de facto made to the Treaty of Asunción -such as keeping non-tariff restrictions or 
protracting the deadline for the exception lists. Despite this broader range, its 
accomplishments fell short from originally expected -e.g. the goal of the 1995 deadline 
was downgraded from a common market to an (incomplete) customs union. As for the 
institutional structure, the reforms were only a few and mainly ordered and formalized 
the procedures developed throughout the transition period.
Since 1995, the regional operation and procedures rest on three pillars: 
intergovemmentalism concerning the institutional structure, consensus -what is 
tantamount to unanimity— regarding decision-making procedures, and ad-hoc
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mechanisms respecting dispute settlement. The Protocol also rendered Mercosur a 
subject of international law by means of granting it legal personality, and established the 
procedures for rule-making at the regional level -linking them to the mechanisms for 
rule-internalizing required by national legislation. In addition, it institutionalized the 
Commission of Trade in order to deal with commercial policies and controversies 
between the member states, and created the Joint Parliamentary Commission and the 
Social and Economic Advisory Forum.
The creation of the Commission of Trade aimed at securing a more technical 
management of commercial issues, including decisions on common rules and resolution 
of controversies. It was therefore expected to reduce politicization, both at the decision­
making and dispute-settlement levels, by requiring member states to go through an 
additional administrative stage previous to escalating to upper power sites. On the other 
hand, the Social and Economic Advisory Forum was not intended to either make 
decisions or arbitrate conflicts, but to involve the civil societies in the integration 
process. The fact that its creation was only accomplished after the process had advanced 
a long way manifests the scarce engagement reached thus far by the main social actors -  
who were not even the main supporters of the new institution but rather their passive 
beneficiaries. The Commission and the Forum were important additions to the structure 
of Mercosur, but as it turned out, they would not acquire as much weight as foreseen.
Conceivably, one of the most consequential arrangements of the Protocol was the 
decision to institutionalize the practice of twice-a-year presidential summits (art. 6) -  
although the supreme regional body, the Common Market Council, was exclusively 
composed of the Foreign and Economy Ministers o f each member country. Very soon, 
however, the CMC rather became a presidential forum, their ministers accomplishing a 
narrower role as presidential aides (Almeida Medeiros 2000a). This should hardly be a 
surprise, since ministers in presidential systems lack the autonomy and legitimacy that 
their parliamentary counterparts enjoy -w hich is one of the reasons why the Council of 
Ministers has been able to play a first-line role in the EU. As Mercosur impact on 
domestic politics increased, the presidents got ever more involved in running personally a 
highly visible body where top decisions were made (Peña 1998: 100b).
The negotiations that led to Ouro Preto were long and difficult. The process of 
confidence-building between Argentina and Brazil had been quite successful, and an 
intimate three-day meeting in a Buenos Aires ranch — *una ‘internación ' de tres días'\ as
Andrés Malamud - European University Institute 178
Presidential Democracies and Regional Integration. An Institutional Approach to Mercosur (1985-2000)
Campbell called it (Campbell, Rozemberg and Svarzman 1999: 164)— helped ease the 
understanding. However, the uncertainty originated in the Brazilian situation -both 
political (the presidential election) and economic (the hyperinflation)— did not facilitate 
the choice for either a FTZ or a CU. Besides, the temptation for Argentina to await for a 
US invitation to join the NAFTA was still another obstacle. Finally, the American 
president’s failure to obtain the fast track instrument from Congress, the success of 
Cardoso’s Plan Real to stabilize the Brazilian currency, and his electoral victory paved 
the way for the regional agreement (Seixas Correa 1999).
Why and how?
Most reports agree that the final outcome of the Ouro Preto meeting was either 
accidental or deceitful. Didonet (2000) supports the former, as he argues that “Ouro 
Preto fo i possível por causa de urna confusâo muito favorável de factores. 92-93 nâo 
tinha sido um período muito fá c il para o Mercosul a nivel de desequilibrio da balança 
muito forte em favor do Brasil, ...havia urna preocupaçào com a saúde da economía 
brasileira na Argentina, e havia preocupaçào também pelo que poderia resultar da 
eleiçâo presidencial de 1994 no B r a s i l Notwithstanding the lengthy negotiations, the 
decision to push Mercosur forward and its final shape were undecided up to the end. “0  
Mercosul estova trovado, as negociaçôes pouco avançavam e de repente, no ultimo 
momento, os acordos de Ouro Preto desbloqueavam [a situaçâof\ Didonet (2000) 
explains. In his view, it was the electoral result in Brazil what paved the way for the final 
understanding, since “a eleiçâo de Fernando Henrique Cardoso fo i vista como algo 
positivo, o presidente Menem explícitamente demostrava a sua preferencia... Entâo se 
chegou aos acordos, mais urna vez com o empenho pessoal dos presidentes” (Didonet 
2000). On the contrary, Domingo Cavallo, Argentine foreign minister in the time of the 
signature o f the Treaty of Asuncion and minister of the Economy in 1994, allocates the 
responsibility for the contents of the Protocol on Itamaraty and the foreign ministry staff. 
He believes that the Brazilian diplomatic structure took advantage over their newly 
elected president in order to settle a customs union that was neither wanted by Cardoso 
nor convenient for Argentina.74 However, Campbell maintains that the choice to go 
beyond the free trade zone was explicitly made by the Argentine government.
74 Cavallo expressed his viewpoint before the author in the “Encuentro de líderes políticos de América 
Latina”, organized by the Argentine government and the PNUD (Proyecto de las Naciones Unidas para 
el Desarrollo) in the Hilton Hotel, Buenos Aires, from March 12 to 14, 2001.
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Furthermore, he claims that his being appointed in office by foreign minister Di Telia w as 
due to his stand for the customs union (Campbell 1999: 11).
The effective role o f the presidential cabinets is underscored by many accounts. 
Cozendey (2000) acknowledges that “/a parie institucional básicamente se genera a  
partir de las c a n c i l le r ía s He mentions the key intervention of José Artur Denot 
Medeiros and Winston Fritsch, and recalls the issues at stake: “en ese momento se 
planteaban distintas opciones: respecto de la personería jurídica, la autoridad de 
negociación externa, el proceso decisorio, la naturaleza intergubemamental o 
supranacional, el principio de decisión (mayoría ponderada o consenso)” (Cozendey 
2000) .
When analyzing the role played by the Brazilian presidents during the transition 
period (1990-1995), Peña remarks the active intervention of both Itamaraty and the 
cabinet by comparing the styles of Collor and Franco. He starts by underlining the 
audacity and histrionics of Collor: as he liked Samey’s legacy concerning regional 
integration, he acted the script that was being written by the Brazilian diplomacy. In 
addition, his cabinet was notoriously pro-Mercosur: made up by ministers like Marcilio 
Marques Moreira, Celso Lafer and Helio Jaguaribe, “era un gabinete de lujo desde el 
punto de vista de la definición de Brasil a favor del Mercosur” (Peña 2001). In contrast, 
Franco was a less lively politician and was aware that he would rule for a period shorter 
than a whole presidential term. However, he appointed a cabinet in which ranked such 
figures as Celso Amorim, Rubens Ricupero and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, all o f them 
openly aligned with Mercosur. Besides, he approved of Itamaraty to continue designing 
and furthering the blueprints of what would conclude in the signature o f the Protocol. 
The influence o f Itamaraty is also stated by Lacalle (2001), who deems that, “del lado de 
Brasil, yo digo que tanto en el periodo de Collor como en el de Itamar Franco fue  
Itamaraty la que llevó la conducción de la política exteriorM. The coincidence between 
Lacalle and Cavallo stems from their rejection to consider Mercosur as anything else than 
a free trade zone. Hence, they see the political leadership (the presidents) as defenders of 
a commercial, intergovernmental project, and blame the public bureaucracies (the 
diplomatic officials and their grasp over the cancilleres) for the supranational bias that 
the bloc allegedly suffered.
Also Peña believes that the foreign ministries accomplished a crucial task in 
negotiating the agreements and organizing the meetings, although he underlines the part
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taken by the Ministries of Economy. In his words, “la participación de los ministros de 
Economía fue muy fuerte. Nosotros, como GMC, participábamos de las reuniones 
formales e informales... Por cierto, las informales eran las que realmente importaban 
entre los ministros, de donde surgía el impulso económico que le daba contenido al 
impulso político que venía de los presidentes” (Peña 2001). Ten years later, presidential 
thrust and informal meetings were still working as the heart of the process.
The shape of the agreement was not defined until the last minute. Lacalle 
remembers that in 1994 there was a heated discussion in Olivos concerning the final 
draft. He was there together with his foreign minister Abreu and, irritated by a 
mistreatment provided by the Argentine foreign minister Cavallo, decided not to sign. 
What was at stake was the unanimity rule, required by the smaller countries. Finally, the 
quarrel was solved and the agreement reached. Lacalle’s (2001) description of his 
negotiating team is eloquent: “Uruguay tuvo una muy buena conjunción: un presidente 
al que le gustan estos temas y que es hiperactivo, un canciller de una gran lucidez 
[Abreu] y un ministro de Economía de un vuelo intelectual muy grande [Posadas]... 
Creo que el equipo uruguayo era, desde el presidente hasta los negociadores, muy 
trabajador”. It is remarkable that the president himself was negotiating. The presidents 
o f the smaller countries exhibited a high profile, by all accounts not inferior to that of the 
larger ones. As to Paraguay, Lacalle (2001) affirms that “el presidente Wasmosy fue un 
gran motor de la integración”, just to immediately add that, “normalmente, en las 
reuniones procurábamos los dos chicos estar de acuerdo
Institutional choice was not easy in 1994, and its evaluation is not consensual 
today. It is arguable that gradualism in the means went side by side with ambition in the 
ends. Cozendey (2001) explains that, “en la vision de las autoridades brasileñas, en ese 
momento de Ouro Preto no se negaba la posibilidad de llegar a tener una 
institucionalidad más desarrollada u órganos más evolucionados, sino que la idea era 
hacerlo conforme fuera necesario por el avance del proceso de integración”. The most 
critical proceeding, he states, was the negotiation over the CET, as it would define the 
character of the process: either a free trade zone or a customs union. Guelar (2001) sees 
the final decision as continuity rather than either rupture or a leap forward, since “la 
decision de la unión aduanera fu e  la confirmación del espíritu iniciar.
The consequential decision not to create a tribunal aroused from the juridical 
nature of Mercosur. No organ was needed to rule on a basis if, as Pereira (2000) claims,
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“o Mercosul nào tern direito comunitàrio (since there are neither direct effect nor 
supremacy of regional law over domestic law) mas, em todo o caso, direito da 
integrando”. Not all analysts usually acknowledge the absence of community law.
The institutional drawbacks o f the structure defined in 1994 are not limited to 
dispute settlement but they also affect decision-making. Gra9a Lima (2000) grieves over 
the fact that “o Mercosul sofre do facto  de que nào se logra um executivo do Mercado 
Comum, nem sempre é possível tomar decisoes consensuáis... Os técnicos... precisam  
consultar ao superior”. The political escalation of technical issues has weakened the 
institutional structure of Mercosur.
The appraisal of Ouro Preto’s aftermath is not conclusive yet. Sanguinetti, for 
example, believes that the 1994 Protocol constitutes one of the most positive 
benchmarks. In his words, “yo no creo que en el 89-90 haya habido un cambio 
s ig n ific a tiv o only in Ouro Preto does Mercosur acquire ”una configuración mayor”, 
becoming the actual turning point of the project (Sanguinetti 2001). In contrast, Alfonsin 
laments that the outcome o f  the process is far from inclusive and participatory. 
According to him, “la actual estructura institucional del Mercosur excluye en gran 
medida la infraestructura de participación: los partidos políticos, las asociaciones 
intermedias, los sindicatos y la principal expresión de la democracia representativa que 
son los parlamentos" (Alfonsín 2001: 7). Guelar even questions the whole significance 
of the developments occurred throughout the 1990s. In this decade, he says, “se perdio 
esa esencia, por eso yo pienso que la esencia del Mercosur es recuperar ese espíritu 
fundacional que todavía no está patentado ni en Asunción ni en Ouro Preto. Asunción y 
Ouro Preto son mucho más expresiones del segundo andarivel que del primero y 
fundacional’ (Guelar 2001).
Conclusion
The first stages of Mercosur were relatively smooth partly because they entailed 
negative rather than positive integration (Bouzas 2001) -except for the GET. 
Intergovernmental bargaining was the mechanism employed to advance the process 
through momentous agreements. Henceforth, the process would not require decision­
making institutions or even regulatory ones, since deadlines were agreed and fixed in 
advance and were expected to enter into force automatically. Likewise, the European 
Union leaders had chosen the easier path by mid-‘80s when they relaunched integration
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aiming at the single market -thus reducing barriers— rather than at economic union -  
what would have implied positive and dramatic measures. The main difference between 
both regions stems form the previous institutionalization of the HU, which allowed a 
combination -albeit variable over time— of positive and negative procedures.
One of the remarkable characteristics of Mercosur is the difficulty to single out 
its founding fathers. No leader accomplished the task that Jean Monnet, Robert 
Schuman, or Altiero Spinelli had played in Europe. When asked, some protagonists or 
observers would mention Alfonsin and Sarney, others Menem and Collor de Melo. Their 
roles were mixed and quite more complex though. Danese recognizes that presidential 
summits, for which bureaucracies work hard, were benchmarks of the process. However, 
he underlines that “la diplomacia presidencial no es un hecho de politico externa 
sencillamente, es un hecho de politico interna” (Danese 2001).
The presidents faced the challenge of creating an international organization 
without limiting their future room for maneuver. Students of institutions recognize the 
importance of political elites and their goals but, as Milner (1993: 347) points out, they 
do not always discuss “how to reconcile the influence of elites and institutions when they 
conflict.” In Mercosur, the political elites -especially presidents and chancellors— 
prevented such conflicts from arising by not creating institutions that could restrain them 
further.
It is somehow bewildering that liberal intergovernmentalism was crafted to 
account for a partially supranational European Union, but cannot fully explain a pure 
intergovernmental phenomenon such as Mercosur. Likewise, neither delegation nor 
pooling were chosen as preferred institutional arrangement, since institutions were kept 
negligible. Regarding the European construction, Moravcsik (1998a) claims that 
economic interests prevailed over geopolitical or ideological reasons even in the “least 
likely” case as De Gaulle’s policy toward European integration. This chapter is intended 
to show that Mercosur did not follow such a path, but a more politics-oriented one that 
depended heavily on political motivations and executive leadership.
After the transition stage was accomplished, in January 1995, Mercosur would 
undergo almost five years of cyclical stop-and-go. Bouzas (2001) calls the 1995-1998 
period as “the age of the markets”, and depicts it as a  time in which politicization 
receded as business carried the day. In contrast, Seixas Correa (1999) distinguishes two 
periods between the establishment of the customs union and the beginning of the crisis in
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1998, and characterizes them by the sustained involvement of the presidents oriented 
towards the implementation o f  the agreements and the deepening of the process. Next 
chapter will assess the degree to which missing regional institutions and proactive 
presidents -backed on domestic institutions—  continued to characterize M ercosur’s 
operation.
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C H A PT E R  10
PO LICY-M AK ING  A N D  C R ISIS M A NA G EM ENT  
T h e s p e c ia l  r e g im e s  ( a u t o m o b i le s  a n d  s u g a r )  a n d  th e  1 9 9 9  c r is i s
Introduction
This chapter focuses on three main events along the short history of Mercosur. 
Two of them regard the special regimes that were established since the beginning of the 
process and are still in force, i.e. automobiles and sugar. The third one concerns the 
outburst and management of the most serious crisis that the bloc had to face so far, the 
one triggered by the Brazilian devaluation of 1999* The methodology draws to some 
extent on the neo-transactional approach that Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998) have 
developed in order to assess integration, as it is especially sensitive to different policy 
areas and day-to-day politics. However, it also benefits from the liberal approach to 
preference formation, as developed by Moravcsik (1998).
As discussed in chapter 5, Mercosur is as uneasy a matter for neotransactionalism 
as it is for intergovemmentalism. This is so because neotransactionalism regards society 
as the departure point for integration, as transnational transactors increase their 
exchanges and demand that national or transnational authority accommodate regulations 
and policies to the new situation. Mercosur, instead, is an outcome of the political will of 
national governments, which only thereafter brought about demands for further action.
Originally conceived o f to account for European integration, neotransactionalism 
stressed the significance of four main actors in pushing forward the process: national 
states, transnational transactors, the European Commission, and the European Court of 
Justice. The latter two are supranational institutions that do not exist in Mercosur, a fact 
that, added to the prevailing lack o f importance of transnational transactors, leave 
national states alone as main actors.75 Therefore, no supranational bargainers but national 
officials have accomplished most crucial roles, and this chapter attempts to determine the 
role played by each o f them in some key events.
In order to explain supranational governance in the European context, Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz (1998: 19) call on “the rule-centered logic o f institutionalization,” 
by which transactors would demand clearer and more predictable rules as
75 The main contrast with liberal intergovemmentalism is that national governments respond neither to 
domestic pressures nor to increasing interdependence but instead take the initiative of pursuing 
integration.
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interdependence increases. In Mercosur, although increasing interdependence has created 
the need to manage a growing number of crises and coordination problems, transactors 
seem to demand (particular) decisions rather than (general) rules. For such a task -the  
argument o f this research goes—, national presidents were by and large perceived as 
abler -m ore accessible, more responsive, more effective, faster— than any other actors 
or channels to get decisions made. Therefore, this chapter looks for traces of presidential 
intervention as both policy-crafters and dispute-settlers, in order to assess the real 
magnitude o f the role played by the chief executives.
Special regime: automobiles
There are many reasons why cars have become a central issue to the integration 
process. In the first place, the national bases o f the automobile industry are being 
undermined everywhere by global competition. Furthermore, it would be improper to 
speak o f an integrated world automobile market, as the sector is developing in a set o f 
sub-regional processes -organized into regional clusters rather than worldwide (Bastos 
Tigre et al 1999). In the second place, cars are believed to be for Mercosur the 
equivalent to coal and steel for the early European Community. This is so for it is the 
sector in which intra-industrial complementation have developed most, and also because 
it is a dynamic sector as regards the expansion of both investment and labor markets. In 
the third place, the automobile industry acquired a special status as the only sector that, 
established since the first integrative steps, persisted despite all the subsequent changes. 
As key Argentine negotiator Roberto Lavagna pointed out, this is ‘W único acuerdo 
sectorial que sobrevivió al cambio metodológico de 1990, [constituyendo] un ejemplo 
exitoso de expansión de la producción, modernización tecnológica y modernización de 
productos y procesos con un razonable equilibrio entre las partes” (Lavagna 1999: 7- 
8). According to the same analyst, the reason for this outcome was that “el sector 
automotriz tuvo fuerza política suficiente como para impedir que se destruyera el 
proyecto sectorial’ (IRI 2000). Whether sectoral interests had the political strength that 
Lavagna claims or not, the decision to continue with the sectoral agreements in this area 
was not politically contested. Instead, there was a coincidental decision by Argentina and 
Brazil to go on with such a sectoral strategy that was heralded, defended and rescued -  
when in jeopardy—  by the national executives.
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The automobile industry represented huge investments and many thousands of 
jobs for Argentina and Brazil. Its relevance for and impact on Mercosur becomes clear 
when analyzing the whole process of negotiations and renegotiations that established and 
kept working the special regime. Both the weight of the actors concerned and the 
massive investments in the area have turned it into a very sensitive issue for Argentine 
and Brazilian national governments -especially for the former, as the performance of the 
automobile industry accounted for half the increase of the whole Argentinean industry 
between 1990 and 1994.
The foundations that foster integration between the national automobile 
industries were established by Protocol 21, included in the Economic Complementation 
Agreement N° 14 that Argentina and Brazil signed at the end of 1990. It was explicitly 
defined as provisory and its terms were supposed to be renegotiated in a few years. 
Indeed, Protocol 21 was eliminated four years later, when the signature of the Ouro 
Preto protocol in December 1994 established the customs union. In its place, the CMC’s 
Decision 29/94 created an Ad Hoc Technical Committee that was requested to elaborate, 
before June 1, 1995, a proposal for a Common Car Regime that should come into force 
on January 1, 2000. Meanwhile, a bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil, 
added to Decision 29/94, guaranteed reciprocal acknowledgment o f the national regimes 
still in force in Argentina and Brazil.76 7 Both partners also agreed not to introduce 
unilateral restrictions on trade within the Free Trade Zone. From June 1995 on, bilateral 
agreements could be modified only in order to increase intra-regional trading exchanges, 
but not to bestow advantages to the respective industries with the purpose of attracting 
investment. However, this story would dramatically change shortly afterwards.
According to Eaton (2000: 363), “the first step in policy analysis is identification 
o f all the relevant actors who have stakes in and the power to affect the outcome of a 
policy process.” Therefore, the following part presents the sequence o f the crisis and its 
negotiation process, to subsequently single out the actors that took part at every time
76 According to ADEFA’s (Asociación de Fábricas de Automotores de Argentina) figures, investment in 
the sector reached 20.000 million dollars between 1991 and 1998 -only in Argentina and only 
considering terminal plants (Sajem 1999).
77 The Argentine Special Regime, implemented in 1991, consisted of compensating imports with exports 
and was expected to last until the end of 1999. The regime encouraged the assembly plants to register a 
fair balance of trade through levying a tariff of 2% for each non-compensated dollar. For its part, the 
Brazilian Popular Car Regime was admitted to endure until December 1996 (Sajem 1999).
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and analyze the role played by businesspeople, bureaucrats and government officials. The 
goal is to determine the veto power held by each player and to evaluate their strategies 
and impact, in order to gauge the relative importance o f the actions taken by the 
presidents and their effective consequences.
The remaking of the automobile regime and the 1995 crisis
Between 1990 and 1996, there was a blossoming increase of intra-regional trade
of cars as a consequence of tariff lifting and the agreements aimed at balancing imports 
and exports (see table 10.1).7S However, by mid-1995 Brazil was suffering from 
economic distress as a result o f the Mexican crisis. Also Argentina was facing economic 
turmoil, although its public and financial sectors were more solid than Brazil’s. 
Automobile production remained stable in Argentina just because of its exports to Brazil, 
what generated a growing imbalance that exceeded the proportion accepted by the 
treaties and raised bitter complaints by Brazilian producers. The government was 
expected to take protective measures, but these were supposed to contemplate the 
Mercosur agreements and to be addressed toward extra-regional trade.
- • Table 10*1 ^
Evolution of bilateral trade in the automotive sector! betw een  
' ■ ' ’ ’ ■ ‘ Brazil (in units of vehicles) v
Year
1990
From Argentina to Brazil 
0
From Brazil to Argentina 
350
Volume of trade 
350
1991 3,900 17,000 20,900
1992 13,200 64,500 77,700
1993 23,700 39,500 63.200
1994 35,200 31,000 6 6 ,2 0 0
1995 32,600 20,300 52.900
1996* 36,800 15,600 52.400
* First semester.
SOURCE: Gazeta Mercantil Latinoamericana, December 15-21, 1996: 9-1.
The crisis was finally triggered in June 13, Tuesday, when Brazil announced that 
it would limit imports of automobiles in the second half of the year to 50 percent of the 
total of imports in the first half o f the year. Surprisingly, the Provisional Measure 2410 
considered no exception regarding Mercosur. This fact caught observers unaware and 78
78 It should be noted that, besides free trade, there were other reasons contributing to a surprising 
performance, such as macroeconomic factors and economic recovery (Bastos Tigre et al. 1999).
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angered the Argentine authorities. The Brazilian presidential spokesman, Sergio Amaral, 
communicated the decision to two Argentine negotiators that had flown to Brasilia, 
Jorge Campbell and Carlos Magarmos. The Brazilian cabinet itself was divided about the 
decision, as finance minister Pedro Malán opposed restrictions to trade whereas planning 
minister José Serra supported them. Both were close aides to the president so he usually 
mediated between them, but this time the hard-liners carried the day.
Next day, Argentine papers covered their front pages with the alarming news: 
“limitó Brasil la importación de autos argentinos”19 Actually, the quotas were not 
limited to Argentina; the issue became highly sensitive to the health of Mercosur because 
Argentine officials and producers considered that Cardoso’s decree violated the Ouro 
Preto protocol, which guaranteed free trade between all Mercosur partners. However, 
this protocol also set up the requisite of balanced trade, so the Brazilian government 
justified the measures on the lack of equilibrium concerning imports and exports.
The conflict was one of the most serious that Mercosur had faced thus far, and 
was furthermore exacerbated by the proximity of the Mercosur Economic Forum This 
was a gathering organized by the World Economic Forum, and was scheduled for later 
that very week -from June 18 to 20 in Sâo Paulo. On June 14, Menem threatened to 
boycott the summit meeting of Mercosur presidents that was to take place as the highest 
happening of the Forum. Menem’s menace brought about febrile negotiations aimed at 
preventing such a negative incident for the reputation of Mercosur.
Cardoso ultimately decided to postpone the entering into force o f the decree for 
30 days, faced with Menem’s strong stance. It is somewhat puzzling that either second 
level officials or the presidents themselves carried out the negotiations. Argentine foreign 
minister Torcuato Di Telia was stuck in Rome due to an air strike, but his deputy 
Femando Pet relia did not take part in the process either. Only the number three of 
Palacio San Martin, Jorge Campbell, got involved. The presidents went directly to the 
point and held conversations in order to work out a solution. As spelled by an Argentine 
journalist, “más allá de los problemas de transporte de Di Telia, lo concreto es que 
desde un principio la crisis fue  manejada personalmente por Menem con más 
asesoramienio del ministro de Economía, Domingo Cavallo, que de la cancillería”*0 7980
79 Clarín 14-06-1995.
80 Clarín 16-06-1995: 5.
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According to public sources, Cardoso himself called Menem on the phone at 5 PM  on 
Thursday 15, and sent him a personal letter at 8 PM. This time, direct presidential 
intervention was not limited to the main countries: Paraguay’s Wasmosy and Uruguay’s 
Sanguinetti also offered themselves as personal mediators in the dispute between their 
bigger partners.
Over the weekend, Menem responded to Cardoso through another letter, in 
which he accepted to concur to the regional meeting. It was formally agreed that all 
presidents would meet together, and thereafter Menem and Cardoso would hold a 
bilateral summit. In spite of the provisional accord, Brazil ratified the validity o f the 
restrictions but accepted to negotiate them with Argentina. Strange enough, no partner 
ever mentioned the possibility o f appealing to the Protocol of Brasilia, the institutional 
instrument by which Mercosur partners are supposed to solve their controversies.
Shortly afterwards, the discussion leaked into the Brazilian administration. While 
the official stand was to insist on the establishment of a national automobile regime, the 
cabinet hawks criticized the negotiators who, at Ouro Preto, agreed to a regional regime 
with a country (Argentina) that already had a domestic one at work. On Monday 19, 
Menem and Cardoso finally held the bilateral summit but only agreed to sign a 
declaration asking to keep on with the negotiations. The discussion was made public, and 
neither Wasmosy nor Sanguinetti were able to stop it. Cardoso explicitly asked Menem 
to act "políticamente, para que las partes se equilibren. Lo más importante es la 
voluntad política” . Again, no mention to institutional procedures was made. In turn, 
Menem replied that “podemos negociar, pero en el marco de los acuerdos firmados en 
el Mercosur, [que son] inmodificables porque en la Argentina son ya una ley superior 
de la Nació?!.”81 The Argentine position was vocally more institutional, whereas the 
Brazilian kept focusing on the political will.
Next day, the situation took a dramatic turn around. Menem and Cavallo 
admitted that the negotiations of 1994 had left Brazil disadvantaged and slowed down 
with their accusations, while a heated discussion arose within the Argentina cabinet. Di 
Telia and Cavallo blamed each other, and the latter should acknowledge the reasonability 
of Brazil’s claims when, during the bilateral negotiation, he was informed that Mercosur
81 Clarín 20-07-95: 2-3.
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technical committees had never met in order to adjust and enforce the automobile 
agreement.
President Cardoso finally pledged a negotiated settlement of the dispute and 
suspended application of the quotas to Mercosur partners. Negotiations proceeded and 
resulted in a two-party agreement: Brazil would not apply the quotas to Argentina for 
the remainder of 1995, and the two countries would begin negotiations to establish a 
definitive common regime that would last until the year 2000 (Cason 2000). Menem 
officiated as the only spokesman of the accord.
Who and how?
The automobile issue was considered by both Argentina and Brazil as highly 
sensitive because it meant much more than commerce. As the Argentine industry 
secretary Carlos Magarinos noted, “the real dispute is over investments” (Cason 2000: 
31). Therefore, not only trade balance but also industrial planning and even 
macroeconomic stability were at stake. This fact explains why national governments 
were so receptive to the arising conflicts and so eager to solve them promptly. What it 
does not explain, however, is why it was the presidents themselves who got directly 
involved in an area that could be plausibly managed in a technical way by lesser public 
officials and domestic bureaucracies -whether diplomatic or technical.
In spite of the economic importance of the sector, the negotiation of the common 
automobile regime was called “a case with no economic groups involved” (Sajem 1999: 
71). This does not mean that vested interests were absent, but instead that they lie on a 
few huge transnational companies that pursue their goals with little coordination with 
each other -rather than on a set of firms among which a formal and endurable link exists 
so as to permit a common policy. The transnational companies were not preexistent to 
the integration process, so they designed their strategies on the basis of the process but 
were used to dealing directly with the national governments since the beginning. For 
their part, governments had been quite receptive to the companies’ demands and kept 
aligned with the companies’ preferences, as was manifest in the maintenance o f the 
automobile regime. As a result, the companies used to get what they looked for: direct 
links with the decision-makers and active policies in their favor. Also governments were 
satisfied, as they desired to attract investment and create jobs. Brazilian Provisional
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Measure 2410 disrupted the cross-the-border alignment between governments and 
companies, splitting up the interests along national lines.
The automobiles market was anything but free. Government intervention 
guaranteed not only positive incentives but also protective measures, both against extra- 
and intra-regional competition. Such intervention was not only accepted but demanded 
by auto firms: as a former Brazilian minister put it, “the auto firms love quotas” (Cason 
2000: 30). On the Argentine side Oscar Salvi, director of Toyota Argentina, defended 
the protective measures as he stated that “the traditional policies of Brazil... have been, 
if not imperialistic, at least overwhelming” (Cason 2000: 31).
Therefore, carmakers’ strategies were not market-oriented but government- 
oriented. The Brazilian government was well aware, and it feared that current trade 
regulations for automobiles would influence transnational companies’ investments in 
Mercosur to Argentina’s benefit. On the other hand, many in Argentina feared that their 
country would become a “province o f Brazil” had the situation not be reverted, as 
bluntly stated by well-known political journalist Mariano Grondona.82 The only surviving 
sector of the original integration project was, paradoxically, one of the most deeply 
rooted in national sentiments.
The dynamics of conflict and conflict-resolution in the automobile sector was the 
outcome of the interests at stake and the strategies of the involved actors. Systematically, 
the preferred option was the constant delay in the fulfillment o f treaties, along with the 
protraction of the negotiations aimed at settling up a permanent agreement. Likewise, the 
favored course of action was always based on informal, bilateral (i.e. Argentina-Brazil) 
negotiations, never the request o f formal procedures. Any time that the option to recur 
to the mechanisms established in the Protocol of Brasilia or the Ouro Preto Protocol 
arouse, businessmen insisted on the impossibility of respecting them “for the time being, 
at least” (Sajem 1999: 79).
The 1995 crisis in the auto sector ended up in the same way as all the subsequent 
conflicts in the sector would: the procedure was informal and bilateral negotiation -  
ultimately, presidential diplomacy— , the result was the maintenance of the status quo. 
Neither buildup nor spillover turned out, but for most observers the preservation of
82 “La Argentina, provincia de Brasil” (La Nación 28-01-1996).
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Mercosur was good enough -given the poor regional antecedents and the magnitude of 
the conflicts.
After only four years in place, few people were ready to consider Mercosur 
institutional performance as satisfactory. Fernando Henrique Cardoso himself would 
strongly criticize some of its features: “nos, brasileiros, inveníamos a teoría de um 
Mercosul nao institucional, bascado na relaçâo dire ta dos g ovemos e, 
fundamentalmente, dos presidentes. Quando hâ crises, eu, Menem, Wasmosy e 
Sanguinetti conversamos. Decidimos até problemas menores, como, por exemplo, se se 
pode ou nao financiar a produçâo disso ou daquilo. Bobagem. Presidente nao tem que 
se meter nisso. Se diminuí o aumenta a cota de automóveis, isso acaba na nossa máo. 
Tive de resolver um problema desses com o Menem, em Sâo Paulo” (Cardoso and 
Toledo 1998: 126). What Cardoso calls a Brazilian-crafted theory, only to subsequently 
qualify it as a mistaken one, is not other thing than the way Mercosur has operated since 
its inception. Interpresidentialism, the term here comed to identify such an operation, 
accomplished the function to keep Mercosur working -however despised it uses to be. 
The presidents, because of their institutional capabilities and the traditional role of the 
presidential office, were targeted as the only plausible suppliers of rules, enforcement and 
dispute allocation. Therefore, every demand -from  the most significant to the most 
trivial, either coming from national producers or from foreign governments— was 
channeled directly to the president. As regards the 1995 automobile crisis, this was a 
predictable, reasonable, and successful procedure.
Special regime: sugar
The choice o f the sugar regime as a leading case for gauging presidential 
intervention in Mercosur was not made by accident. Since it has often been selected as an 
issue for underlining the importance of either national parliaments (Vigevani et al. 2000) 
or social actors (Vigevani et al. 2000; Lucca 2001; Romero 2001) in Mercosur, the 
hypotheses advanced in the present research face a direct challenge. Hence, the 
measurement of the relative weight of each actor -i.e. executives, legislatures and social 
actors— in shaping the final outcome is likely to feed controversy and, by so doing, 
stimulate research and shed further light upon the operation o f Mercosur.
The presidential communiqué issued in the wake o f the CMC meeting held in 
Buenos Aires on June 30, 2000, comprised thirty-one items. Two o f them referred to
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cars and sugar respectively, and they manifested the differences that still remained 
between both issues. Paragraph 14 celebrated the progress done in the negotiations 
regarding the consolidation, complementation and productive specialization of a regional 
automobile policy. Subsequently, paragraph 15 advocated that a similar agreement was 
reached for the sugar sector, with a view to integrating sugar to the free trade zone and 
the common tariff. However, the requirement for any proposals was delayed to the next 
CMC meeting. Between 1985 and 2000, no improvement in either cooperation or 
integration had been achieved in this area. Stagnation was evident; its causes were not.
The sugar regime: nature and conflicts
Sugar was a hot issue since the beginning of the negotiation process. Argentina
and Brazil had, and still have, opposing interests deriving from a high differential of 
productivity. Such differential is not due to a diverse utilization of technology, as it is 
similar in both countries, but to the indirect subsidies that Brazil allocate to the 
production of sugar cane.83 This policy dates back to 1975, when the first oil crisis led 
the Brazilian government to encourage the use of cane alcohol as a proportion of 
gasoline -the so called Programa Prodicool, considered a strategic choice of paramount 
importance by the military administration (Favero 2000). Although the proportion varied 
over time, it never ranked below 20%. As a result, the usual share of alcohol in the sales 
of any given sugar plant jumped from 8% to 40%, distorting both costs and prices. 
Henceforth, the production of sugar was artificially increased, and it became not the main 
product o f cane but a byproduct tradable at marginal prices (Lucca 2001).
The commercial effects of the differential of productivity are sizeable. The 
subsidies to cane croppers have rendered Brazil the first producer of sugar in the world, 
its share in world trade ranking close to 30%. To properly assess the magnitude of this 
figure, it should be taken into account that sugar is one of the most protected 
commodities in world trade (Favero 2000; Romero 2001). On the other hand, Argentina 
faces a difficult situation originated in the tough world competition and aggravated by 
the domestic conditions in which the production of sugar takes place. Argentine crops 
mainly spread over five provinces, the most important o f which are Tucuman, Salta and
83 Although it is also true that economy of scale, transportation infrastructure, and the weather are more 
favorable to Brazil than to Argentina as regards sugar production.
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Jujuy -all of them located in the poor Northwestern region.84 Sugar constitutes the basis 
of the regional economies in all three provinces, and it is the most significant 'source of 
employment -both direct and indirect— only after the public administration.85 Given the 
federal arrangements established by the Argentine constitutional regime, and in the wake 
of the social and economic reasons just mentioned, the senators and deputies 
representing the Northwestern provinces make up one of the most solid political blocs 
when it comes to defend their constituencies in Congress.
The Brazilian position has always insisted on the prompt inclusion of sugar into 
•the Mercosur free trade zone. To the contrary, Argentina has delayed such an occurrence 
through diverse strategies. Hence, the most conciliating sectors in Argentina have 
claimed to only gradually incorporate sugar into the free trade zone. Their project was to 
establish a transition period spanning over ten years, in which the sector should create 
protective mechanisms that guarantee the supply to the domestic market —as no 
economic restructuring was planned. On the other hand, Brazil’s proposal called for a 
transition period no longer than twelve months; the two stances were impossible to 
reconcile. Furthermore, time was not the only source of disagreement between the two 
countries. Some of the Argentina’s toughest sectors have even asked Brazil to abolish 
the Proalcool system, a demand that was straightforwardly rejected. Brazil claims not 
only economic reasons but also strategic, political and ecological motivations for 
sustaining this plan, so it is not likely to give it in anytime in the near fiiture.
Much as happened with most of the issues and controversies raised along the 
short history o f Mercosur, Uruguay and Paraguay stayed out of the front line. The 
former did never represent a problem, since it imported all the sugar for domestic 
consumption from Brazil. Uruguay only produced a minimum amount of sugar, just 
enough to cover the American quota of imports. Instead, it preferred to increase its 
productivity by substituting crops, while importing refined Brazilian sugar (Fávero 
2000). On the other hand, Paraguay recently started to constitute a minor problem, as its 
sugar plantations were expanded in the last years and its government and croppers are 
decided to keep on with the activity. Paraguay supports a program similar to the 
Brazilian ProálcooU even if its dimensions are quite more reduced (Fávero 2000).
84 To the contrary, in Brazil sugar is mostly grown in the wealthy states of the South.
85 Tucumán alone accounts for about 60% of the overall national production. The activity is calculated to 
generate some 50.000 direct jobs and 500.000 indirect jobs, over an area of roughly 27.000 kms2.
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Given the complexity of the issue at stake and the contradictory interests that had 
prevented any agreement, the CMC resolved to create a unique ad-hoc committee in 
1994 and established the sugar special regime. Through three decisions taken between 
August 1994 and December 1996,86 the so called Grupo Ad Hoc was commissioned to 
define a regime that should adequate the sugar sector to the customs union -i.e. to the 
common external tariff and the intra-zone free trade zone. The parameters were two: 
first, the proposal should aim at the gradual liberalization o f intra Mercosur trade of 
sugar; second, it should seek the neutralization o f distortions stemming from the 
asymmetries between different national policies regarding the sector. The deadline was 
originally set to November 1, 1995, but it was later protracted to May 31, 1997. The 
latter date would bring about the first o f the two serious crises that Mercosur would face 
as a consequence of the sugar issue; the second one would take place in 2000. Both are 
analyzed in the following section.
Who and how?
Between 1995 and 1997, Argentina acrimoniously questioned the ‘Mercosurness’ 
of Brazilian subsidies to sugar. According to senator Alberto Tell (PJ, Jujuy), “contra el 
azúcar subsidiado la Argentina no puede competir, porque tiene un régimen 
desregulado y de libre competencia.”87 Cane croppers and their representatives were 
demanding no additional protection, but instead that sugar imported from Brazil be 
charged as much as the one coming from any other country. In the same vein, Brazilian 
deputy Paulo Börnhausen (PFL, Santa Catarina) would counter that “Argentina exporta 
trigo a partir de una cultura fortemente subsidiada. Esta característica da sua 
produgäo de trigo toma inviável para os produtores brasileiros terem condigöes de 
competigao justas ou ao menos razoavelmente aceitáveis para permitir que concorram 
no mercado intemo com as importagoes advindas da Argentina”.88 These positions 
delineated the scenario in which both congresses would confront each other, embracing 
defensive strategies on behalf of their respective interest groups.
In May 1997, the Argentine Congress passed a bill (Ley 24.822) charging imports 
of Brazilian sugar with the same tariff as non-Mercosur countries. It was intended to be
86 CMC Decision 7, August 5, 1994; CMC Decision 19, December 17, 1994; and CMC Decision 16, 
December 16, 1996,
87 Clarín 04-09-1997.
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in force as long as the asymmetries caused by the subsidies to the Proálcool Program 
subsisted. Although the Brazilian authorities deny to have exerted any pressure on the 
Argentine government,8 9 Menem vetoed the law through decree 471/97. The alleged 
reason was that it opposed Mercosur treaties, a coincident stance with the position 
officially expressed by Brazil (Vigevani et al. 2000).
Some months later the dispute over the status of sugar trade was back, and by 
September 1997 the crisis reached a peak. On Wednesday 3, the Argentinean Senate 
rejected the executive veto, following the House’s position adopted earlier in June. 
Notwithstanding the opposite stance manifested by economy minister Roque Fernández 
and foreign minister Guido Di Telia, the congressional insistence was decided by 
unanimity. The electoral campaign was under way, and no legislator intended to be 
exposed to criticism by leaving a free road to sugar imports from Brazil.
The argument escalated bitterly after the overriding of the veto. Reaction on the 
Brazilian side needed not be waited for long. In the Brazilian congress "hubo amenazas 
de represalias, dirigidas a limitar las importaciones de trigo argentino. Además de su 
importancia económico-social, el episodio repercutió de forma especialmente intensa 
por haber ocurrido en un contexto político delicado, marcado por divergencias 
públicas entre Brasil y Argentina respecto de la reforma del Consejo de Seguridad de 
las Naciones Unidas” (Seixas Correa 1999: 252). By public divergences, Seixas Correa 
referred to the obstacles that Argentine diplomacy was putting to Brazil’s securing of a 
permanent chair at the UN Security Council on behalf of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, should an institutional reform finally came into being. However, these 
divergences were no more than a background condition: the real issue rested with 
conflicting sectoral interests and their parliamentary echoing.
The Brazilian executive kept a prudent stand all along the conflict. Cardoso and 
his aides were aware that the Argentine legislators were acting under the pressures of the 
electoral campaign, so they opted to trust the efforts the Menem administration was 
doing to reduce the damage. The Argentine executive publicly condemned the 
congressional position, and eschewed plans that went from proposing a new bill revoking 
law 24.822 to appealing the constitutionality of the law before the Supreme Court.
88 O Estado de Sao Paulo 06-09-1997.
89 Gazeta Mercantil 25-05-1997
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Simultaneously, it requested its Brazilian counterpart more time to solve the problem. 
There were some officials on the Brazilian side -notably foreign minister Lampreia— 90 
who were not convinced about the authenticity of the Argentine executive, but the 
presidential choice was to concede some more time.
The situation seemed to be in a dangerous deadlock. According to Danese 
(2001), “en la reunion del Copacabana Palace ... se vio que las cosas estaban llegando 
a un punto que era insoportable, y que sería necesaria una intervención presidencial 
muy firm e para que las cosas pudieran avanzar; entonces se concertó (un encuentro 
* presidencial)”. On November 10, Menem traveled to Brasilia. This trip was not an 
isolated gesture but a pattern, o f which observers would come to notice in due time. In a 
later occasion, Brazilian deputy foreign minister would testify that “se observa ... un 
padrón de comportamiento según el cual las crisis comerciales en el Mercosur han sido 
superadas por entendimientos políticos en los más altos niveles, que invariablemente 
reafirman el compromiso común con la integración subregional... La visita de Estado 
del presidente Carlos Menem a Brasil, el 10 de noviembre de 1997, revertiría el clima 
negativo nuevamente creado con la crisis del azúcar en septiembre de 1997’ (Seixas 
Correa 1999: 252/3). However, the controversial law was still in force and a formal 
solution had not been found. Instead, the Argentine president was just adapting to a 
practice dating back to the Virreinato del Río de la Plata: “acátese, pero no se cumpla”. 
In ancient times such a practice worked against the rulings coming from Spain; now, they 
did alike against laws coming from the Argentine Congress.
The preeminence of the national executives vis-a-vis the Joint Parliamentary 
Commission and the national Congresses are better underscored by a further incident 
concerning the sugar issue. In August 24, 2000, the Argentine Congress passed a bill 
that, based on the usual arguments, aimed at protecting Argentine cane croppers from 
Brazilian competition. The law protracted the validity of Decree 797/1992, which had 
established a protection regime for the sugar industry and was to expire in December 
2000, and set no new deadlines. Brazilian officials issued condemnatory responses, 
whereas the Brazilian congress menaced to limit imports of food containing sugar from 
Argentina. President De la Rúa was upset about the legislative decision. He was
90 Gazeta Mercantil 05-09-1997.
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expected in Brasilia on August 31, when a South American summit would take place, 
and he was not pleased to be received by an unfriendly climate* After a bitter cabinet 
meeting, he sent his foreign minister91 92 to negotiate with the deputies from the 
northwestern provinces in order to avoid a “guerra entre los congresos del Brasil y la 
Argentina"P
If in November 1997 only the visit of president Menem to Brazil had allowed the 
softening of tensions raised by the disputes between the two assemblies, providing a 
temporary resolution for the crisis, in 2000 the risk of an outbidding conflict that could 
jeopardize the whole process looked greater. Mercosur had not yet overcome the effects 
of the 1999 crisis, and legislators from both countries were menacing retaliation even 
when no electoral campaign was underway. Members of the Joint Parliamentary 
Commission also played a part on the issue, but they could not reach an agreement 
(Mustapic 2000). On September 1, De la Rúa promised Cardoso that his government 
would not endorse the controversial law, taking the risk of bringing about a domestic 
conflict of power.
When things seemed to get worse, the Gordian knot was cut by President De la 
Rúa: on September 4 he vetoed the law, just to subsequently sign a resolution with the 
same contents! (Although it additionally established a limit of five years of validity.) The 
goal was twofold. On the one hand, the decision prevented an open-ended outbid 
between congresses through the expedient o f taking the issue out o f the legislative arena. 
On the other hand, a decree in place of a law would improve the executive power of 
negotiation, since it turned the Argentine president able to guarantee its Brazilian 
counterpart that the decree would be lift as soon as an agreement was reached -thus, 
without the need of going through a neither secure nor rapid legislative process.93 
Subsequently, both presidents agreed to initiate a round o f negotiations with a view to 
incorporating sugar into the free trade zone, in the line they had manifested in the 
communiqué of Buenos Aires on June 30 (paragraph 15).
91 The fact that it was the Argentine cancillería -and not other cabinet offices— which was handling the 
situation was acknowledged and welcomed by the Brazilian administration (Fávero 2000), as it 
highlighted the political relevance of the conflict.
92 “Ley de protección a la industria azucarera. El azúcar amargó al gabinete” (Clarín 30-08-2000).
93 “De la Rúa firmó una resolución y vetó una ley. El azúcar, protegido hasta el 2005” (Clarín 05-09- 
2000).
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This event shows how the presidents have chosen to take all responsibility -and  
power—  whenever Mercosur undergoes a serious conflict. They have done so even at 
the expense of relinquishing the likely benefits they could extract out of a two-level game 
(see Putnam 1988). To be sure, the presidents may no longer argue that domestic 
institutions keep their hands tied in order to obtain concessions from each other, since 
they have made plain that no actor stands over the presidential will.
Vigevani et al. (2000) argue that the sugar issue seems to expose the inadequacy 
of Mercosur structure to overcome the threats posed by negatively affected interest 
groups. They describe the process by which “grupos sociais e económicos argentinos e 
brasileiros organizaram-se em articulagdes políticas nacionais identificadas com a 
questdo para garantir seus interesses. Sua pressao buscou influir ñas decisoes dos 
respectivos parlamentares, ocasionando o enfrentamento entre os legislativos dos dois 
países, gerando urna crise diplomática” (Vigevani et al. 2000). As much as the 
evolution o f the crisis illustrates the limitations of Mercosur institutional structure, its 
resolution similarly illustrates the extent to which the recurring mechanism for dealing 
with such events was interpresidentialism.
The grand crisis of 1999;  management and outcomes
This section looks upon the crisis triggered by the 1999 devaluation of the
Brazilian currency and the ensuing reaction by the Argentine government. Its aftermath 
would drive Mercosur members to the conclusion that a tighter macroeconomic 
coordination and a more effective overlooking and implementation of the common 
agreements were needed -hence, to further efforts at relaunching the process as defined 
in the summits o f Buenos Aires (June 2000) and Florianópolis (December 2000).
The Brazilian devaluation and its aftermath
Along the 1990s, both Argentina and Brazil experienced periods of domestic
turbulence, either due to political -uncertain electoral outcomes— or economic -  
inflation or recession—  reasons. However, such difficulties were never undergone at the 
same time, what allowed integration to proceed as the largest Mercosur partners 
compensated each other in times of trouble. In 1999 the situation radically changed: both 
economies were simultaneously in recession, and Brazil was furthermore compelled to 
devaluate its currency in January, thus threatening to alter dramatically intra-regional 
trade and investment flows.
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Affected interests and receptive political leaders fostered a heated discussion in 
Argentina. The main request was that the government close the borders so as to prevent 
a flood of Brazilian exports from entering the domestic market -a s  well as a reciprocal 
runaway of local investments towards the now more profitable neighbor. As a result, by 
mid-1999 the government made resort to protective instruments at disposal according to 
WTO regulations and, especially, to those provided by ALADI. Brazil considered such 
resources to be a direct violation of Mercosur agreements, and vigorously menaced 
retaliation. Additionally, Brazilian officials charged the Argentine government with 
carrying out a foreign policy that directly undermined the regional unity, through an 
outspoken political and military alignment with the United States that went against 
Brazilian aspirations to regional coordination -and hereby, against its aimed regional 
leadership.94
The 1999 regional crisis had, as usually in Mercosur, national underpinnings. 
After a tough stmggle against market forces that pushed for a devaluation of the Real, 
the Cardoso administration gave in and decided to float its currency on January 13th. 
There were also political factors concurring to define the final outcome: some days 
earlier, former president Itamar Franco -by  then governor of the key state o f Minas 
Gerais— decided to default the debt his state had with the federal government. Although 
the defaulted amount was not large, the plausibility of a widespread fiscal disobedience 
alarmed foreign investors and creditors, further feeding the uncertainty and accelerating 
the crisis.
When the Brazilian decision to devaluate was taken, Menem was in the United 
States in an official visit. In Argentina, some criticism was raised pointing to the fact that 
the Cardoso administration had neither consulted nor informed its partner’s government 
about a decision that was so influential for Argentina. Both Menem and his economy 
minister, Roque Fernández, disregarded the critiques with two different arguments: for 
Menem, the measure was not technically a devaluation; for Fernández, a devaluation 
should logically be undertaken without previous warning. In any event, the contact 
between both presidents was so close that Menem received a phone call from Cardoso
94 The Brazilian government was upset by three stances of Argentine foreign policy: the status of extra- 
NATO military allied conceded to Argentina by the US government, the Argentine resistance to support 
the Brazilian claim for a permanent chair at the UN Security Council, and the Argentine permission for 
the deployment of American military troops in joint exercises near the Brazilian border.
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on January 14, while he was conceding an interview to an Argentine newspaper, to 
explain the situation and expected outcomes of the ongoing domestic process.95
The reaction in Argentina to the Brazilian decision was heterogeneous. Whereas 
the government remained calm and comprehensive o f its counterpart, many 
representatives o f the industrial sector and the media warned about the possibility o f  an 
“avalanche"’ of cheap goods from the giant neighbor.96 Fears of invasion of Brazilian 
products was first called “efecto B rasit\ to be later renamed “Brasil-dependencia”. The 
former label, somehow neutral, denoted a likely danger by contagion; the latter connoted 
a sentiment of subordination that would subsequently call for a protectionist reaction. 
The Menem administration took some rapid measures to relieve its domestic pressure, 
such as reducing some taxes, diminishing import tariffs for sensitive goods coming from 
non-Mercosur countries and asking the Brazilian government to eliminate distorting 
subsidies. Nothing was enough to dissipate the public concern, and the Unión Industrial 
Argentina (UIA) insisted to ask for a tariff raise.97
The months following the devaluation witnessed an increasing tension between 
the largest Mercosur members. All South American countries except Bolivia - th e  
smallest economy in the region—  and Argentina had adjusted their exchange rate after 
Brazil, but the Convertibility Plan prevented a similar response from Argentina. In 
February, the presidents and ministers of Argentina and Brazil met twice: first in Mexico, 
in the frame of a Rio Group meeting, later on the 12 in Sâo José dos Campos, Brazil. 
These summits, along with the ongoing Brazilian instability, were not enough to ease the 
apprehensions, so in April the Argentine government should act to appease its domestic 
front.
Between April and July, the Argentine executive issued three rulings aimed at 
balancing trade with Brazil. On April 19, Resolution 458 put in motion an antidumping 
procedure against steel imports; on July 14, Resolution 861 fixed import quotas for 
textiles; finally, on July 26, Resolution 911 incorporated to the Argentine legislation a 
norm of ALADI that would allow Argentina to apply safeguard measures. It did not 
mention any exception for Mercosur members, so it could be interpreted as an attempt to
95 “Menem prometió a los inversores que la Argentina no devaluará” (Clarín 14-01-1999).
96 “Efecto Brasil: temen avalancha de productos brasileños por la devaluación. Los industriales pedirán 
medidas de protección” (Clarín 17-01-1999).
97 “Los industriales insisten con subir los aranceles” (Clarín 22-01-1999).
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establish barriers to trade via the setting o f import quotas -what was in open conflict 
with Mercosur rules. The Brazilian government reacted strongly: for the first time since 
the creation o f the bloc, it announced -through undersecretary o f foreign trade José 
Alfredo Grafa Lima—  that all negotiations were suspended.98 9One year later Graga Lima 
(2000) would diplomatically downplay these events, preferring to speak of “commercial 
confrontation” rather than political crisis. However, the magnitude of the controversy 
can hardly be overlooked, as most key protagonists lived it as the most critical ever since 
1985.
During the hard times running between the Brazilian devaluation in January and 
the Argentine Resolution 911 in July, some progress had been made though. On April 
28, the first ruling of the Ad Hoc tribunal settled up after the Protocol of Brasilia was 
issued, generating expectations for a juridical institutionalization of Mercosur 
procedures. Shortly later, on June 7, Menem and Cardoso held a meeting in Olivos -first 
alone, then with their foreign ministers— in which they seemed to reach key agreements 
on fiscal responsibility and macroeconomic coordination. One week later, on June 14, 
they met again in Asunción in the friendly context of the Mercosur biannual summit, 
together with the presidents of Paraguay and Uruguay. However, by the end of July the 
dialog between Argentina and Brazil was dramatically broken. Domestic pressure for 
tougher measures was mounting on both sides and the prospects for Mercosur looked 
desperate. Paulo Skaf, chief of the Brazilian Asociación de Industriales Textiles, went as 
far as to state that “éste es el primer paso hacia el fin  del M e r c o s u r Could anybody 
prevent such a cheerless end?
Who and how?
In a letter sent to the temporary presidency of Mercosur in Montevideo, the 
Brazilian government accused Argentina o f perpetrating “an explicit violation of the 
Treaty of Asunción,” and denounced “an alarming retrocession in the development of the 
integration process”.100 After declaring a halt on all negotiations, Itamaraty asked for an 
urgent bilateral meeting to protest against the establishment o f quotas and to preclude its
98 “Presión por las medidas "proteccionistas" de la Argentina. El gobierno de Brasil pidió una reunión 
urgente del Mercosur” (Clarín 27-07-1999).
99 Idem.
100 “Maratón de reuniones en Buenos Aires. Argentina discutirá con Brasil la crisis comercial” (Clarín 
28-07-1999).
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generalization. In this regard, both administrations were internally split. The Argentine 
foreign ministry blamed secretary o f industry Alieto Guadagni for promoting the 
controversial resolutions, whereas the latter accused canciller Guido Di Telia for 
nurturing Brazilian distrust by unilaterally applying to NATO. In Brazil, hard-liners and 
soft-liners were inverted: while ministers of economy, Pedro Malan, and o f industry and 
trade, Clovis Carvalho, showed comprehension towards Argentina, foreign minister Luiz 
Felipe Lampreia was extremely harsh. Knowing that Menem was planning to travel to 
Brazil in August, Lampreia discouraged the attempt by publicly declaring, on Tuesday 
27, that the political climate was not good for a presidential summit. On Wednesday 28, 
Cardoso’s spokesman Georges Lamaziere added that the presidential visit “should be 
postponed for better times”.101
On Thursday 29, the Argentine presidential plane Tango 01 landed in Brasilia; 
Menem was on board. After having dinner with Cardoso in the presidential residence, the 
two presidents went out to a press meeting where they denied that there were any 
differences between the two countries. What factors explain such a sudden transit from 
bitter anger to intimate friendship?
Menem arrived in Brasilia from New Orleans, USA, where he was taking part in 
a hemispheric conference of energy ministers. The trip back home contemplated a 
technical stop in Manaos, in the north of Brazil, late on Thursday. On Wednesday 
morning, however, Di Telia suggested to Menem -when the latter was boarding towards 
New Orleans— to arrange a summit with Cardoso. Menem accepted. Di Telia was 
planning a non-conclusive meeting, in which both countries would harmonize positions 
while Argentina might also take advantage o f the stormy situation. The secretary general 
of the Argentine presidency, Alberto Kohan, had other plans.
Kohan was one of the closest men to the president. He was known for his 
disputes within the cabinet, in which he had confronted many ministers aiming to 
surround Menem with his own people of confidence. Menem’s style of command was 
shaped on a double-checking basis: he used to separately instruct two subordinates to 
carry out the same mission, so he would be able to control them both through one 
another. Kohan was his preferred emissary to command these parallel political
101 “De Manaos a Brasilia” (Clarín 30-07-1999).
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operations, although usually such operations were kept at the domestic level. Parallel 
international diplomacy seemed a higher step, but this time such step was taken.
Kohan bypassed foreign minister Di Telia and called Lampreia by phone. On 
Wednesday evening, on route to the USA, he communicated to the Brazilian minister 
that Menem had decided to exclude Brazil from the scope of Resolution 911. They 
subsequently agreed that next day the stop from New Orleans to Buenos Aires would be 
done in Brasilia instead of Manaos, so as to allow for a presidential meeting. 
Notwithstanding his previous warnings against Menem’s visiting Brazil under the current 
conditions, Lampreia diplomatically accepted the unexpected decision. Also Di Telia, 
who had stayed in Buenos Aires, had to come to terms with the fa it  accompli, although 
not only was he skipped but also his substantive plans had been changed. In his view, the 
conditions accorded by Kohan were closer to capitulation than to negotiation. However, 
he called in his associates and decided to adapt his strategy to the new situation, 
preparing to travel to Brasilia the following day.
On Wednesday, Di Telia, Guadagni and Peña arrived from Buenos Aires and met 
with Lampreia before the arrival of Menem. The climate was tense. The Argentines 
informed about the lifting of safeguards against Brazil and asked for special treatment 
given the exceptional situation brought about by the devaluation, but Lampreia showed 
little concern. Instead, he claimed that Argentine had “crossed the red line” and 
reaffirmed that Mercosur would be destroyed if the decision were kept. Later on, the 
foreign ministers participated in the presidents’ meeting, and Lampreia repeated his 
vigorous complaints before Menem and asked for a written document, to which request 
Menem responded that his word was sufficient guarantee. In this opportunity, President 
Cardoso mediated in the argument and sided with his Argentine counterpart to ease the 
debate.102 At the end of the day, both presidents appeared together for the picture and 
their foreign ministers gave details o f the agreement to the press.
The efforts o f the Argentine diplomacy calmed down the Brazilian government, 
but they were not enough to avoid an unwelcome interpretation. On Friday, the 
newspapers in Buenos Aires considered that Argentina had given up, entitling 
“Argentina cedió y bajó la tension en el Mercosur”103 Argentine officials made their
102 “Entretelones de un día muy agitado. El palo y la zanahoria” (Clarín 31-07-1999).
103 Clarín 30-07-1999.
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best to counter such a view, but their efforts were not rewarded. Eventually, when the 
following extraordinary meeting of the CMC took place a few days later in Montevideo, 
Menem had already issued Resolution 955 exempting Mercosur countries from the 
effects o f Resolution 911.
In the episode just related, Menem affirmed his supremacy vis-à-vis the cabinet 
and the diplomacy. Under his personal supervision, his man o f confidence skipped both 
the political and bureaucratic line in order to arrange a meeting with the Brazilian 
president - a  meeting that, incidentally, also went against the explicit wish of the Brazilian 
foreign minister. Presidents alone thus proceeded to settle the dispute. When asked the 
reasons why Di Telia accepted Kohan’s parallel diplomacy without a complaint, a chief 
Argentine official replied -off the record—  that Di Telia was ready to accept any 
conditions so as to stay in office. Therefore, he once more accommodated to a 
presidential fait accompli, as he always had.
As Moretti (2000) underlines, the condition that allowed Menem to stop at 
Brasilia was the previous decision to withdraw Resolution 911. He would pay a domestic 
cost for such a decision, as the industrial sector and most congressional groups were 
demanding for more, not less protection against the Brazilian ‘menace.’ But, advised by 
Jorge Campbell, he decided to prioritize Mercosur over any transitory domestic issues, 
and he held the political resources to act in conformity.
Conclusion
The three cases analyzed above show the extent to which presidential 
intervention boosted the process o f integration and shaped its outcome, by acting not 
only as decision-makers but also as dispute-settlers. The presidents were perceived as 
efficient problem solvers because they had popular legitimacy and the determination to 
intervene, but the tasks they performed were not merely based on charismatic leadership 
but on institutional capabilities. In order to negotiate and secure agreements with their 
counterparts, Menem, De la Rua, Franco and Cardoso made extensive use of the 
attributions that the Constitutions and the law granted them.
There are additional reasons that explain the large room for maneuver that the 
presidents enjoyed. Among them, the tradition of executive supremacy in domestic 
politics was not lesser. A second cause was the feeble institutionalization of Mercosur, 
which featured neither veto points nor veto players that could either make the necessary
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decisions or block the presidents’ intervention. Finally, the absence or weakness of 
relevant social actors claiming for enhanced participation facilitated the predominance of 
presidential decisions.
State-led -presidentially driven— integration was a homogeneous feature o f 
Mercosur dynamics, as the low level of involvement of business organizations was 
similar in all four members -especially in Argentina and Brazil (Schneider 2001). It was 
already said that such a fact diverged from expected theoretical outcomes, since both 
liberal intergovemmentalism and neotransactionalism predicted governmental action as a 
• result of sectoral or functional demands. In Mercosur, the evolution of business 
involvement in the integration process also diverged from other Latin American paths 
towards regionalization. Schneider (2001) demonstrates that both Chilean and Mexican 
business organizations took a much more active part in fostering and shaping open 
regionalism than their equivalents did in Argentina and Brazil. The absence of 
businesspeople and business associations in the process -even when they were invited to 
participate (Schneider 2001)—  did little to curtail the power held by the presidents. On 
the contrary, 'Ha escasa participación del sector privado en la estructura institucional 
derivó en que su presencia se dio a través de las presiones ejercidas sobre los 
negociadores nacionales, antes que en form a orgànica” (Redrado 1999: 3). Informal 
lobbying through direct executive agents was thus another relevant factor to account for 
executive supremacy.
Some believe that Mercosur troubles do not stem from the integration process 
itself but from the recurring crises of its member countries. Therefore, a stronger 
institutionalization would not have solved such troubles; instead, it may have accentuated 
them by adding institutional discredit to enduring ineffectiveness (Pereira 2000). To 
accomplish a common market might require stronger institutions, but until 2000 the 
customs union seemed not to need them. However, by 1999 there was a growing 
awareness of the overwhelming position reached by the presidents, what ignited public 
reflections on the issue. In 1999, former Uruguayan president Lacalle stated that the 
Mercosur secretariat should be reinforced in order not to erode the presidents’ image.104
104 “Mercosur: Lacalle pide no desgastar la imagen de los presidentes*’ (El Observador 03-08-1999). The 
reason for Lacalle to protect the presidential image was not to diminish presidential power but to 
preserve it for crucial issues. Coherently, he later advocated the direct effect of regional normative in 
order to increase the power of regional -executive— decisions vis-à-vis domestic institutional actors -  
such as the Congress (Lacalle 2001).
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In 2000, Chilean president Ricardo Lagos was even more explicit: “Cuando hay 
dificultades entre nuestros países la política del teléfono presidencial no funciona. No 
es posible que los presidentes se agarren a telefonazos para resolver los conflictos.” 105 
It might have been undesirable, but it was certainly possible. And, above all, it was 
accepted and stimulated by the presidents of the larger partners.
In January 2000, the Brazilian government created, within the executive 
jurisdiction, the office of Embaixador Especial para o Mercosul, appointing ambassador 
José Botafogo Gonçalves for the post. The intention was to demonstrate the priority 
Mercosur had in the agenda of the Cardoso administration, in order to reassure the other 
partners that unilateral decision-making -such as the devaluation— had been a 
consequence of market pressures, not o f the government preferences. Up to that 
moment, it was the foreign ministry’s undersecretary of Assuntos de ïntegraçâo 
Económica e de Comercio, ambassador Alfredo Graça Lima, who had conducted the 
Brazilian commercial coordination within Mercosur (Costa Lima 2000: 18). Since 2000, 
he would be in charge of the bloc’s external negotiations. Graça Lima (2000) makes 
clear the institutional location o f Botafogo’s office: “é um órgáo da presidencia da 
república, está fora da estrutura do Ministério de Relaçôes Exteriores,” what meant 
that even in the country with the most professional diplomacy the president decided to 
keep direct command in what regarded Mercosur.
105 “El Mercosur tiene que integrarse en serio” (Ricardo Lagos in Clarín 14-05-2000).
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CONCLUSION
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C H A P TE R  11
R E G IO N A L  IN TE G R A TIO N , P R E S ID E N T IA L IS M  A N D  M E R C O S U R
Description of a process
The creation and performance of Mercosur have been studied in different lights 
and from a variety of approaches. A number of works have been produced, alternatively 
focusing on civil society and Mercosur working groups (Grandi and Bizzozero 1997; 
Bulow and Fonseca 2000), social actors and interest groups (Vigevani 1998; Sajem 
1999), political parties and the Joint Parliamentary Commission (Medeiros 2000b; 
Vigevani et al. 2000; Vazquez 2000; Caetano and Perina 2000), and so forth. Few of 
them would deny the substantial role played by the national executives on Mercosur 
proceedings; most of them, however, just overlooked it by the expedient of either 
concentrating on marginal processes or emphasizing secondary players. Some of these 
analyses, I contend, were led by wishful thinking, namely the hope to overcome the 
alleged democratic deficit through increasing social participation and/or promoting an 
institutionalizing process alia European Union. Still and all, as this research is intended 
to show, the operation of Mercosur is different from the expectations or desires of most 
observers -and even protagonists.
As successor to the Argentine-Brazilian rapprochement, Mercosur was impelled 
by convergent national interests. Unlike the European Union, it has not created a base 
for common regional interests, as it lacks a common budget and, therefore, can neither 
finance common policies nor allocate resources. However, it has established a customs 
union, its figures regarding intra-regional trade have tripled whilst extra-regional trade 
has also increased, and its development attracted both third states and business attention 
that rapidly translated into important amounts of foreign investment. Despite the 
progress Mercosur has shown in a decade, its member countries have not felt the need to 
build up the institutional structure, originally crafted as intergovernmental and minimal 
Nevertheless, significant decisions were made and critical conflicts were solved along the 
1990s. Behind every one of them was the intervention of the chief national executives.
The first moves toward regional integration in the Southern Cone were fueled by 
geopolitical -i.e. defense coordination, nuclear security—  as well as domestic-political -  
i.e. consolidation of democracy— reasons. Economic reasons also were certainly 
present, but they were not the driving force. Hence, political actors enjoyed a larger
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room of maneuver than they did in other regional contexts, as they faced no social or 
economic balancing counterparts. The supremacy of politics notwithstanding, a 
distinctive feature o f Mercosur is that political parties were not among the significant 
political actors. Instead, it was the national governments that directed the process. They 
did so through the national presidents, whose decisions were mostly independent of the 
respective congresses, cabinets, parties and civil societies. In 2000, a working group 
comprised of prominent diplomats and representatives of Argentina and Brazil issued a 
document assessing the state o f the relationship between the two countries. They 
concluded that ‘7a construcción gradual, a partir de 1986, de una alianza estratégica 
entre las dos naciones, ha sido el producto de una fuerte voluntad política, liderada por  
una activa diplomacia presidencial que ha interpretado corrientes profundas que 
operan en la realidad internacional, los propios intereses nacionales de cada uno de 
los países, y  una opinión pública favorable al entendimiento recíproco” (D’Alessandro, 
Peña, Subiza, Lafer, Teixeira da Costa and Thompson Flores 2000). In other words, 
Mercosur was not in the nature of things: in spite of the mentioned international forces 
and domestic interests, its construction was a product of direct presidential intervention.
Chapter 9 reviewed the evolution of Mercosur through the analysis of the grand 
bargains that ended up in the key treaties. In turn, chapter 10 examined the processes o f 
decision-making and dispute-settlement in three representative areas or events. Both 
chapters showed that the same mechanisms whereby Mercosur was brought to life kept 
operating thereafter, thus becoming a permanent characteristic o f the region. These 
mechanisms were not only different from the European Union’s, but rather opposite — 
allegations of institutional mimetism (Medeiros 2000b) or replication (González-Oldekop 
1997) notwithstanding. The main difference has to do with the nature of the societal 
contract: while the EU has built a triadic structure that includes some kind o f authority 
supra-partes, Mercosur has not moved beyond a dyadic structure. This is so even though 
four -not two— members formally integrate the bloc, and that a specific mechanism was 
instituted in order to settle controversies between the partners.
Stone Sweet has pointed out that, “in dyads, conflict can be debilitating, but 
conflict is constitutive of the triad” (Stone Sweet 1999: 150). As a consequence of this 
understanding, “dispute resolution, the cornerstone o f diplomacy, is being gradually 
substituted [worldwide] by juridical processes under the regulatory and legislative 
dimensions of international law creation” (Weiler and Mo toe 2000). In Mercosur,
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however, triadic dispute resolution (e.g. ad hoc arbitrage) has rarely been called into 
play,106 and dyadic proceedings have become the rule. Therefore, conflict has never been 
formally institutionalized as a constitutive part of the process.
As Mercosur has no community law but integration law, every decision made at 
the regional level should be internalized through domestic procedures in order to come 
into force -thus becoming national rather than communitarian. Likewise, the absence of a 
supranational tribunal allowed national courts to keep a strong grip on the evolution of 
regional jurisprudence (Oviedo 1998).107 No underground spillover such as the one 
described by Weiler (1994b) as a consequence o f supranational judicial activism has 
therefore taken place. Despite the frequent disputes, a litigation spirit never managed to 
permeate Mercosur; and neither did private conciliation.
The absence of spillover could have been compensated by either spillaround -  
fostered by increasing activity of transnational transactors—  or buildup -driven by 
governmental efforts at the expansion of regional institutions. Neither occurred. Instead, 
progress toward completing the customs union and the multiplication of trade and 
investment flows was accompanied by little institutional development, whereas the 
frequent crises did not set off a spillback but rather a retrenchment around the core 
countries: Argentina and Brazil.
The disclosure of Mercosur working mechanisms
The procedures through which Mercosur was built and actually operated were
informal, bilateral, politicized, and executive-driven. In short, they were interpresidential. 
They were informal because Mercosur treaties and protocols established formal 
procedures (i.e. intervention by the Trade Commission, CMC meetings, calling of an ad- 
hoc Tribunal) that did not contemplate direct presidential intervention. They were 
bilateral because Argentina and Brazil would systematically strike an agreement before
106 The dispute settlement procedure established by the Protocol of Brasilia was activated only five times 
in a decade: twice in 1999, once in 2000 and twice in 2001 (http://www.mercosur.org.uv, accessed 
October 14, 2002). In contrast, the European Court issued 349 rulings only along its first decade, 
running between 1953 and 1963 (http://curia.eu.int/common/recdoc/indexaz/en/cl.htm, accessed 
October 14, 2002).
107 In 2001, the Brazilian press reported that, having to decide between the jurisdiction of the Brazilian 
legislation and the one established by either Mercosur or related bilateral treaties, the Supremo Tribunal 
Federal do Brasil (STF) and the Superior Tribunal de Justiga (STJ) gave precedence to the latter in just 
two cases out of 30. In addition, it should be noted that the author of one of those two cases was Paulo 
Costa Leite, at the same time president of the STF (“Juizes do Mercosul debatem legisla;ao”, Valor 
Econdmico 27-06-2001),
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calling in Paraguay and Uruguay -unanimity rule notwithstanding. They were politicized 
because governments negotiated neither on technical grounds nor through institutional 
channels, but instead they went forward through presidential diplomacy. And they were 
executive-driven because domestic institutions were backing presidential diplomacy, thus 
providing both legitimacy and efficacy-improvement tools to presidential involvement.
Many hypotheses may be brought to fore to account for Mercosur success with 
scarce institutionalization. Among the classical ones are the insufficient demand for 
institutions rooted in the low level of interdependence, the small number of member 
countries and the imbalance of power created by the Brazilian outweighing of the other 
members. These hypotheses might explain the scarce institutionalization, but they can 
hardly illuminate the actual provision of decision-making and dispute-settlement that was 
present in Mercosur and turned out to be necessary to keep it working. Indeed, the 
national executives provided decisions -leadership— rather than rules -common 
institutions—  to the project. To act differently would have resulted in relinquishing 
presidential power.
Direct presidential intervention became an all-pervading thrust whenever the 
Mercosur machinery needed. The presidents were perceived as trustworthy brokers and 
guarantors as long as they enjoyed popular support and faced no significant veto players 
in the domestic arena -given their institutional position. In countries where leadership 
had been traditionally stronger than formal institutions, the presidents of the new 
democracies appeared to combine the better of the two worlds: robust leadership with 
simple, straightforward institutional design. The most important veto player that the 
Argentine and Brazilian presidents confronted was defined by the federal organization of 
both countries, but the presidents usually managed to handle emerging troubles by means 
of their control over the federal budget -even though the Brazilian states enjoy greater 
financial autonomy than the Argentine provinces. If, until mid-80s, the literature 
considered that those presidents who lacked Congressional support were deemed either 
to blockade or downfall -the latter meaning democratic breakdown—, between 1985 and 
2000 democratic stability -entailing a fixed presidential term— ensure that presidents 
kept their office regardless of congressional support. Their reduced dependence on a 
majoritarian legislative coalition endowed the presidents with greater political autonomy.
The working relationship established between the presidents gave rise to a win- 
win dynamics based on a divide-the-difference basis, which especially involved the larger
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member states. This dynamics is usually deemed as having worked satisfactorily along 
the first years o f Mercosur, but some authors consider that it lost leverage and even 
became counterproductive after 1998. Bouzas has called this phenomenon the 
politicization bias, which turn from positive to negative was arguably one of the causes 
for the crisis o f Mercosur (Bouzas 2001). A different argument, supported by key 
Mercosur negotiators (Caputo 1999; Cozendey 2000), states that an early 
institutionalization may have had even worse counterproductive effects -a s  those 
underwent by the Andean experience.
The different meanings of politicization were analyzed in previous chapters. 
Whereas the mainstream theories of regional integration politicization conceived it of as 
opposed to technical management -regional institutions being an intermediary between 
them—, interpresidentialism depicts it as an alternative to institutionalized proceedings. 
The relation between politicization and technical management is therefore not mediated, 
and the latter remains subject to the former without developing any autonomous margin. 
Furthermore, neither social actors -as in neotransactionalism—  nor wide national elites -  
as in liberal intergovemmentalism— but specifically the top executives are responsible 
for the initiation and operation of the process, which undergoes no significant feedback 
effect (see Table 11.1).
. . Table 11.1
Theoretical uses and working mechanisms o
Theory
Neo­
transactionalism
Liberal inter­
governmental ism
Inter­
presidentialism
Context
EU
EU
Mercosur
Mechanisms
Politicization [a] Institutionalization Technical
Management
Jioa.
Politicization [b] Institutionalization
Politicization [c]
Technical
Management
-> Technical ___ fHH> Institutionalization
Management
[a] By social actors, around special interests
[b] By elites, around national economic interests
[c]-By presidents, around national political interests 
 ► Causal effect
*. pee(jback effect
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It is worth comparing the operation of Mercosur with the two regions against 
which it is usually weighed. The European Union is “a consensus seeking system based 
on rational deliberation, appeals to evidence, and suasion strategies. These strategies are 
even hardwired into formal voting rules, especially in areas where unanimity is required. 
Unanimity voting provides the procedural guarantee of the Pareto principle, assuring that 
no change takes place if even one actor opposes a new legislation” (Caporaso 1998: 
347). Following Caporaso, status quo is expected to be the most likely outcome of the 
EU highly institutionalized procedures. And still, the EU has evolved and continues to do 
so. In turn, the Andean Community has reformed its proceedings from previously 
supranational features in favor of a more intergovernmental and politicized profile. Cruz 
Vilaga (1999: 432) argues that “e patente na reforma andina a preocupagao de reforjar 
a iniciativa política na condugáo do processo, através do reforgo do papel dos 
chanceleres e, sobretudo, da intervengáo regular e institucionalizada dos presidentes.” 
Consequently, the role of the Andean judicial system has resulted undermined by the 
reform -as well as by sub-utilization. The transformation of the CAN, alike the EU, was 
the consequence of political decisions and not of any kind of spillover. Furthermore, it 
seems to be routed towards interpresidentialism.
Between 1985 and 2000, Mercosur resembled the last stage of CAN. It featured, 
as Moretti (1999) put it, “una superutilización de las instancias políticas y una 
subutilización de la instancia a r b i t r a l In his view, “se trata no tanto de una 
deficiencia institucional sino de una insuficiente utilización de las instituciones que 
hay.” The conclusion is that the frequent complaints about the institutional deficit miss 
the point, as the real deficit is, if something, normative (Redrado 1999). 
Interpresidentialism became the routine mechanism as it provided a substantial, 
institutional locus for Mercosur to operate.
The impact of presidentialism over the effective performance of Mercosur goes 
beyond the materialization o f direct presidential intervention, executive-legislative 
relations or presidential control over the diplomacy. There are additional indicators that 
reveal clear differences from the way that parliamentary democracies would have worked 
out political negotiations and emerging problems. First, cabinet ministers were often 
impotent to authoritatively settle disputes or make binding decisions on key issues, as 
their decisions -and their positions itself— unconditionally depended on the presidential 
approval. Second, the presidents frequently entrusted negotiators in whom they confided
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regardless of their governmental position, and independent of the party or coalition that 
supported the chief executive. The political and economic turmoil that shook many Latin 
American countries and their presidential democracies since the 90s raises the question 
whether interpresidentialism is likely to last or change, as it accommodates to the new 
phenomenon of unstable governments within stable political regimes.
Perspectives for further developments
Following Bulmer-Thomas (1998), it can be said that the success of a regional
agreement depends on its capacity to fulfil its goals, which may be variable. Therefore, 
there is not a unique way to evaluate integration, as each case creates its own yardsticks. 
According to the objectives established by its founding treaties, after 15 years of 
integration efforts Mercosur had achieved a reasonable degree of success. Its 
performance is even more remarkable when compared to previous and contemporary 
Latin American experiences. A successful outcome was far from granted, and the 
procedures whereby it was attained were unexpected.
A low number of key member countries, democratic stability and the presidential 
format o f the national executives became the non-economic backbone o f Mercosur. It 
developed a new sort of “interpresidential” integration that departed from the European 
experience as much as from mainstream theorization. Liberal intergovernmental 
approaches could explain certain features, but they fall short of accounting for the 
autonomy of the national executives -vis-à-vis domestic interests— that eventually 
brought about not-demanded integration. Likewise, neo-transactional approaches may 
help to understand some sectoral processes, but they fail to shed light on how integration 
proceeded in an environment where protectionist interests widely prevailed over 
transnational transactions -and that conspicuously lacked any kind of supranational 
brokers. Rather, Mercosur became a case o f supply-side integration, the presidents being 
the core suppliers (Malamud 2002; Perales 2003).
Weaver and Rockman find that a given government’s capabilities are an outcome 
of the fit among three factors: “the nature of its policy challenges, its institutional 
arrangements, and the conditions that facilitate and limit institutional effects” (Weaver 
and Rockman 1993a: 40). In Mercosur, the integration endeavor (policy challenge) 
found unanticipated support on the coupling between concentrationist presidentialism 
(institutional arrangement) and activist presidents (condition). It is true that some
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analysts regard presidentialism as a potential obstacle for the advance of the process. 
According to Hirst, Mercosur may face drawbacks precisely because its member 
countries are “democracias presidencialistas, ñas quais as simpatías e os humores dos 
respectivos mandatarios correspondem a urna variável interveniente em qualquer tipo 
de iniciativa govemamentar (Hirst 1995: 194). However, it is hard to see how four 
parliamentary democracies could have scored better. In any event, the evidence shows 
that, between 1985 and 2000, interpresidentialism fostered integration instead of 
hindering it -in  spite of the turbulences manifested over the last years of this period.
In the EU, parliament ary-shaped politicians built up an intergovernmental 
supreme body (the European Council) to be sided with the common, supranational 
organs (the Commission, the Parliament and the Court). Whereas the former makes the 
decisions that determine the nature and scope of the polity -in a state-like manner— , the 
latter rules over day-to-day politics and only exceptionally concurs to modify the 
“constitutional” structure of the EU. Hence, the roles o f supreme authority and daily 
administration are kept separated, as they usually are in semi-parliamentary systems such 
as the French. In contrast, a presidentialist format does not consent to the separation of 
roles between chief of state and chief of government. The indivisibility of the chief 
executive in Mercosur’s domestic polities has pervaded regional politics: either each 
president makes the decisions himself or his aides —accountable only to him— do. The 
constitutional restriction for the presidents to either share or delegate his responsibility as 
chief executives transcended the national borders, becoming a constraint for regional 
decision-making. In Mercosur, supranational delegation would not only require national 
cession of sovereignty but also executive cession of constitutional powers. Hence, 
supranationalism and presidentialism appear as an institutional contradiction.
The impact of domestic politics upon regional integration has been extensively 
studied in the European case, and some conclusions may also fit Mercosur. Risse- 
Kappen stated that “the more fragmented and decentralized the political institutions, the 
stronger the organization of societal interest representation, and the greater the 
consensus requirements in state-society relations, the less capable are national 
governments to pursue independent and autonomous policies on the EU lever  (Risse- 
Kappen 1996: 64, emphasis added). Mutatis mutandi, in Mercosur the high 
concentration of power in hands of the chief executives turned them more capable of 
pursuing their autonomous policies at the regional level. Furthermore, not just the
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Tinstitutional dimension but also the other two assessed by Risse-Kappen -weakness of 
societal interest representation and little demand for consensual politics— have rendered 
Mercosur executives more autonomous regarding both vested interests and non­
executive veto players.
Regional integration in the Southern Cone took off simultaneously with 
democratic transition and economic reform, presidential institutions remaining a constant 
along all these processes. It has been said, regarding the influence of neoliberal populism 
on the launching o f market reform under democracy, that “a brilliant solution for an 
immediate problem... may turn into a birth defect” (Weyland 1999: 398). A similar 
wariness should encourage further research as to the unfolding relationship between 
presidentialism and integration. If and when Mercosur is to  build stronger regional 
institutions, its architects will have to carefully take into account the member countries 
regime type. Whereas parliamentary European countries have given birth to a much less 
parliamentary-like European Union, Mercosur may probably resemble its national 
political institutions, especially concerning presidentialism and federalism. It is also likely 
to remain attached to domestic actors such as the presidents themselves, the 
states/provinces, and the courts o f justice. The so-called democratic deficit will hardly be 
bridged through the creation and empowerment of a regional parliament, since authority 
and legitimacy, in presidential systems, do not emerge from -and  are not accountable 
to— the legislative assembly.
The future profile of Mercosur rests on some key political decisions, of which 
Peña underlines four: the definition o f economic preferences under a multiple-speed, 
variable-geometry shape; the establishment of collective disciplines that refrain unilateral 
behavior; the improvement of the dispute settlement mechanisms; and the nurturing of a 
climate of mutual confidence among the partners as well as among them and third 
countries.108 To accomplish these goals, increasing delegation to non-politicized agencies 
may become convenient -and even unavoidable. Excessive politicization may prove 
counterproductive and lead to the reversal of integration, especially in the case of 
continuous domestic turmoil. But, if failure is to be prevented, those who decide over the 
areas, level and nature of future delegation should not neglect the interpresidential 
dynamics of Mercosur.
I0S Peña Félix, “A dilui?ao dos sucessos político-económicos obtidos com o Mercosul nao é 
recomendável” {Valor Económico 09-10-2002).
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